THE MEDIATED TRANSITION: MASS MEDIA AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

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Abstract:

This study examines the role of mass media in the process of how individuals in countries transitioning to democracy orient themselves to the new political, economic, and social realities. I use data from the mid-1990's in Central and Eastern Europe to inform us on the following questions: How do citizens of democratizing countries use media? Do individuals' patterns of information-seeking and/or distraction-seeking affect their political attitudes and economic evaluations? Have international media contributed to democratization? Finally, I posit a multi-level process that places the individual-level findings within in the context of countries' media institutional reform process. I find that mass media affect individuals independently; and in conjunction with their socio-economic and socio-political predispositions, advantaging some groups and disadvantaging others in the socialization process. Secondly, the observed individuals-level effects are related to the degree of media institutional reform in their country. As such, these findings make a strong case for including mass media in our understanding of the process of political socialization in countries transitioning to democracy and that mass media in democratizing countries play a role unlike their western counterparts.

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Contents:

Chapter	Title	Page
1.	*Introduction*..	1
2.	*Literature Review*..	27
3.	*Theory*...	43
4.	*Methodology*..	82
5.	*Reading, Watching, and Listening: Medium and Frequency*.......	98
6.	*You are What You Watch: Content*...	136
7.	*The Diffusion Hypothesis: Broadcasting Democracy*.................	176
8.	*Media Institutional Reform and Political Socialization: A Multi-level Argument*...	221
9.	*Conclusion*..	275
	Bibliography...	297

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Chapter 1: Introduction

"[It had] … *become evident that the media were a more important component of the political process than parties and the electoral systems, and likely to remain so*" Eric Hobsbawm (1996, 581).

Political communication studies have demonstrated that in modern democracies, mass media influence citizens' political perceptions and attitudes by cultivating a means to perceive the way the world works and their role in it (Bartels 1988, 1993; Blumler and Gurevitch 1995; Brody 1991; Dalton *et al.*1998; DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1982; Entman 1989b; Fallows 1996; Fan 1988; Iyengar 1994; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982; Lerner 1958; McCombs and Shaw 1972; McQuail 1987; Newton 1999; Page and Shapiro 1992; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987; Patterson 1980; Patterson and McClure 1976; Putnam 2000; Pye 1963; Schmitt-Beck 2003; Zaller 1992, 1996). Central to these studies is the normative underpinning that mass media serve as a powerful resource for citizens of a democracy by providing information, exposing individuals to a wider range of experiences beyond their immediate worlds, and by providing an arena for public debate (Kinder 1998, 168-9). And while some have argued for these advantageous aspects of mass media (Bartels 1993; Dalton 1994; Franklin 1994; Norris 1997; Schmitt-Beck 2001), more recent studies have suggested that media consumption inhibits the interaction of individuals, alienating them, which in turn can foster apathy, distrust, and even political disengagement (Fallows 1996; Ferrarotti 1988; Putnam 2000) or 'malaise' (Newton 1999).[1] These newer studies are in stark contrast to the optimistic normative assumptions of media's influence on citizens of democracies and their contribution to the proper functioning of democracy.

[1] 'Malaise' comes from Robinson 1976 ('video-malaise') and was revisited by Newton (using his term: 'media-malaise'). It refers to a general disengagement from social and political interaction.

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This study examines the effects of mass media on individuals' political attitudes and economic evaluations in countries transitioning to democracy. Scholars have been interested in understanding the process of political socialization that individuals have undergone during the rapid political, economic, and social transition in Central and Eastern Europe in the past decade. The general consensus is that learning new political and economic attitudes is limited to the influence of socio-economic variables and other individual-level attributes and/or direct participation in new political and economic order. I seek to contribute to this understanding by arguing that *observation* of the new order, that is, an indirect or mediated presentation provides many learning opportunities. Yet, the guiding theoretical framework of the study of mass media has limited export to non-Western regions.

While the study of mass media is not new, the study of mass media in transitional democracies is. This study increases the number of bridges between political science and mass media, expanding the work of political communication. However, as one scholar notes,

> *"[S]tudies of post-communist societies have generated an interesting corpus of works and a passionate field for theoretical debates…[however,] we have to recognize that nothing essentially has happened in media theory: no new theory, no new concepts, no new patterns emerged from the media's evolution in these countries"* (Coman 2000, 35).

Coman cites three reasons why this maybe be so (*ibid.*): in the rapid transitional phase, events often overtook analysis; there has been a general lack of information about these processes; and finally, the difficulty associated with analyzing and ultimately theorizing across the multi-country region. This inquiry seeks to address these concerns arguing that in our haste, scholars of democratization have not revisited this period of

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democratization beyond the brief frenzy of analyses in the mid to late 1990's, often forgoing examinations beyond the expected. Secondly, while there is a dearth of information (or more exactly, data), data do exist and can be rigorously examined to inform us on these processes. Finally, the variation at the national level creates opportunities to examine the similarities among and disparities between countries undergoing democratization that differ in identifiable and theoretically interesting ways. Or as Randall has put it (1998, 3, italics in the original), "[n]otwithstanding these analytical difficulties, we can none the less ask in what ways it has been suggested that the media *could* contribute to democracy and democratization."

Therefore, this study will test theories of media influence on individuals' political attitudes relevant to issues of transition to democracy and consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Using a set of cross-national surveys,[2] this inquiry will unpack the dynamic effects that media have on new democrats' political attitudes and egocentric and sociotropic economic evaluations. As democratic theorists have long espoused the virtues of a plural, free press in democracies; we can now begin to understand the realized role of media's impact on new democrats during periods of democratization. For the citizens of the new democracies of CEE, their rapid process of forming new values, attitudes, and behaviors has been subject to many influences. It is not unreasonable to argue that by shaping individuals' understanding of the world and their place in it, one powerful influence is mass media, especially during times of social and political change (Ball-Rokeach and DeFluer, 1976). This study is able to confront some of these concerns by examining these events after the 'dust has settled' with the new availability of cross-national surveys.

[2] Intermedia Surveys in Eastern Europe, 1996-2002

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Therefore, before scholars embark on examining specific individual-level media effects, such as the effects of political advertising or variation across audio and video components of presentations, they should first inquire as to the nature of broad media differences in democratizing countries; that is, differences in usage, intensity, and content choice. We should not approach countries undergoing political, economic, and social transitions as simply an increase in an *N* in a media study; but rather, we should be asking how these media effects differ across regions in order to better guide our inquiries and how these limitations change our expectations of media effects.

East vs. West:

While often overlooked, mass media are uniquely positioned to contribute to (or detract from) citizens' socialization to new political norms in countries transitioning to democracy. This inquiry is important as the proliferation, pluralization, and liberalization of mass media in democratizing countries are poised to make a significant contribution to individuals' learning of new social and political orientations by way of providing a means to understand the changes and new social and political realities. The study of mass media in CEE expands the regions in which we can reliably and validly examine these phenomena, test our theories, and even generate new bodies of knowledge about media. This is good news as existing theory may be limited.

In advanced industrial democracies (AID's), mass media have been recognized as salient components of individuals' political orientation, engagement, and understanding. As media studies have been almost exclusively limited to advanced industrial democracies, expanding research beyond these borders contributes to our understanding of how media's influence works. As nearly the entire corpus of media theory has been

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generated in the West, the implicit assumptions on which they are predicated suggest that they may provide little theoretical guidance in understanding mass media and democratization.

Separating Western-based media theory from a theory of media and democratization are the two central units of analysis in most media studies. For the citizens of CEE, they do not have the relationship with mass media that those in the West have had. The abrupt introduction of market-based, non-state dominated media does not resemble the West's gradual and evolutionary relationship with mass media. Given the chaotic nature of the early periods of transition, the rapid proliferation of media sources, and citizens' seeking to understand these changes, the process of democratization is profoundly different than the stable media presence and political and economic certainty in Western countries.

As other authors have argued, there is an inherent paradox of media in new democracies exists as citizens are unaccustomed to media and their role (see Scammell and Semetko 2000). Simply, citizens of Central and Eastern Europe do not share the long-term and gradually evolving relationship with mass media. Historically subjected to propagated information, limited media selection, and rigidly dominated programming, these citizens' use and therefore receptivity to messages and influences of mass media are is stark contrast to their Western counterparts' unregulated use of commercial and diverse mass media.

Both the senders and the receivers in democratizing countries are not parallels of their western counterparts. Citizens of countries undergoing democratization are not citizens of democracies. New politics, new economics, and a new society place heavy informational demands on citizens. In reorienting themselves from political and economic institutions

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that demanded little more than token participation, citizens were presented with alternatives. These political and economic alternatives saddled them with the burden of seeking information from any resource that explained the choices to be made. Far from habituated media consumption of western citizens, for many, the search was not one of leisure but of survival. In times of democratization, citizens are less likely to be the passive consumers of mass media and are more likely to be consuming media in a fashion that suggest information-seeking.

Comparison between the West and CEE has been problematic as the requirements of citizens are so different (Rose and Shin 2001). Unlike the American and Western European contexts, the rapid proliferation of media has changed the information and entertainment environment significantly and dynamically (Paletz, Jakubowicz, and Novosel 1995). Many Western countries have media cultures that are somewhat similar across consumption habits, orientations to the general dispersion of content, and discretionary time to engage in media use, what they term "capitalistic societies with traditions of media freedom" (Becker 1989, 3). It is not unreasonable to argue therefore that many citizens of democratizing countries remain subject to several influences that shape their political orientation and political action repertoires.

Secondly, during the period of transition, the tumultuous political and economic events undermine any equivalence to the relative certainties enjoyed by Westerners. During transition, and generally unlike citizens of the West, CEE citizens did not posses stable sets of political and economic attitudes. There is little evidence that suggests a smooth exchange of political attitudes. One might say they were in "attitudinal flux". Making sense of the transition was a clear imperative in ambiguous circumstances,

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heightening the need for information (or distraction). Similarly, individuals' process of orienting their values and attitudes to the rapidly mutating political, economic, and social institutions and norms sent them searching for sources from which to do so. These citizens could not rely on comparatively certain political and economic realities and the transitions left many with an uncertainty that most assuredly shaped their adaptation strategies. In contrast to Western citizens' experience with not only democracy but also media as relevant components of modern society, Central and Eastern Europeans are in the process of building these experiences. Thus, citizens of democratization are not citizens of democracies.

Finally, another argument for the problematic expansion or internationalization of media theory is the difficulty in defining market and state sponsored media. For CEE, the pre-transition state's monopoly of power over information, opinion, examination, and even the select appearance of an event or person rendered a skewed perception of the world. The liberalization of mass media institutions and the routing of the state from its dominion over media served to illuminate the power which the former regime wielded via its control of mass media. The surge of media to fill the gaps in the past and present alike took the form of independent television and radio stations, independent newspapers, periodicals, and magazines. The explosion of media institutions, spilling over into the new public and private spheres finds no recent analogy to the West. Simply, the institutions of mass media of democratizing countries are not the institutions of mass media of democracies.

Similarly, while the majority of media effects research (and subsequent theoretical advancement) is generated in the US, the US system of mass media is not a useful metric

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(Downing 1996). Mass media disparities in technological, economic, and even political standards and norms between the US and large parts of the rest of the world (including Western Europe) weaken the external validity of mass media theories and their subsequent hypotheses. Sparks (2000, 45) makes a similar argument that clear divides between commercial and state-run media are easy to make, especially in terms of presenting political alternatives (he uses the examples of US and North Korea, respectively). Yet, what of the BBC, a governmentally funded mass media that remains generally immune to persuasion of 10 Downing Street? Similar to the resulting political institutions of this region, which did not emerge as copies of the American or Western European models of democracy but rather as *sui generi* versions, media institutions have only moved in the western direction.

Exporting theories for rigorous testing in other geo-political regions under different sets of institutional, political, economic, and social circumstances is the only means of generating robust theories of mass media. This inquiry is one of these by addressing not only the individuals' media consumption choices and political attitudes and economic evaluations but also by placing these findings in a larger, cross-national framework that seeks to contextualize the findings in a multi-level model of media institutional reform. It is because these fundamental differences between mature democracies and new ones that we should cease to imagine that we know much of media effects in democratizing countries and hesitate before simply treating them as new cases of an old paradigm.

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Political socialization and mass media:

This project will critically examine the underlying notions of the political socialization approach, particularly as it pertains to the transitions literature. This inquiry goes above and beyond other studies not only by giving us an opportunity to empirically examine media effects on individuals in democratizing countries, but also forces us to re-examine our thinking of how political attitudes are developed in countries in transition. It asks, do individuals require direct political experience with new institutions to acquire new political attitudes or can mediated experience of the process provide not only wider experience with transition but also cultivate the development of democratic political attitudes?

Political scientists have generally accepted the premise that learning new norms, values, and attitudes derives from individuals' interaction with the institutions that affect their lives (Converse 1964; Johnston 1998; Kinder 1998; Rohrschneider 1994, 1996; Searing 1969, 1986; Searing, Wright and Rabinowitz 1976; Verba 1965). Similarly, democratization scholars have sought to explain the origins of individuals' new political attitudes predominantly through exposure to and involvement with new political institutions and personal political experience (Duch and Gibson 1992; Edwards and Foley 1998; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Gibson 1998; Inglehart 1992; Kunioka and Woller 1999; Mishler and Rose 1995, 1997a, 1997b, 2001; Muller and Seligson 1994; Rose 1994; Rose, Haerpfer, and Mishler 2000;).

Within this literature, the study of the process of attitudinal socialization is relevant as appropriate political socialization to new democratic norms has been argued to be an essential contribution to democratic stability and longevity (Almond and Verba 1963;

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Eckstein 1966; Gunther *et al.*1995; Linz and Stepan 1996; Lipset 1963, 1994; Putnam 1993; Schedler 2001). The process of individuals' learning the norms of a new political culture and a new institutional order is the "… internalizing of customs and rules governing political life – [and] is important because it affects the quality of interactions between citizens and their government" (Graber 1993, 204). Yet, while the *need* for new democrats to learn the new norms of democracy is assumed, the *how* remains the more important question.

As Mishler and Rose (2001) have recognized, while the culturalists and institutionalists argue about the relationship between institutions and values, they agree on the fundamental premise that political attitudes are learned, and in some manner, linked to individuals' experience. Verba has argued (1965, 533) that what an individual believes about the political process is learned from observation of that process. Media provide a much wider exposure to significant social and political events, thereby broadening individuals' social and political experience. Therefore, this study challenges transitionologists' thinking about individuals' acquisition of new political attitudes by positing that political attitudes are subject not only to individuals' immediate experience with new political institutions but also through powerful mediated experiences as well.

Mass media have a mediating role between objective social reality and personal experience. They can be called the *intermediaries* of political experience. Like Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer's contribution, this inquiry "…draws its significance from the fact that the media are the main, often the only, source from which citizens learn about politics" (2000, 25). Media's power in ordering the world in such a manner for individuals to consume and even adopt comes from its ability to structure, order, and confer importance

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on events, issues, and even personalities. This notion rests on two key conceptualizations of new media's role in democratic politics.

One of these is the apparent patterning and consistency in the media's portrayal of the world. People's perceptions and interpretation of reality are the foundations for their understanding of the world. Mass media have a *mediating role* between objective social reality and personal experience (McQuail 1987, 52). Symbols and common configurations guide individuals' perceptions and interpretations. These combinations and patterns of symbols define reality in an agreed-upon way, establishing shared meanings within a society. The diffusion of symbols and patterns of symbols as a basis for understanding is crucial to people's ability to develop a meaningful understanding of the world (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1982, 138; Graber 1993). Specifically, mass media provide a means to understand political and social realities by presenting coherent and patterned messages. By simplifying and contextualizing the complex political world, they define what and who are salient features of individuals' perceptions of politics (and in many cases try to provide an answer as to *why* something is happening). Therefore, media's presentation of coherent and patterned messages is a means for viewers to make sense of the complex world of politics (Kinder 1998, 168-9; see also Gross 2002, 52).

Second, they allow for "second hand" involvement in the political developments and increase the number of experiences that are viewable and available for vicarious involvement. Citizens have limited first-hand experience with politics (Schmitt-Beck 1999, 222); and however vicarious or once-removed individuals' experience of political phenomena may be, it is most likely to be the predominant source from which individuals develop political understanding. National and international events and affairs are almost

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single handedly disseminated via media (Mutz 1992, 484; Greenberg 1964). Therefore this study is predicated on media's ability to enhance individuals' firsthand experience and in doing so both directly and indirectly shape individuals' political and economic views.

Individuals' political attitudes do not emerge *de novo.* As mentioned above, both the institutional performance and socialization process of political attitudinal learning are well-entrenched (Finifter 1993, Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1996). Yet, as most individuals' participation and political experience is limited and infrequent, in what other way do these individuals have of learning about democracy? Apropos of the re-orienting and socialization processes required of citizens in transitional countries, media scholars argue media influence is most significant in shaping attitudes as they are forming, less successful at changing them once they have formed. For the heightened state of transition, mass media are a location where the affairs of public life are played out, often the location of developments of culture, and again, the dominant source of definitions and images of social reality (McQuail 1987, 3). Echoing Verba's earlier observation (1965, 533), Zaller explicitly argues that "…citizens learn about matters that are for the most part beyond their immediate experience…" (1992, 40) and often must rely primarily on the media through which this information is available. For countries in traumatic periods of political, social, and economic transition, what institution if better positioned to portray and disseminate the new political *modus vivendi* than media? The multiplication and diversification of media is not simply a matter of providing more media choices to CEE's. Accompanying these changes were the norms of leisure time, shopping patterns

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(via advertising), and information gathering (Casmir 1995).[3] Yet, once again, little is known about the specific contribution that media has made to citizens' development of democratic political attitudes in democratizing nations.

Mass media and democratization theory:

"Existing literature on democratic transition has largely ignored the role of the media in processes of regime change" (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer 2000, 3) and few comparativists have included media as significant independent variables (Schmitt-Beck 1999, 223; see also Newton 1999; Norris 1996) as media studies have largely remained restricted to advanced industrial societies, overwhelmingly the US and Britain (Semetko 1996). This Western-centricity is problematic by limiting both the broader testing of these theories and our understanding of media's role in countries and regions undergoing profound re-orderings of social, economic, and political realities. Related to this inquiry, there have been few studies on mass media effects on individuals' development of political attitudes in new democracies. For the most part, media research in CEE has attended to the complex processes of liberalization and privatization of media institutions (Hester 1991,1992; Gross 2002; Milton 2000; O'Neil 1997, 1998; Paletz 1995; Rogerson 1997; Splichal 1994). In re-thinking the process of attitudinal development in democratizing countries, this study contributes to the development of a theory of media and democrat*ization*.

[3] In an article on the limitation of transplanting Western advertising models in CEE, Rohde and Pellicaan (1995, 151) use the example that when Westerners see an advertisement with Ray Charles drinking a Pepsi Light, in which nothing is said of the cola itself, they see an advertisement for a Pepsi product. However, they make the case that CEE's have little experience with 'diet soft drinks' or 'light soft drinks' and are confounded about what the commercial is attempting to present. For CEE, mass media and the images, sounds, and words they produce fail to parallel their history in the west.

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The theoretical development springs from the unique findings here. The results here suggest distinctive non-Western media consumption patterns among citizens of democratizing states. These citizens' mass media consumption, albeit recognizable, deviate from their Western counterparts' in significant ways that are related to their particular history, that is, their non-western-ness. This distinctiveness modifies the effects we anticipate from these citizens' use of media,[4] effects that have been largely unknown to this point.

This inquiry also finds evidence for media's role in providing second-hand or mediated experiences with the new political, social, and economic realities; that is, an *observational* component to individuals' political socialization process. Citizens draw from media as a means to understand 'far away' or 'large' political and economic phenomena. As the 'distance' of political or economic phenomena from citizens increases, mass media also increase their salience in determining individuals' orientations and ultimately attitudes regarding these phenomena. While more familiar to Western media scholars, this has been overlooked as a relevant component in understanding the political socialization process in democratizing countries.

Finally, the examination of the cross-national variation across media institutional reform lays the groundwork for a developmental argument. At varying levels of media institutional reform, citizens of countries arrayed in an ordinal ranking manifest differing attitudinal responses to mass media, often the same media. Albeit limited by a single time period, the distinctive levels of reform suggest that mass media do *not* exert effects

[4] This study is aimed at the media consumptions of CEE *in general* rather than specific consumption patterns (around elections, or of only political content; Gross 1996; Jakubowicz 1996b; Stefan 1997). These together underline the importance of investigating democratizing countries as new species rather than simply additional cases.

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uniformly in democratizing countries but are linked to the degree of legislative, technological, and political reform of media institutions.

A theory might emerge from the findings that suggest that during transitional periods, given both a proliferation of domestic media and the influx of international media, citizens of these countries are subject to, not only their personal experience with, but also the mediated presentation of transition as sources of attitudinal socialization. Further, if we can accept the propositions that media are an institution of society (some may argue a largely political one) and that media provide a source of cultural values, individuals' evaluations of the performance of political institutions are shaped by the information or distraction provided by mass media. In presenting societies in transition, media may carry both the political values and the criteria through which individuals derive political attitudes. And within a region of democratizing countries, there appear to be developmental 'stages' of media reform that modify the effects of mass media.

Normative theory of media and democracy: An implicit examination

There seem to be two approaches to understanding media's role in these countries. "…[T]he media can play an instrumental role in resocialization and modernization by teaching a new way of participating in politics and socioeconomic life and by encouraging new individual and national aspirations … [and by] help[ing] shape public opinion on *all* matter related to democratization" (Gross 2002, 90). On the other hand, "…in countries with nonexisting or developing party systems, news values or journalistic preferences for personalities and conflict may actually serve to hinder the institutional development of parties and public attachment to them" (Semetko 1996, 279).[5]

[5] For AID's, Dalton and Wattenberg have argued that the changing media environment impacts individuals' perceptions of political parties in government (2000, 278), depriving parties of their role as a source of

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"…*exposure to the media produces apathy, cynicism, fear, trust, acquiescence, and support – moods that condition participation in the political process, which may range from total abstinence to efforts to overthrow the government by force*" (Graber 1993, 236).

Given the change in culture *and* the change in media, the socialization process has been dynamic. Subsequently, if we also accept the simple proposition that the individual-level development of qualities associated with a democratic political culture aids the process of democratization, we can more broadly address the question of whether mass media have helped or hindered the process of democratization. As such, this inquiry forces us to confront the larger, normative question.

The study of how individuals reorient themselves to a new political, economic, and social order has been a mainstay in the study of democratization politics. By examining this aspect of political behavior, this study contributes to our understanding of what promotes democratic stability and longevity. Media scholars are generally aware of media's role in Western societies but can we say that mass media are good for, not democracy, but *democratization*?

Normative democratic theory is predicated on the exchange of ideas by means of a free and plural press. It is through this that media are argued to contribute to the appropriate function of democracy. For countries in the early stages of democratization, we know very little about the contribution of mass media. Democratic theorists have long espoused the virtues of a plural, free press in democracies; but what has been the contribution of media to democratizing countries? The Lippmann/Dewey debate originated in the 1920-30's, and has significant relevance to studies including media in general, and this one in particular. In Lippmann's seminal contribution to the study of

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political information. They further ask if the proliferation of media information, in the form of more channels and programs, provides more information or more distraction (*ibid.*, 280).

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public opinion (1922), he argued that participatory democracy was unachievable as well as undesirable, concluding that democracy should be the sole responsibility of appropriate representatives. He derided the notion of an 'omnicompetent citizen', asserting that media's power in influencing mass publics coupled with their limited interest and knowledge about politics was appropriate only to an elite-dominated governance. Mass publics' opinions simply reflected elite competition as it was disseminated through media ('the 'manufacturing of consent'). In contrast to the 'naïve' adherents of 'participatory democracy', he saw representation and technical expertise as the basis for democratic political order.

Dewey, on the other hand, argued for media as means of public empowerment (1927, Chap. 5), serving as a de facto 'town meeting', facilitating conversation and discussion, and encouraging an exchange of opinions. His view of media was that it served as a contribution to a participatory democracy. His concern however was less of policy expertise than the simple distribution of 'the facts', placing a great deal of this burden on the role of a free press and an active audience. His rebuttals to Lippmann included optimistic assessments of the gradual development of mass publics toward deliberative processes through the proliferation of information, as provided by a free and plural press, and individual-level development, particularly in terms of education (1922, 1925). This debate between Lippmann and Dewey's conceptualizations of the role of media in democratic societies continues today (Dahlgren and Dahlgren and Sparks 1995; Garnhamn 1986; Rorty 1998; Swanson and Mancini 1996). At the core of this normative debate is the role of media as a means of accumulating information and political

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empowerment versus its use as a mechanism of manipulation and popular political neutralization.

Still, the relationship between a democratic society and its media cannot be assumed. The free press theory simply aligns a free and plural press with a free and rational society (McQuail 1987, 113); while the democratic-participant theory requires an audience that is actively involved in political life (*ibid.*, 122). The former reflects Lippmann's conceptualization of media and the latter, Dewey's. Lippmann is less interested in the capabilities of the audience, and much less the inherent variation among them that shapes media's influence. Yet, Dewey is optimistic about the role of media as it corresponds to individuals' level of education, among other individual-level social and economic variations. As these two theories differ as to the variation among audience members, this underscores my interest in examining the linkage between variations in individual socialization and media in democratizing countries. The Lippmann/Dewey debate also serves as a theoretical foundation for this examination. In countries undergoing democratic transition, has the proliferation of new informational sources and a pluralization of voices helped to encourage the development of appropriate democratic attitudes, or not?

Newer discussions argue that democratic politics is based on communication in the form of deliberation and discussion (Barber 1984; Dahl 1989; Fishkin 1991, 1995; Habermas 1989). Yet, even Graber questions 'participatory democracy' as the ideal as the 'marketplace of ideas' does not seem to allow the 'truth to prevail' (2003, 143-4). Western-centric media researchers seem to increasingly approach their subject with some sense of pessimism. Competing media theory suggests that in modern democratic states,

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media have served to imbue citizens with information and also to both cognitively and behaviorally de-mobilize them. In the American context, Putnam has accounted for a pattern of disengagement that is explicitly linked to media exposure, particularly television (2000, chapter 13). Others have similarly warned of media's unhealthy relationship with democracy, citing political apathy, alienation, distrust, cynicism, disillusionment, confusion, and even fear as its by-products (Newton 1999, 579; see also Patterson 1993; Robinson 1973).

This is in stark contrast to the optimistic anticipations of an emerging and pluralized media in new democracies. "The notion of a free press is central to many models of 'democracy', and this new development [the pluralization of the media and the removal of authoritarian censorship] was therefore warmly welcomed" in Eastern Europe (O'Neil 1997, 1). Yet, even among media and political communication scholars, "…the prevailing view … is that the new Eastern European media and their journalism do not represent, are not expressions of, and do not enhance the growth of civil society" (Gross 2002, 145, see also Sparks and Reading 1998; Splichal 1994). Media specialists cite the ironic emergence of a cacophony of cynicism rather than the development of liberated media (Bennett 1998, 196). For CEE, are media the 'watchdogs of democracy' or do they simply 'alert' people (Goidel and Langley 1995, 321-5)? Instead of an information resource, media may serve as a distraction that drowns out the quiet calls for initiative. A free and plural press in Central and Eastern Europe, it seems, is held in both optimistic and pessimistic regard as to its role in democratizing countries.

Normatively, for countries continuing to transition toward democracy, if media are mobilizing and integrative, democracy has benefited. If not, media may not only be

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hindering the process of transition but also undermining the long-term prospects of democracy in this region. Therefore, media's role in shaping new democrats' development of democratic attitudes may, instead of 'leveling the playing field', *reinforce* the developmental disparities between citizens. This can be seen as anathema to the contributory role a free and plural press is assumed to have in a democracy.

Methodological contribution:

As citizens of new democracies have struggled to make sense of the complex social, economic, and political changes that have taken place, mass media (as a widely and cheaply consumed form of political and social communication) are well placed to present these new democrats with the new political and social reality and their role in it. Further, as differing effects can emerge from a single medium, media are examined across several of its dimensions, content, frequency (also called intensity), medium, and source.

Yet, one limitation persists in media studies. It has proven methodologically difficult to determine the strength of mass media's claim to causality in the complex social setting. Current political communication and mass communication research has demonstrated that, whether directly or indirectly, media do influence individuals and their orientations to politics.[6] DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach have argued that although "media do not exist in a vacuum", their effects are far from arbitrary (1982, 234). However, at the core of non-experimental media studies the essential problem of isolating media's claim to causality. It must be stated at the outset that the use of phrases such as 'media influence attitudes' or 'media shape attitudes' is not entirely accurate. This inquiry will not only differentiate

[6] Many studies have focused on media's influence on political behavior, specifically electoral choice (Bartels 1993; Dalton *et al.*1998; Schmitt-Beck 2003; Zaller 1992, 1996). Others have examined how individuals' perception of politics is shaped by media, especially in the news form (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995; Entman 1989; Fallows 1996; Iyengar 1994; Norris 1997; Postman and Powers 1992).

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among the variety of means of media effects (i.e. content, medium, and frequency) but also address the theoretically problematic issue of self-selection. Untangling this causal knot has been an omnipresent obstacle in media studies. By examining the interactive nature of individuals' media consumption patterns and their socio-political predispositions (that is, taking advantage of their interactive nature rather than trying to disentangle them), the substantive impact of media on individuals can be more accurately assessed and properly ascribed to the individuals that use them.

In competition with personal communication and personal experience, mass media struggles for significance. Media consumption correlates with socio-economic variables, often times, very well. Yet, in contrast to simple socio-economic correlations with media usage, Graber points out,

> "*…people who are exposed to the mass media already possess a fund of knowledge and attitudes which they bring to bear on new information. Since we do not know precisely what this information is, nor the rules by which it is combined with incoming information, we cannot pinpoint the exact contribution which mass media make to the individual's cognitions, feelings, and actions*" (1980, 11).

The 'uses and gratifications' literature explicitly addresses this correlation and states simply that people tend to consume media in such a manner that it reflects their social and economic location (Blumler and Katz 1974).[7] To address this long-standing methodological difficulty, this study will model an array of individuals' socio-political predispositions that rather than simply control for heterogeneity among audience members, interact with media consumption patterns to produce a variation of variable salience across the same interacting variables (see Schmitt-Beck 2003). Zaller (1992, chapter 2) was among the first to note the importance of the non-monotonicity among

[7] This also is referred to as 'self-selection' (see Putnam 2000, 218).

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variables in interaction terms, which more accurately captures (and more appropriately ascribes) the relationship among interacting individual-level variables.[8]

As individuals do not uniformly consume or use media or its messages, social location, as defined by individuals' placement in the social structure, suggests heterogeneity between, and homogeneity among, these groups (Zaller 1992; see Sears and Freedman 1967). Like the knowledge gap literature suggests, the differential endowment of groups (in the case of the knowledge gap, education levels) tends to isolate, alienate, and neutralize some while enabling, mobilizing, and engaging others. Media, henceforth, can be seen as a possible cleavage, shaping society by politically stratifying it (Schmitt-Beck 2003, 255-7). For CEE's beginning to learn norms of a democratic political order, the short and frenzied period of transition does not provide them with a wealth of *democratic* political experience that they can draw from; yet, they do possess general socio-political predispositions, or a set of experiences, anticipations, and orientations that potentially mediate the impact of mass media.

Individuals respond according to differing sets of social, economic, psychological, and political orientations (Iyengar and Simon 2000). As Zaller (1992) and Schmitt-Beck (2003) have suggested, socio-political predispositions (as they include social and economic status variables) mediate media' influence. For political scientists, these studies come closest to remedying the 'media effects' issue. By identifying the mediating effect of individual-level qualities rather than simply assuming simplistic or naïve consumption variation among audience members, this idea goes further in eliciting the estimative influence of media. Given these theoretical and methodological concerns, what this study ultimately demonstrates is that various combinations of socio-political predispositions

[8] This topic is taken up in much greater detail in the Theory chapter.

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and media consumption heighten the effect of media while other combinations negate its influence.

This inquiry:

How individuals in countries transitioning to democracy orient themselves to the new political, economic, and social realities has been a mainstay of the study of democratization. This study asserts that the role of mass media is an overlooked part of this political socialization process, and in doing so, this study contributes to our understanding of the democratization process, that is, what promotes democratic stability and longevity.

The bulk of democratization research has resulted in understanding political socialization as a function of individuals' structural location and direct experience with the new political order. This project broadens the answer to this question by arguing that learning new political attitudes is also influenced by individuals' *observation* of the new order, that is, a mediated presentation. Further, if we find support for this, the question then remains: *how* do mass media influence the development of political and economic attitudes.

The question of how media affect individuals' political socialization in new democracies has received little scholarly attention. Despite the several publications on media institutional reform, I think this has gone uninvestigated largely for one reason: a lack of data. Without the means to empirical examine these questions, they have simply gone unasked. Therefore, I use empirical social science methods and historical analysis to inform us on five key questions.

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- How do citizens of democratizing countries use media?
- What effect does making attentive or information-seeking media choices have?
- What effect does making distraction-seeking media choices have?
- Have international media contributed to this process or are domestic media the only, or at least dominant, source of media influence?
- Do the observed effects correlate with cross-national variation in the degree of media institutional reform?

To address the first question, I ask the most basic media question. Which media do citizens of countries in transition use? Do we see the same consumption patterns, media choices, and responses to these choices? Therefore, the first empirical chapter examines the various consumption choices of individuals. How do these individuals use media and how does a choice of radio, newspaper, and/or television correlate with particular political and economic attitudes. This question seeks correlations that provide clues to causation. Does television (radio, newspaper) consumption correlate in ways we expect? And if so, why? And if not, why? These answers to these questions establish that not only are individuals' media usage during periods of democratization different from the west, but also that in many cases media play different roles.

To address the next two questions, I introduce variation in individuals' content choices for television. While a topic of enormous discussion within the western media literature, we must defer to the unknown. During periods of transition, does individuals' consumption of news inform them and cultivate democratic attitudes; that is, does information-seeking aid their understanding of the process of democratization? Conversely, does individuals' consumption of entertainment, that is, distraction-seeking, alienate and isolate them and discourage political engagement in the political changes taking place? This part of the analysis taps a more important question by capturing more specific consumption choices, that is, subtle political behavior in the form of information-

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seeking or distraction-seeking during a time when the demand of learning new political norms is paramount.

The third part addresses a question central to the democratization literature. Beyond domestic media sources, do international sources of media provide a means for individuals to learn new political norms? The diffusion hypothesis suggests that international media, as they are consumed by citizens of countries moving toward democracy, cultivate norms associated with the sending country. In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, western media penetration into the region was not happenstance but a conscious program of competing with the authoritarian regimes. Therefore the question is simply whether international media have maintained their influence, promoting democratic values in countries that are democratizing.

Finally, given the diversity of media institutional reform in the region, we cannot make the assumption that these countries present identical media from which variation at the individual-level would simply be a matter of citizens' choices. Therefore, to address the cross-national variation in media institutional reform, I place these countries reform process in historical context and use an index of legislative measures, the influx of international media, residual political influence, and technological capacity and create a rank ordering of these countries across all of the included media. Given the regional variation in the degree of media institutional reform, I then correlate these rankings with the individual-level findings to determine if the extent of structural disengagement in these countries suggests stages of media's effects on the political socialization process.

Essentially, this is a question of *which* media and *how*. Or stated as a question, do these citizens' media consumption choices translate into political behaviors that

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ultimately shape the political socialization process in countries transitioning to democracy?

The next sections will address the state of the literature regarding political socialization and the role of mass media. I will also present the guiding theory, derive testable hypotheses and set out the methodological basis for this inquiry. The following sections will be theoretically driven, empirical examinations of micro-level and macro-level data that examines the influence of mass media in countries undergoing democratic transition.

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Chapter 2: Literature Review

This section will review the background for this research, define and explain the choice of dependent variables and their place in the larger democratization literature, outline the theoretical contribution of mass media influence on individuals' democratic attitudes,[1] and explain the plausibility of their claim to contribute to our understanding of media's influence on individual political socialization in countries transitioning to democracy.

As this inquiry also more broadly examines media dependency and diffusion in Central and Eastern Europe, it is necessary to provide the reasoning behind media's return to prominence and how we can use the theories of mass communication, political science, and political communication to examine media's influence on new democrats' democratic attitudes. This section develops the idea of media as an important and effective means to political socialization in countries undergoing political, social, and economic upheaval. This inquiry will build on this by incorporating the intervening variables of social and economic location and socio-political predispositions that mediate media's influence providing a clearer theoretical linkage between individuals' media consumption patterns and their subsequent democratic attitudes.

This section will examine the existing literature as it pertains to media's influence on individuals' democratic attitudes in CEE, the theoretical and methodological contributions and limitations, and where this inquiry contributes. At the outset, the most obvious gap is the simple lack of understanding of the influence of media outside of the Western contexts, especially in transitional societies. For Eastern Europeans, their

[1] For simplicity in the writing, the term *democratic attitudes* in this section will include the above described dependent variables (institutional trust, socio-tropic and egocentric economic evaluations). More detailed analysis will be given to each set of attitudes in their respective chapters below.

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transitions to democracy have not taken place in a vacuum but rather have been inundated by international media and witnessed their own media evolve and multiply. Given media's role as a disseminator of culture, particularly one born of a changing political and social order, individuals are likely to draw from it to make sense of the rapid and often confusing changes taking place.

Just as behavioral and institutional theories have been exported to democratizing states, are theories of media and democracy the same as the theories of media and democrat*ization*?[2] The experiences and demands of new and mature democrats differ suggesting that the effects of media may differ as well (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer 2000, 6). This is particularly relevant in Central and Eastern Europe as their experience with politics has largely been one in which the regime discouraged voluntary, independent political action. As an extension of research conducted in Western countries, this inquiry contributes to the fuller understanding of how individuals learn the norms of democracy and the nature of influence mass media have in democratizing countries. Additionally, this inquiry promises to be informative as we have learned that Western theories have not traveled well to CEE. It is an important first step in this line of inquiry, hopefully generating more avenues for future research than simply confirming a single, small answer.

[2] Bennett cites this difficulty calling it the "…elusive general theory of media and democratization" (1998, 196).

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Political Attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe:

Given that this inquiry examines political attitudes and economic evaluations in CEE, what has the broader scholarship contributed to our understanding of political socialization during periods of democratization? During the brief honeymoon period in Central and Eastern Europe, scholarly examinations of political values and attitudes have culminated in a mixed bag of results about the progress of democracy and spread of congruent democratic attitudes in this region. The most prominent have been examinations of social capital (Edwards and Foley 1998; Kunioka and Woller 1999; Rose 1994; Mishler and Rose 1995, 1997a, 1997b); interpersonal and institutional trust (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Mishler and Rose 2001; Muller and Seligson 1994); tolerance (Duch and Gibson 1992; Gibson 1998); democratic values at large (Mishler and Rose 1995; Rose, Haerpfer, and Mishler 2000); and post-materialist values (Inglehart 1992).

The bulk of research on this question has resulted in understanding political socialization as a function of individuals' structural location and direct experience with the new political order. That is, that political attitudes and economic evaluations emerge either from individuals' structural location or as a product of casual or considered interaction with the new institutions. Both of these constrain opportunities for citizens to develop new attitudes through the predetermination of existing attributes (education level, income, urban vs. rural residence) or the only occasional prospect to participate meaningfully in the new political order. The former is largely an immutable (or subject to only gradual change) determinant and the latter is, except for the highly politically motivated, at best a sporadic practice. Few have sought out non-political or fixed sources of new political attitudes.

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As political attitudes are the result of a complex nexus of influence, rather than search within the limited political domain, we should cast our nets wider to understand this process. However, as this inquiry shows, these popular determinants do contribute to our understanding of the political socialization process. However, my project broadens the answer to this question by arguing that learning new political attitudes is also influenced by individuals' *observation* of the new order, that is, a mediated presentation. In a number of ways discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter, media present political and economic realities from which individuals' can use to derive their orientation to both politics and economics, including their subsequent attitudes and evaluations. Therefore, the dependent variables were chosen as being both substantively important to both the democratization literature and our understanding the process of political socialization in transitional countries and conspicuous in the literature, providing cross-national validity that aids our appeal to establishing a basis for theory testing.

There have been few systematic, cross-national studies on the mass media effects on individuals' development of political attitudes in countries undergoing democratic transition. Many are limited to single issue studies, limited contexts, content-specific analysis, single case studies, and the difficulties associated with survey research and media studies. While media have been argued to be the essential conduit of relations between state and society, i.e. a component of civil society (O'Neil 1998, 1-2), in the study of mass media and democratization, there is no small gap but rather a chasm. Few empirical works have been conducted on mass media's influence on individual political attitudes and political socialization in democratizing countries. In those few cases, individuals' patterns of media use significantly enhanced the predictive power of political

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orientations (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer 2000, 20). Interestingly, their research further suggests that the orientations they sought to explain were more powerfully affected when they relate to more closely to themselves, such that media provide for viewers their appropriate role in the new democratic order. The results have been surprisingly positive as "… media in new democracies perform a constructive rather than destructive role in the process of democratic consolidation" (*ibid.,* ,22).

New democrats' patterns of consumption of various types of media are related to both the development of civil society and individual political development. Media do not make these values but provide the information and/or distraction that shape individuals' development of these democratic qualities. "Politics is an activity peculiarly dependent on communications … to the extent that people share the same information they have a tool necessary for reasoning together and for arriving at common conclusions" (Pye 1962, 128; see also Frey, 1973). In his examination of Burma in development, Pye often notes the importance of common communication.[3] He argues that the process of socialization, in as much as it is similar, creates a common cultural identity. A citizen's ability to develop a political identity is predicated on his awareness of the political world, a process based exclusively on the gathering of information, requiring a conscious effort at perception, cognition, and learning. For those countries with restricted content, the introduction of new media, that is the diversification of not only channels but content, saw the most significant "reduction of time devoted to nonmedia behaviors" (Becker 1989, 353), a "reallocation of the resources of attention, time, money, and space" (*ibid.* 362). The most relevant aspect of this is not only an expansion of televisions offerings

[3] While broadly relevant, Pye's research was largely concerned with national minorities rather than nations in transition.

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but also an accompanying high use of entertainment (*ibid.* 360). Any deviation from a shared understanding of political and social trajectories can result in a society weakly prepared for its new demands (*ibid.*, 44-7).

Tocqueville was excited about the opportunities presented by media (in his case, newspaper) for citizens of a relatively new nation to converse and "take steps in common without having met" (1969[1835], 203). Both Dewey's 'Great Community' (1927) and Habermas' 'public sphere' (1989) necessitate communication and debate, what they both have argued was a necessity for a democratic society (see also Dahlgren 1987, Garnham 1986). As transition demands individual political socialization and education to a new political culture, it becomes essential to mobilize congruent sentiments and loyalties toward the new democratic order. The requirements of democracy include certain habits, beliefs, attitudes, and values (Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1989; Diamond 1993) and the role of the media can provide insight into the development of a democratic civil society and individual political development. Traditional theories of democracy and media argue that the competitive marketplace of ideas promotes and sustains an arena for the discussion of politics.

For Lerner, in non-Western countries (particularly ones that are modernizing), media teach people participation by presenting them with choices among new ideas, situations, and opinions (1963, 342). Simply, mass media, according to both Pye and Lerner, are major instruments of or play important roles in social change and individual development. To understanding the complex process through which individuals acquire, learn, and manifest new political and social values, mass communication and political

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communication theories suggest that an examination of the powerful, albeit indirect, influence of media is warranted.

Scholarly interest is increasing given the proliferation and near omnipresence of media sources in modern society. Others who have made inroads to testing these theories cross-nationally (Newton 1999; Schmitt-Beck 2003) have not considered the interactive nature of media and their audience, as statistical control for media consumption variables does not capture the issue of self-selection or the interaction effect of consumption and individual-level attributes.

The big questions of media research increasingly include understanding media's role in shaping political attitudes and behaviors in both modern and modernizing democracies. Yet, western-centricity (especially in the American context) and the reliance on experimental settings (particularly in the agenda-setting, priming, and framing literature) have limited the theoretical exportability of media studies findings in general. Despite the reciprocal relationship between media and society, the influence of mass media on people has been demonstrated to be the stronger of the two (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; MacKuen 1981, 1984; McCombs and Zhu 1995). Media studies scholars have longed to bring individuals patterns of media consumption into the study of political socialization and political socialization (again, the most advanced being the agenda-setting literature). As can clearly be seen in the previous section, the agreement among media and political communication scholars alike is limited. These theories, therefore, only stand to develop under more widely tested conditions.

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The dependent variables:

This study includes the political and economic attitudinal variables of institutional trust and sociotropic and egocentric economic evaluations. These dependent variables capture the multi-faceted nature of new political attitudes that are theoretically and substantively important to the process of political socialization in transitional countries. In order to determine the nature of media influence, their conspicuousness in the literature and consistent cross-national validity aids our appeal to establishing a basis for theory testing. As this inquiry posits a mediated experience component, it must test the attributes regarded in the transitions literature as relevant political and economic attitudes.

These dependent variables also capture the partial development of new democrats' orientation to their new political role. As media use can provide the means for widespread learning of norms and an explanation of their significance (Key 1964, 326-329, 348-9), what makes the voluntary consumption of mass media and the development of relevant political attitudes interesting is that political socialization, the exposure to liberal democratic values, is an individual responsibility (McClosky 1964). Therefore, there may be a media consumption pattern consistent with political socialization in a new political order, that is to say, choices individuals make about media are in fact subtle political behaviors that contribute their eventual orientation to the new political order (Buckingham 1997; Garramme and Atkin 1986; Hart, Smith-Howell and Llewellyn 1996; Lang and Lang 1990; Lenart and McGraw 1989; Martinelli and Chaffee 1995; Morduchowicz 1994; Mutz and Martin 2001; Rahn and Hirschorn 1999; Shanahan 1998.).

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Institutional Trust:

Within CEE, individuals' evaluations of institutional performance seem to be strong predictors of satisfaction with democracy (Mishler and Rose 2001). Other transitionologists have cited support for the democratic and market-based economy as contributory towards the process of democratic consolidation in CEE (Gunther *et al.* 1995). The congruency postulate of Almond and Verba (1963) posited a positive relationship between a society's political culture and its political regime tended to cultivate the necessary legitimacy for democratic longevity (see also Putnam 1993; Eckstein 1996). As individuals' orientations to new politics have been argued to serve as a proximate measure, and even a cause, of regime stability (Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond 1999; Gunther *et al.*1995; Linz and Stepan 1996), this linkage suggests a move beyond the empirical institutional consolidation of a new political order to a question of democratic quality. Simply, attitudinal support for new democratic and economic institutions is a consolidation imperative. The assessments of institutional performance and the general support for both democratic political institutions and a market economy provide potent indicators of individuals' assessment of democratization in general.

Schumpeter defined democracy as "…a political *method,* that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political – legislative and administrative – decisions" (1943, 242). Kaase and Marsh (1979, 40) argue that institutional trust is the implicit acceptance of the political philosophy of the political system. As institutions provide the clearest manifestation of a new political order, citizens' experience with democracy is predominately mediated by institutions. Institutional trust captures individuals' orientation toward the new democratic institutions and arguably democracy

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itself. Klingemann and Fuchs (1995) assert that widespread trust in institutions increases the stability of the system because trust is the subjective probability of a citizen believing that the political system will produce preferred outcomes.

As the countries of Eastern Europe move beyond the painful stages of transition, their assessments of the new political order will come to rely less on the economic situation and increasingly on political institutional performance (Evans and Whitefield 1995), even if that performance is the political handling of economic reform (Przeworski 1991, see also Duch 1995, 187). Mishler and Rose have contributed a great deal to the understanding of trust, both institutional and interpersonal, in Eastern Europe and have found that while institutional trust remains low in Eastern Europe (1995, 1997a, 1997b), it is unrelated to interpersonal trust (2001). In relation to regime stability, they have linked higher trust in institutions to the likelihood of people are to have a stable party identification (1998, 225). In terms of political stratification, democratic attitudes, and media use, the greater the 'confidence gap' among a society, that is, the greater the disparities between respective institutional trust or confidence levels, the less consensus there is over the normal function of politics (Lipset and Schneider 1987).

In both mature and democratizing countries, appropriate political attitudes, or the lack thereof, are relevant in that "… much of the general public, through apathy, *excludes* itself from full citizenship" (Eckstein 1996, 6: italics are mine). In contrast to political activities in CEE under the ancient regime, democratic politics is voluntary. "[C]itizens' political engagement is an important correlate of the affection/disaffection dimension and a crucial aspect of the viability of democracy" (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer 2000, 10).

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We can choose to understand individuals' orientation toward system in three ways: cognition (facts), affect (degree of support) or evaluation (normative assessment). This research is interested in democratic attitudes and economic evaluations, rather than political knowledge which has been subjected to questions of what is 'enough' political information. Additionally, although some have suggested that citizens know alarmingly little, others assuage these fears demonstrating that they are sufficiently informed (Graber 2001; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991).[4] Therefore, these dependent variables do not tap the ability of individuals to recall specific facts but rather affect and evaluation.

What influence do media have? Media have been argued to shape opinions regarding candidates and public officials, particularly through framing the criteria by which their performance or behavior should be evaluated (Iyengar 1991; Patterson 1980; Patterson and McClure 1976; Protess *et al.*1987; Protess and McCombs 1991; Weaver *et al.* 1981) and on evaluations of political parties (Kepplinger and Brosius 1990). Some have argued that media create largely cynical responses within mass publics to public institutions (Capella and Hall Jamieson 1996, 1997). In either case, media shape mass public's criteria of political judgment (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).

Yet, not only do media link events together and provide the criteria with which citizens evaluate institutions, in doing so, they also attribute responsibility, particularly governmental responsibility (Abramowitz *et al.*1988; Gomez and Wilson 2001; Johnson and Pattie 2002; Peffley 1984; Taylor 2000). Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948) were the first

[4] Lupia and McCubbins (1995) suggest that the 'democratic dilemma', the *mismatch* of the requirements and the abilities of democratic citizens, is resolved through reasoned choices by individuals and the process through which information is both gathered and (more importantly) incorporated to make decisions can compensate for low concrete and specific political knowledge.

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to assert that mass media defined what and who are salient features of individuals' perceptions of politics. Institutional trust has been argued to be driven by experience and media not just excessive negative media coverage (Miller and Listhaug 1999; Nye *et al.*1997) reinforcing the theoretical underpinnings of this research that individual-level attributes and media effects are related. Both the press and television provide news not only about what is happening, but *why* it is happening, providing citizens with an understanding of the world (Goddard *et al.*1998). It is not unreasonable to argue that individuals' media consumption may influence their attention to and therefore assessment of the performance of new democratic institutions.

Economic Evaluations:

I also examine media's influence on individuals' economic attitudes. Specifically, do media shape individuals' sociotropic and egocentric economic evaluations, and if so, how? Economic evaluations, while not explicitly democratic political attitudes, tap individual's orientation to emerging economic realities, that is, a move from state-dominated economic organization to liberal markets. Additionally, the distal disparity of these evaluations allows us to compare the role of mass media on individuals' assessments of 'near' and 'far' phenomena. Individuals' assessment of national level economic performance is primarily guided by observation of the progress of reform, national-level indicators, and processes beyond the domain of a single or even handful of individuals. Egocentric economic evaluations are inherently individualistic and more likely to be influenced by individuals' immediate or direct economic situations. We can

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anticipate that large, distant, economic processes are more likely to be influenced mass media than personal concerns.[5]

How then have media and economic evaluations been linked? Media have been included as important to economic evaluations as they shape political evaluations (Mutz 1992, 485; see also Mutz and Martin 2001). Similar to the reasoning of the previous section, media simplify complex information, identify actors, and even assign responsibility. By presenting economic information, simplifying it for consumption, and attributing responsibility for economic changes, media in effect provide a readily available economic 'understanding' (MacKuen *et al.*1992; Weatherford 1983). More recent contributions concur, arguing that economic evaluations must include media as they set the expectations of viewers and are likely to attribute blame, explaining how 'the world works' (Gavin and Sanders 2003). Economic perceptions may be more powerful than economic knowledge lending some support to the use of survey data as subjective evaluations are better than macroeconomic measures (Gabel and Whitten 1997).

Media's posited contribution to the understanding of how individuals in transitional countries learn new economic values emerged from the economic voting literature. Scholars have increasingly found support for the notion that the 'collective' salience of issues may be more powerful an influence than personal experience (Becker, McCombs, and McLeod 1975; Mackuen *et al*. 1992; McLeod, Becker, and Byrnes 1975; Goidel and Langley 1995; Mutz 1992, 1994; Mutz and Martin 2001; Weatherford 1983). Despite individuals' personal experience with economic realities (i.e. unemployment, higher prices, etc…), their perceptions of the economic situation as a whole, are in many

[5] This anticipated finding is supported here and buttresses the role of mass media as an important determinant of political attitudes (given individuals' observation of the national progress of democratization, captured here by institutional trust).

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instances, more important to their evaluation of the economic system. Mackuen *et al*. (1992) were explicit in that the perceptions of economic conditions (particularly economic expectations rather than retrospective evaluations) are derived from mass media. News coverage of economy, specifically, has been shown to influence economic evaluations even after controlling for real economic conditions (Goidel and Langley 1995, 326). Weatherford (1983) argues that personal economic experiences and contextual economic evaluations compete for saliency. He continues that individuals who are information poor, personal experiences more salient yet, for individuals who are information rich, perceptions of "collective" economic conditions are more powerful. Like Weatherford (1983), this model incorporates personal experience, through the inclusion of socio-political predispositions to understand media's influence on individuals' economic evaluations. Mutz argues that media (in her case, local newspaper coverage) weaken impact of personal economic conditions through a process she has described as the de-politicization of personal experiences in lieu of social or national conditions (1992). This effect was particularly significant given the amount of coverage (which was more prevalent during economic downturns, see Headrick and Lanoue 1991).

In terms of economic information, although some have maintained that personal experience trumps media influence (Conover, Feldman, and Knight 1987; Graber 1984; Weaver *et al.* 1981), other scholars contend that media subject people to broad understandings rather than 'hard' facts or concrete information about the economy (Mackuen *et al*. 1992; Mutz 1992), usually in the form of simplifications or the assignment of responsibility. Regarding the latter, Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) have argued that mass media 'packages' information making the linkages between national

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economic situations and national political actors. Pocket book voting rests on the power of macro-level economic situations as more powerful indicators of individuals' economic evaluations (Eulau and Lewis-Beck 1985; Lewis-Beck 1981). Mishler and Rose (1996) have made a similar argument for CEE, suggesting that citizens' institutional trust is based on macro- not micro- economic evaluations (see also Mishler and Rose 2001). Through the process of compiling individuals' experiences in to aggregate for presentation, mass media facilitate individuals perceiving their experiences as part of a larger social whole (Mutz 1994, 691).

As we have seen, an increasing number of studies suggest that including media in modeling citizens' economic evaluations is imperative, as perceptions, not simply knowledge, of the economic situation seems to be highly salient. Underlying these arguments is the notion that media construct a reality from which citizens perceive their proper role. Therefore, in answer to the causation question, media studies cannot yet point a definitive finger; yet, testing these theories of media influence more broadly contributes to our collective honing in on the element of media that contributes to this process. This study asserts that mass media present individuals with wider political experiences, evaluative criteria, and simplified information thereby heightening their own ability to foster or inhibit the development of democratic attitudes.

By including both sociotropic and egocentric economic evaluations, we further tap into the connection between economic and political attitudes (Fiornia 1981; Hibbs 1982; Lewis-Beck 1988). These dependent variables are an attempt to capture the partial development of new democrats' orientation to their new political role. Media use can provide the means for widespread learning of norms and an explanation of their

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significance (Key 1964, 326-329, 348-9). What makes the voluntary consumption of mass media and the development of relevant political attitudes interesting is that political socialization, the exposure to liberal democratic values, is an individual responsibility (McClosky 1964). Therefore, there may be a media consumption pattern consistent with political socialization in a new political order.

The importance of a correlation between individuals' patterns of media consumption and democratic attitudes is that the media people choose to consume affects their perceptions of the world and their place in it. In new democracies, the interaction of individuals' need to re-orient to the norms of democracy and media's central role in shaping individuals' perceptions of reality and their role in it can be part of our understanding of how individuals learn democratic values and norms. Normatively, a free and plural press should encourage participation and even cognitive mobilization, as some have argued (Dalton 1996). Mass media serve as a free and plural arena for public, political contestation, enabling individuals to consume information from which to generate their social and political opinions and values. Yet, others have demonstrated that this may not be so (Newton 1999; Putnam 2000).

We can see the importance of political socialization in the democratization literature as well as the absence of significant media research into the broader contributions of the former. This inquiry revisits this process, bringing mass media to the foreground. The next chapter sets out the theoretical basis for media as a means to attitudinal change. It presents the grounding theory from which testable hypotheses are derived and further establishes the cornerstone of media research that provides the basis for this inquiry by highlighting the complex role of media in the political environment.

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Chapter 3: Theory

> *"[F]iction…lets us redescribe ourselves. That is why the novel, the movie, and the TV program have, gradually but steadily, replaced the sermon and the treatise as the principle vehicles of moral change and progress*" (Rorty 1989, xvi).

This chapter introduces the basis for individual-level media effects and how, beyond the western-centric literature, media can play a significant role in the political process. I develop a set of hypotheses that provide the basis for the empirical analysis in the following chapters. It further outlines the approach used to elicit media effects in the complex social setting by discussing the important role of intervening variables. In doing so, this chapter theoretically grounds this inquiry in within the larger media and democratization literatures.

To date, political science has accepted media research with come caution. To confront this, this section addresses the foundation on which this inquiry rests. The assumptions are one, that media do have influence on individuals (Bartels 1988; Brody 1991; Fan 1988; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Newton 1999; Page and Shapiro 1992; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987; Patterson 1980; Patterson and McClure 1974; Schmitt-Beck 2003); and two, media are capable of persuading individuals in matters of opinion and belief, influencing behavior, and structuring individuals' perceptions of reality (McQuail 1987, 82; also DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1982; Lerner 1958; Pye 1963).

Media as Culture:

Figure 1 represents the direction of causation between individuals' use of media and their attitudes. For this inquiry, it is also as important to set out the 'why' these variables are correlated in such a manner.

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<Figure 1 about here>

Mass communication, as an academic discipline, is premised on the notion that media are the conveyors, and in many ways, the producers of culture. If we define culture as a collection of artifacts that represent the shared values of a society, mass media document the behaviors and values of its respective society. Furthermore, by its very function of dissemination, media serve as a conduit of culture to a wide audience. The shared values that are the composite components of a society's culture that need to be transmitted trans-generationally are done so through the collective beliefs, myths, and ideals. Because of its broad reach and near omnipresence in a society, mass media are an institution that does this well. Merton (1957) argued that media contribute to the social equilibrium by reinforcing patterns of behavior that are essential to the success (and survival) of a society by reinforcing examples of appropriate behavior and vilifying anti-social or marginal behavior (see also Alexander 1981; Lasswell 1958, chapter 2). For this study, therefore, the theoretical linkage between individuals' mass media consumption and their development of democratic attitudes is the media as culture argument.

Within the discipline of mass communication, one scholar, and others from the Annenberg school, has posited the relationship between media and culture such that media were responsible for the cultivation of the dominant images of a society (Gerbner 1980). This 'cultivation theory' rests on the assumption that media tend to offer uniform and relatively consensual versions of social reality and their audiences are 'acculturated' accordingly. By disseminating the norms of a collective society, mass media are, in other words, the purveyors of a society's culture. Media can serve as a 'learning environment'

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that aids individuals in acquiring a new set of values, beliefs, and attitudes (Gerbner 1980).

Media tend toward 'national' or 'general public' interest or at least are broadly acceptable mainly through convention (McQuail 1987, 92-3 and 285; see also Keane 1991), lending support to the cultivation theorists' notion of television, for one, as the disseminator of consensual and majority political values. Based on the founding notion that media can serve as a molder of society, cultivation theorists have argued that the symbolic world of the media, particularly television, shapes and maintains (i.e. cultivates) audiences' conceptions of the real world (Gerbner and Gross 1976).

Mass media can also be conceptualized as a source of power, the arena for public contestation and the dialogue of culture, and by doing so, define the images and constructs of social reality (McQuail 1987, 3). In the same manner of argument, media can serve as an institution of continuity or change in culture; hence, its role in transmitting and disseminating the new values of a new society. McQuail argues that, "…media as an institution is engaged in the production, reproduction, and distribution of knowledge in the widest sense of sets of symbols which have meaningful reference to experience in the social world" (*ibid.*, 51). As democratization is not simply an institutional alteration but one that demands cultural re-orientation as well, it requires a massive social learning process (Madsen 1978; Linz and Stepan 1996).

Lippmann (1922) asserted that given the distal relationship between the representative and the represented, individuals' political experience is largely limited to what they can piece together of the world through what is reported and presented. More simply, citizens more often than not, do not have first-hand knowledge about politics (Gamson 1992;

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Mayer 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992; Schmitt-Beck 1999, 222; Volgy and Schwarz, 1978, 153). However, media can present competing arguments without the necessity of directly engaging a viewer (see Calhoun 1988; Sanders 1997; Schudson 1997), and as it facilitates opportunities to be exposed to dissimilar views (Mutz and Martin 2001).

Lerner (1963) makes the claim that media have taught people to participate by providing for them, in familiar terms, the options available to them in the new political and social order. The media also serve as purveyors of shared values, such that the portrayal of particular political actions as anti-social can shape citizens' perceptions of political action norms (Hall *et al.*1978). The media's most significant contribution has been "…to serve as examples of and conduits for the newly available political, economic, and cultural options, on one hand, and facilitators of political, market, and cultural competition, on the other" (Gross 2002, 167).

An often overlooked link in the development of political science media theories is the notion of media as culture. Where media are widely dispersed and consumed, they influence the expectations of individuals, the understanding of the world outside individuals' immediate experiences, and reinforce cultural norms. Preceding the effects of specific media manipulations, media play a broad but salient role in defining citizens' perceptions and therefore conceptualizations of reality. The *media as culture* argument is essential to the notion of influential media effects. It is therefore theoretically plausible that media institutions enjoy a considerable amount of influence over citizens' new political attitudes and orientations.

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Media Effects: Broad Hypotheses

In many types of media research, the effects of media are certain, the means, however, are controversial (Newton 1999, 577); however, despite the complexity of and difficulty in discerning media's influence, it cannot be dismissed (Entman 1989, 361). This section outlines the broad hypotheses while the following empirical chapters will more specifically address the media effects and interactions as they pertain to the media concepts under investigation.

At the outset, I examine how citizens of democratizing countries use media and if these consumption patterns not only differentiate these citizens from their western counterparts but exert an observable effect on the development of political and economic attitudes. The first part of this inquiry examines the difference across television, newspaper, and radio. How do these individuals use media and how does a choice of radio, newspaper, and/or television correlate with particular political and economic attitudes. Does television (radio, newspaper) consumption correlate in ways we expect? And if so, why? And if not, why?

The essential difference among media has been based on format differences, that is, informational quality and intellectuality (Kleinnijenhuis 1991). It is generally agreed that people are generally able to get more information from newspapers than television (Chaffee 1977; Kraus and Davis 1976), suggesting a more powerful engaging effect. Simply, newspapers are more 'effective' than television (Eyal 1981; McClure and Patterson 1976). "Newspaper use is consistently associated with informational uses and gratifications" (Chaffee and Kanihan 1997, 425) adding that newspaper reading is an information-seeking activity (*ibid.*, 425). Newspapers have been suggested to provide

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higher levels of public confidence (Miller *et al.*1979) and awareness (Mondak 1995b) in mass publics than television. Unlike television, newspapers are less event-centered, presenting things in a more contextualized manner (Altheide 1987; Gitlin 1980; Iyengar 1990).

The choice between reading a newspaper and watching television has been correlated with quality of information differences and political engagement (Newton 1999; Putnam 2000; Schmitt-Beck 2003). Fortunately, examining television in comparative terms against the influence of other popular media allows us to make an argument for its relative influence, whether positive or negative. This may be a function of the temporal nature of television and the enduring nature of the written word; but nonetheless, in general, newspapers are better political informants than television (even television news: McLeod *et al*. 1996; Patterson and McClure 1976). Additionally, and although under-theorized, the role of radio is included, particularly given the historical role of radio in the pre-transition years (Paulu 1974; Birnnaum 1979).[1] Therefore, in the first empirical chapter, the core hypotheses include:

> **H_{M1}:** Individuals' consumption of television is negatively correlated with individuals' democratic political and positive economic evaluations..
>
> **H_{M2}:** Individuals' consumption of newspaper television is positively correlated with individuals' democratic political and positive economic evaluations.
>
> **H_{M3}:** Individuals' consumption of radio is positively correlated with individuals' democratic political and positive economic evaluations.

Second, I examine the effects of content choice. Moving beyond differences *among* media, the interaction of medium and content should further flesh out media effects as

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[1] Others have discussed radio as a means to educate citizens of developing countries (Brownstone 1970), but this was limited to radio programming that was specifically designed to educate a specific group (Colombian farmers) about a specific set of tasks (read, write, and farming techniques).

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variation in individuals' consumption of content is an important contribution to our understanding (Iyengar 1994). This content component is likely more salient to the consumption patterns of individuals and is more likely to produce effects on individuals' political and economic attitudes as there is room for positive and negative effects within the same medium (Blumler and McQuail 1968; see also Trenamen and McQuail 1961).

Newton suggests the same as, "…television pulls in different directions according to its content" (1999, 594), concluding that news mobilizes and entertainment alienates (although the latter relationship is much weaker; see also Carpini *et al.*1994; Putnam 2000). Others concur noting the competing effects of television as both immobilizing and information-providing and citing content as the distinguishing component (Newton 1999, 581 see also Bennett *et al.*1999).

Why would we expect media news programming to be significant? "News media are expected to inform, present diverse views on the issues of the day, set the agenda, and help shape public opinion on *all* matter related to democratization" (Gross 2002, 90). Television news may provide the strongest influence on individuals' political and economic evaluations (Iyengar 1984; Miller and Krosnick 1996). The divide between news and entertainment consumption is important as news has been shown to be normatively contributory in that it encourages culturally appropriate behaviors and attitudes and punishes those that are not (Alexander 1981).

This research constrains its examination to a division of content (news, high content, and low content), a differentiation that provides sufficient consumption differences to be theoretically informative in examining variation in individual's democratic attitudes. These choices reflect individuals' predilection for entertainment or information and

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therefore tap a more fundamental motivation of individuals. Does individuals' consumption of news inform them and cultivate democratic attitudes; that is, does information-seeking aid their understanding of the process of democratization? Conversely, does individuals' consumption of entertainment, that is, distraction-seeking, alienate and isolate them and discourage political engagement in the political changes taking place? From this, the second empirical chapter includes the following hypotheses:

> **H_{C1}:** Individuals' consumption of news (and high content) programming on television is positively correlated with individuals' democratic political and positive economic evaluations.

> **H_{C2}:** Individuals' consumption of entertainment programming on television is negatively correlated with individuals' democratic political and positive economic evaluations.

As a final component of the individual-level examination, I examine the role of international media. Diffusion of values via mass media across the permeable borders of nation-states has been argued to play a significant role in the transformation of political values. This argument is not one of market-based competition for an audience but rather the cultural differentiation among established and nascent media institutions. Programming carries cultural information that implicitly provides a normative framework of the source location. Therefore, individuals' media consumption decisions render subtle but discernable effects in their political attitudes. The diffusion hypothesis has been argued to exist but not the specifically why. My argument is that diffusion is a salient media concept based on the media as culture argument posited above.

For societies in transition, Lerner argues that 'western media', in as much as if diffuses into these countries, raises expectations and aspirations, widening horizons, ultimately enabling people to want better alternatives for themselves (1958; see also

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Schramm 1964). Diffusion as a source of individual political development is at the core of many theories of democratization; yet scholars generally use the term abstractly, deferring to an international zeitgeist of democracy, demonstration, and occasionally international pressure (particularly over issues such as human rights or ideological congruency) (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996; Lipset 1960; Mainwaring 2000). Huntington explicitly cites international media as the conduit for the 'demonstration effect' among democratizing nations (1991). For CEE, western media penetration into the region was not happenstance but a conscious program of competing with the authoritarian regimes. Therefore the question is simply whether in the transition period, international media have maintained their influence, promoting democratic values. In these countries, we would expect to see democratic attitudes correlated with a high (or at least disproportionate) consumption of Western broadcasts and print media. This brings us to the following hypotheses:

> **H_{S1}:** Individuals' consumption of international media is positively correlated with individuals' democratic political and positive economic evaluations.

> **H_{S2}:** Individuals' consumption of domestic media is negatively correlated with individuals' democratic political and positive economic evaluations.

This part of the study examines citizens' development of political and economic attitudes and asserts that they do not require exclusively personal experience with new political institutions. Mediated political and economic experience is a powerful influence on their political and economic evaluations of the new political order by bringing a wider set of experiences to them and providing implicit cultural norms. Therefore, the hypotheses will reflect variation over media in order to uncover not only the influence of media but also identify specific aspects of media that may be more or less salient in this

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democratizing setting. That is, do these content consumption choices translate into political behaviors that ultimately shape the political socialization process?

In addition to the individual-level effects, this study places media in the context of the six countries by examining the media institutional reform process. What do we know about media and media institutions in CEE that may illuminate the findings presented in this section? During this period, media institutions skipped Pool's 'regulatory learning curve' (1983, 116-119), that is to say, the competing demands on these media institutions to be both commercial and a 'marketplace of ideas' were not gradual; but rather, the struggle between technological regulation and informational freedom was nearly instantaneous. Complicating the transition, the relationship between the incumbents of the media institutions and the legislative process suffered from a long standing and tenacious belief that media exist to serve the government (Brown 1994, 34; see also Curry 1995; Downing 1996; Hankiss 1993; Ognianova 1990; O'Neil 1997).

During the transition, many proto-political parties made efforts to secure and control some portion of the mass media in order to counter the former Communist parties' domination over the media infrastructure. Observers note that at the outset of transition, "…media systems were predominantly controlled by political parties, governments, individuals, and commercial enterprises and to a lesser extent by religious, ethnic, intellectual, and other groups" but became largely autonomous by the middle 1990's (Gross 2004, 114).[2] Politicians, especially the holdovers from the previous regime, saw media as the magic wand to shape public opinion (Goban-Klas 1994, 244).

[2] Additionally, during this time, the residual influence of politics on television, even going so far as to say party congruency (that is, loyalty), shifted from television to print media in the form of party organs in some of these countries (Gross 2004, 114-6).

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In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the *ancien regime*, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland made clear moves toward institutional liberalization, unlike Romania and Bulgaria (Gross 2002, 35; see also Schöpflin 1993, 287).[3] Granted, these processes of liberalization in the former countries did not go uncontested, but the struggles were short-lived. Czechoslovakia was first in creating a working legal framework for broadcasting (Sparks 2000, 43), legislating the first law on the operations of radio and television broadcasts (on 30 October 1991). In Poland, which quickly followed suit, Solidarity had set a precedent in 1989 by including access to radio and television (in the form of at least one channel on each) in its lists of demands (Sparks and Reading 1995, 41),[4] thereby paving the way for early legislative action. In Hungary, the dissolution of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda in August 1988 ushered in competition for control of the media. And although the Hungarians enacted the Frequency Allocation Act in 1993, it was not until 1995 that a broadcast law was formally legislated (Corcoran and Preston 1995).

Despite this, Hungary was the exemplar of this process. Hungary's 'media wars' of the early 1990's were essentially brief, albeit high profile, battles over privatization (Gross 2002, 58). In short, they were a very public struggle over *de facto* ownership (either through financial or legislative power) of Hungarian mass media. In 1992, the appointed heads of both Hungarian Television and Radio were dismissed due to their increasingly 'independent' policies. The ensuing scramble for power was a nothing more than a short, but public, political party scrum.

[3] Broadcasting laws needed to include "freedom of information" law as well as requirements for licensing, rights, responsibilities (Orcutt 1992).
[4] Of course, that did not happen. They were simply allowed to broadcast their own programs on government television until 1990.

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For Slovakia, the Velvet Divorce from the Czech Republic in 1993 distanced control of the Slovakian media institutions from the Czech-born legislation and saw a return to an 'unofficial' adherence to the 'official' line of the nationalist Mečiar government between 1991-1998 (Vojteck 1995). Each country underwent an initial struggle for control and privatization of the media; however, "… after 1992-95 [with the exception of Albania], the control and even influence of political parties and politicians over the media waned" (Gross 2002, 56).[5]

We can further see this disparity, drawing from the observations above, in Jakubowicz's examination of media institutions in CEE (2001). He makes the case for separating Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic from Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania. The distinction is that the former group' institutional reforms have been more transparent and in the direction of liberal market practices. The 'differentiation process' of de-monopolization had a head start in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (Giorgi 1995).

Essentially a north vs. south argument, this resonates with earlier pre-transitional examinations. Buzek, in writing about the function of the Communist press in the early 1960's, suggests a subtle, intra-regional difference between essentially the north and the south (1964, 11), such that the north was, for lack of a better term, freer. This is not irrelevant to this discussion as the institutional reform processes may reflect institutional

[5] For example, the Broadcasting Act of the then-Czechoslovakia 1991; Poland's Broadcasting Act 1992 (modified in 1995); Romanian Audiovisual Act 1992 (Law on Public Service Radio and Television Act 1994 - modified in 1998); Hungary: Radio and Television Act 1995 (Sükösd and Bajomi-Lázár. 2003). These actions were taken largely in response to external pressure to reform and in order to invite foreign investment (Sükösd and Bajomi-Lázár 2003, 14). These governments' attempts to control the media were short-lived (Gross 2002, 61; see also: Sparks and Reading 1998; Splichal 1994).

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legacies of this region that may still cast their long shadows on the transition.[6] As such, this inquiry is interested in the years in which both national and international media were taking the opportunity to establish themselves as legitimate media.

The cross-national analysis here allows for us to test variations in the degree of media reliance given countries' varying levels of political and economic consolidation. The literature on media dependency suggests that as turmoil and periods of transitions exist, citizens are more likely to turn to media as a source of reassurance and information. In doing so, media are arguably more influential on shaping individuals' perceptions of the world around them and their roles. The cross-national variation of the speed and degree of reform allows us to impose some order on the 'stages' of reform. In doing so, we can correlate the various individual-level findings with the different 'stages' of reform. This, like cohort analysis, allows us to propose a linkage between the progression of the national-level reform process and the influence of media at the individual-level.

Most likely, countries that have demonstrated significant progress toward normalizing a democratic culture (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland) will likely vary from ones that have not (Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia), and according to the theory of media dependency, highlight variation in the influence of mass media. Yet, media dependency is not specific as to the expected findings, hampering our efforts to derive testable hypotheses. While we can expect some variation cross-nationally as these countries pre-transition political conditions and rate of democratization are not the same, it is difficult to posit hypotheses for this section rather than merely set out expectations.

[6] Others have argued that the new political institutions of these countries reflect the institutional arrangements in pre-transition CEE (Kitschelt *et al.* 1999). There may be some analogy to media institutions as other evidence suggests this as some have identified variation in pre-transition CEE: e.g. Romania as the "Soviet Model Adherent" (Gross 1996); the more liberal Polish (Goban-Klas 1994; Jakubowicz) and Hungarian version (Tölgeysi 1990).

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The examination of multi-level effects is in many ways inductive, seeking to find *if* relationship exists rather than explicitly *how*. There is little guiding theory about emerging media institutions and how the extent of reform is likely to shape the individual-level effects. Therefore, this chapter, unlike the ones above, is data generating rather than theory testing. However, in doing this, we may be able to create an empirical basis for a theory of the media institutional reform process as a contributor to the micro-level process of political socialization in democratizing countries.

Interactive Effects: Direct vs. Indirect Mass Media Effects:

Shifting focus back to the political socialization process, we must examine the role of individuals' attributes. In it most simple form, 'media effects' would be people developing traits due to their exposure to a medium (Putnam 2000, 218), yet as current literature argues against the 'hypodermic needle' effect of mass media (the 'direct effect'), we must consider the interaction of media and its audience.

It became readily apparent to media scholars that individuals varied in their personal-psychological organization which originated with different biological endowments, including learning. From these patterns of learning, individual acquired a set of attitudes, values, and beliefs that constituted their cognitive makeup. These various differences shaped their perceptive abilities as well (i.e. what they chose to pay attention to); therefore, media effects are subject to intervening variables in the 'cause-effect' relationship (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1982, 186-8). Klapper's observation (1960) that mass communication does not ordinarily serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather functions through a nexus of mediating factors aptly sums up the use of intervening variables, not as controls, but as essential components of the 'nexus

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of effect'. Marsh and Kaase (1979, 98) add that the role of intervening variables is that they "…act prismatically to mediate political behavior at the individual level.

While not direct, media's influence, as it is mediated by socio-political predispositions, makes those effects powerful, weak, negative or positive (Graber 1993, 226). What this suggests is that "*…individual audience members encounter media messages as members of groups and that they do so with a constructed social reality that reflects their past and present social experiences*" (*ibid.*, 184, italics in original). Hence the core problem with self-selection is linked to media effects' substantial conceptual difficulties in that individual consumptive patterns correlate well with socio-economic distributions.

The correlation between SES variables and media use has been formalized to some degree in other theories of mass media use. Self-selection is an assumption of the uses and gratifications literature (Blumler and Katz 1974). The theory argues that this is *because* individuals have a particular socio-economic status (SES) profile that they consume media in the way that they do. This literature is based on a more subtle 'difference of needs' argument. Rather than the readily identifiable variations in media consumption between social groups, this approach suggests that as individuals develop (i.e. much in the manner of ascending Maslow's hierarchy of needs), their resulting demands on media change. Short of direct measurement, researchers have substituted SES variables as indicators of individuals' development along these lines, which have since come to be recognized as social groupings. This selective exposure approach lays the groundwork for the variation in attitudes toward politics derived through media (Graber 1993, 215).

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According to this literature, self-selection, or selectivity, guides media consumption, but in doing so, mediates the influence of media. As a selective exposure theory, uses and gratification simply states that, "…people pay attention to stories that help them in making political decisions, such as voting or participating in protest demonstrations" (Graber 1993, 212). This selectivity leads to a diversification of socializing influences and lays the groundwork for differential attitudes towards politics (important to understand this distribution, who is getting or seeking what). SES variables also have been suggested to create structural differences by providing unequal access to information (Golding and Murdock 1986). It may be useful it delineating patterns of media consumption that suggest their use as sources of information and socialization rather than mere distraction.

Social and economic variables provide strong clues as to an individual's position in the social structure (education and income, even residence) and individual traits that may shape their own habits (age).[7] As certain groups, delineated by these social and economic variables, may consume media similarly, the variation in the other political predispositions is likely to further shape, even alter, media's influence. Income, for example, is a strong intervening variable (Graber 1993, 210-1). This variable is generally less subject to fluctuations and serves as semi-permanent structural constraint on individuals as compared to the more choice-based political predispositions. Unlike developing countries, CEE has a long tradition of high education levels which, coupled

[7] Merton refers to these two sets of intervening variables as the audience member's 'internal contexts' and 'external context' (1994, 311-3), both which he argues are necessary to make claims about media's influence. In his media study, Schmitt-Beck calls social and economic location variables, social structural variables (2003, 240).

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with media, suggests that media should have a predominantly beneficial effect on individuals' development of political attitudes.

Particular audience groups can have an internal structure related to media use and type of content. i.e. a hierarchy can emerge (the notion of political opinion leaders, for example) (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Merton 1949). "…[I]ideas often flow from radio and print to the opinion leaders and from them to the less active section of the population" (Lazarsfeld *et al.*1944, 155). Even so, the consumptive pattern of a population stratifies it according to interest and activity in relation to media and the topics dealt with by mass media. Kiewiet (1983): posited a 'two-step' flow of information as people consume media and what others have consumed and pass on, maintaining media's role. This suggests that rather than the optimistic notions of a free press and a marketplace of ideas from which democrats can derive a political consensus, media would be seen as bolstering the political differences among groups, disadvantaging some and advantaging others (and again, a consumption cleavage of sorts, see Mutz and Martin 2001).

As a selective exposure theory, the uses and gratification theory simply states that, "…people pay attention to stories that help them in making political decisions, such as voting or participating in protest demonstrations" (Graber 1993, 212). This selectivity leads to a diversification of socializing influences and lays the groundwork for differential attitudes towards politics (important to understand from this distribution: who is getting or seeking what). Like the filter hypothesis,[8] it is grounded in the idea that people consume confirming information and can contribute to the understanding of why

[8] Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) introduced the 'filter hypothesis' arguing the influence of mass media was mediated by personal political communication by either reinforcing or blocking the impact of media information for voters, i.e. it was 'filtered'.

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political attitudes are stable and consistent over time. It may be useful it delineating patterns of media consumption that suggest their use as sources of information of mere distraction.

The uses and gratifications model of media use further defines audience members' media use by one of four categories: diversion, personal relationships, personal identity and surveillance. Diversion is simply media use for escape or recreation while surveillance is to gather information about events, people, and issues. The personal relationships and personal identity deal with individuals' identification, para-socialization, comparison, and companionship-development with characters and programs. Surveillance is essentially information-seeking. In any case, there is a continual and selective interaction between an individual and media which plays a part in shaping his behavior and self-perception. Putnam refers to this as 'selection effects' such that people with particular traits seek out a particular medium (2000, 218; see also Berelson *et al.* 1954). However, it is this overlap of social qualities, social category membership, and consumption habits make the disentangling of cause and effect difficult (Newton 1999, 583).

This literature is predicated on the idea that self-selection occurs, individuals with similar socio-economic profiles choose to consume media in a similar manner. This model of media use argues that audience members' media use can be defined by one of four categories: diversion, personal relationships, personal identity and surveillance. Diversion is simply media use for escape or recreation while surveillance is to gather information about events, people, and issues. The personal relationships and personal identity deal with individuals' identification, para-socialization, comparison, and

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This selectivity is most clearly manifest as socio-economic variables and socio-political predispositions and highly correlates with media consumption patterns. Yet, although there is a great deal of correlation, how they interact to ease or restrict media’s influence is key. The question then being, are the effects we hope to find attributable to socio-economic and socio-political predispositions, media, or is the interaction greater than the sum of its parts? Media scholars are not unaware of this. Klapper (1960) noted that self-selection and cognitive dissonance is still problematic if one discovers a link between media effects and individual attitudes. Selective exposure is simply that people choose media that conform to their existing opinions (Chaffee and Hochheimer 1985; Kinder and Sears 1985, 710; Lang and Lang 1985; McGuire 1985, 275; Roberts and MacCoby 1985; Sears and Freedman 1967). Therefore, the long-standing problem is that apparent effects of media exposure actually reflect the impact of politically relevant social qualities that happen to be correlated with media exposure (Bartels 1993, 269).

Individuals are not empty vessels or empty canvases waiting to be filled (Graber 1984). Even citizens of new democracies are not without experience and knowledge about politics. Yet, Kinder goes further to argue that it is not enough to know *if* schemas,

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but what *kind of* schemas (1998, 171). Citizens' understandings of the complex political world are subject to education, cognitive skills, information, attention, and interest (Alvarez 1997; Bartels 1986). This methodological problem of social location is compounded by the heterogeneity of modern society, such that people in 'similar locations' in the social structure will have approximately uniform responses to (and selections of) media. Some authors have argued that social categories are more important than individual differences (Sears and Freedman 1967). This distinction may be theoretically useful. If groups are able and willing to engage in different patterns of media use and those patterns correspond to social structure variables, the process of political socialization, as it relates to these individual-level attributes, is the product of the interactive influence of media (Murdock and Golding 1989).

For this inquiry, these predispositions are individual-level qualities or characteristics that, depending on their value, exaggerate some effects of media and neutralize others. Zaller calls these non-linear relationships non-monotonic (1992, 21), meaning that the differential effects of the same media consumption across different individuals had to do with the differences in individuals' social and political predispositions.[9] It is not just changes in exposure to media, but changes in exposure coupled with the capacity and appropriate political predispositions that makes media's influence significant.

As Lazarsfeld *et al.*(1944) suggested that social categories were important, others concurred, further suggesting that individual responses vary systematically "… according to social categories which the receiver can be placed: age, occupation, lifestyle, gender,

[9] Although Zaller's discussion of the relationship between media exposure and political predispositions is primarily concerned with elite manipulation (see also Carmines and Stimson 1989); he does make the statement that political predispositions are not subject to short-term elite influence and can be safely ignored in the short-term (Zaller 1992, 23), a statement highly applicable to CEE.

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religion, etc…" (McQuail 1987, 261). Bourdieu goes beyond simple explanation to argue that the disparate consumption habits are based on aesthetic judgments and are related in predictable and very structured ways to social structure, particularly occupation, that is to say, class (1986). Although age and social class are relevant, income and education provide the structural incentives of free time and money for media use (McQuail 1987, 238). Newton notes that education has always been crucial as "… it has a strong influence on the use of different kinds of media, and affects mobilization and malaise " (1999, 584; see also Brehm and Rahn 1997). Of course, the most direct solution is to confront this and to assume that individuals *do* choose.

Bartels' results (1993) do provide an interesting question of what is the balance of proportional contribution of pre-existing attitudes and incoming information (*ibid.*, 274). He argues that the pre-existing attitudes are much stronger than the influence of incoming information, but asks about societies unlike America in which the pre-existing attitudes are in contrast to the new political and social reality or experience with both democratic political norms and media institutions is minimal. Are we more likely to find a stronger influence from incoming information? He suggests yes. This balance attests to Graber's observation of pre-existing sets of attitudes and knowledge that mediate media's influence.

Many of the major theories of mass communication and political communication have this argument embedded in them. The 'knowledge gap' literature includes the interaction of media consumption and education. This interaction differentiates not only media's effects but also what people are able to take from it. The theory argues that this is *because* they have this socio and economic status (SES) profile that they consume media

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in the way that they do. The 'filter hypothesis' literature suggests that media's influence must pass through (i.e. be filtered by) individuals' social networks and political communication groups, such that media's influence is strongly reinforcing if it is congruent with an individual's group and neutralized if not. Some suggest that information affects people differently because of their social group membership (Boninger *et al.*1995; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Individuals have experiences and structural constraints that shaped media's influence, affecting people differently because they were in different social and economic locations and had different (although not unique) sets of political and social predispositions. Predispositions can include differences of personality, attitude, and intelligence (DeFleur 1970, 122), or partisanship, cultural (ideological identification, value orientations) and social-structure (class, trade unions, religion, region and race) attributes (Schmitt-Beck 2003, 240), or personality differences (Adorno *et al.*1950; Altemeyer 1981; Costantini and Craik 1980; McClosky 1958; Smith, Bruner, and White 1956; Wilson 1983). Therefore, the interaction of individual attributes and patterns of media consumption must be incorporated if we are to parse through and ultimately understand media effects.

In order to estimate the relationship between individuals and their media consumption patterns, it is important to set out the correlations between their socio-economic status (SES) and their media use. Within the field of media studies, this issue has been a subject of great interest as self-selection, or selectivity, guides media consumption, and in doing so, mediates the influence of media. As certain groups, delineated by these social and economic variables, may consume media similarly, the variation in the other political predispositions is likely to further shape, even alter, media's influence. Therefore, the

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model of media's influence on the process of political socialization in democratizing countries includes not only socio-economic and socio-political predispositions of individuals but also the interactive effects.

Social and Economic Location:

Social and economic status (SES) variables provide strong clues as to an individual's position in the social structure (education and income, even residence) and individual traits that may shape their habits (age). SES variables have been suggested to create structural differences by providing unequal access to information (Golding and Murdock 1986) or attributes that provide predilections for particular consumption choices (see Figure 2).

<Figure 2 about here>

Age is a useful theoretical distinction that relates to the long-standing arguments of adolescent socialization (Inglehart 1997). Given generations' different socialization experiences to the political world, we would expect that younger generations would be more amenable to not only new political orientations but also new media, while members of older generations may be slower to socialize to new norms. In CEE, this is very likely to be the case in the dramatic and rapid shift in the political, economic, and social organizations. For that reason, we might expect trans-generational difference in not only media choices but also in the intentions of the two.

Income has consistently been a strong intervening variable for mass media studies (Graber 1993, 210-1). This variable is less subject to fluctuations and serves as semi-permanent structural constraint on individuals as compared to the more choice-based political predispositions. For example, "the mass media may be more appealing to the

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relatively uneducated and poor in large part because the media are relatively inexpensive forms of leisure" (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1982, 179).

The most salient socio-economic variable that has been examined in conjunction with media usage is education. Higher education trains one to think differently or more abstractly (Almond and Verba 1963), providing a better-organized belief system or an integrated world view (Converse 1964). Converse continues that better-educated people should be more likely to attend to policy information because of the complexities of issue politics require a sufficient level of ability and motivation which would characterize only the most sophisticated citizens. The more educated are more able to consider, even re-consider, issues (Stouffer's 'sober second thought', 1954).

As a component of education, some have argued that variations in media effects across types of mass communication hinge on the distribution and level of literacy in a society (O'Neil 1998, 8). Butler and Stokes (1969) provided more convincing evidence in support of it based on information processing, stating that as individuals became more sophisticated (cognitively), increasing information would have less significant influence (1969, 225). More recent work has suggested that the most informed people about public affairs are more likely to absorb new information (Price and Zaller 1992; Robinson and Levy 1986); yet, the choice of vocabulary suggests a more subtle difference, rather than been influenced, they are more likely to be able to interpret new information.

The knowledge gap theory captures this relationship. This literature simply states that the interaction between education and quality media in the form of good newspapers and television greatly stratifies society (Gunter 1987, 301-17; Kleinnijenhuios 1987, 499-522; Viswanath and Finnegan 1996, 117-135). Essentially, an attentive minority gains more

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information from media than the rest. The principle components of the knowledge gap include a general distribution of aggregate information in society among social classes and the specific subjects or topics on which some are better informed than others. Tichenor *et al.* (1970) argue that the knowledge gap hypothesis does not state that lower status population segments remain completely uninformed; instead, the growth of knowledge is relatively greater among the higher status segments. Some have argued that in political campaign studies, 'gap-closing' can occur in the short-term (Blumler and McQuail 1968). In smaller communities concerning wide-ranging problems, findings suggest a reverse effect, diminishing the differences among citizens (Donohue *et al.*1970). However, not all information may be important to all groups (based on motivation and perceived utility of information) (Novak 1977). The core of the 'knowledge gap' hypothesis is that individuals do not consume information uniformly (mainly due to cognitive capacities related to socio-economic disparities). The gap is less relevant to new democracies as political support (as a democratic characteristic) may serve the long-term stability of the regime more effectively than individuals' possession of neutral, factual data about it.[10]

However, the relationship is not as clear when the concern is influence as those in the middle range of education might combine exposure and openness as to maximize opinion change (Converse 1962; Zaller 1987, 1990b).[11] Simply, the moderately informed are most susceptible to new information as the highly informed are likely committed in advance and the poorly-informed rarely encounter significant messages (Berelson *et*

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[10] Moreover, another reason that the examination of explicitly factual political knowledge may be limited is that news presents aggregated factual knowledge, that is, to some degree contextualized (Sotirovic and McLeod 2001, 274).

[11] This highlights the non-monotonicity of individuals' personal attributes, originally contributing to the 'floating voter' hypothesis.

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*al.*1954; see also Converse 1962). Graber has made similar arguments stating that socio-political predispositions are relevant as "…the success of mass media in bringing about change hinges on the receptivity for change" (1993, 235). Key took this one step further and considering media as the disseminator of culture, formal education may actually serve to influence individuals to adhere more strongly the 'official' values (1961, 340), what he called an 'indoctrinating effect'. Others suggest that even highly educated people may lack political interest or motivation (Luskin 1990). For Zaller (1992), the more sophisticated are more likely to be able to consume media as an informational tool rather than as a distraction (see also Schmitt-Beck 1999). Newton notes that education has always been crucial as "… it has a strong influence on the use of different kinds of media, and affects mobilization and malaise" (1999, 584; see also Brehm and Rahn 1997).

Like income, residence may be a technological argument (availability of broadcast equipment or differences in the variety and number of sources, such as newspapers) but it is also an attempt to get at a more subtle disparity between metropolitan and rural attitudes to various media, particularly media sources (international vs. domestic).

Socio-Political Predispositions:

"*Every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition*" (Zaller 1992, 6).

What are socio-political predispositions and why are they important in understanding the influence of mass media on individuals (see Figure 3)? Zaller makes the most convincing argument in defining and describing their intervening effects (1992, chap. 2). He showed that mass media did affect individuals' political preferences but did so as these effects were mediated by individuals' particular array of social and political predispositions. He argued that predispositions were "…stable, individual-level traits that

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regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political communications the person receives" (*ibid.*, 23), This, he argues, is the critical variable between mass media and political preferences.[12] For this inquiry, the socio-political predispositions are political interest, ideological orientation, and social communication.

<Figure 3 about here>

Political Interest:

Political interest as a predisposition is individual activity directed at making oneself more aware of the political order. Political interest is also related to an individual's broader political identity in that, the manner by which people cope with the world, includes their analytical capacity and their strategies of learning (Lane 1969, 95). Individual's abilities to make adjustments are partially predicated on their adaptive behavior, including the process of accumulating information and using it (Bennett 1976). The sources of information, again, include mass media (Iyengar 1990; McCombs and Poindexter 1983; Robinson and Levy 1986; Weaver 1996).

A combination of rising education levels and easier access to lager amounts of political information have helped mobilize citizens both cognitively and behaviorally (Newton 1999, 580-1). Dalton has made an argument that the declining role of partisanship and parties in Western Europe is related to citizens' cognitive mobilization (1996). A slow but steady increase in political interest, discussion, and ideological sophistication in the US, Britain, France, and Germany has challenged traditional democratic politics (see also Neumann 1986, 40; Topf 1995, 52-91; Verba 1993, 679). Inglehart has also argued that cognitive engagement is a new and prominent feature of

[12] Individuals' predispositions approximate features of Zaller's R-A-S model as his 'reception axiom' estimates the general levels of information (or interest) and his 'acceptance axiom' is measure of ideological congruency with messages received.

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modern politics (1990, 52-91), associated with higher political participation, more political discussion, greater political information, heightened political awareness, refined ideological skills. Klingemann uses self-rated political interest as an indicator of political motivation (1979, 264). Additionally, Schmitt-Beck found that higher consumption of media correlates with higher levels of political awareness (1999), although television consumption with low political interest has been argued to be neutralizing (Cundy 1989).

Measures of political interest have gone by several names and have clustered around information: activity (Converse 1964, 1980), sophistication (Chong, McClosky, and Zaller 1984; Erikson 1979; Luskin 1990; Neuman 1986; Sidanius 1988), expertise (Fiske and Kinder 1981; Fiske, Lau, and Smith 1990), awareness, and education (Dean and Moran 1977; Judd and Milburn 1980; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). "Political awareness denotes intellectual or *cognitive* engagement with public affairs as against emotional or affective engagement or no engagement at all" (Zaller 1992, 21). Zaller has undergone varied conceptualizations (1986, 1990) using education, media exposure, participation in politics, and political knowledge as measures of political awareness. He prefers (and uses in 1992), political facts. However, where this was not available, education and interest served as proxies. In his Measures Appendix, he even flirts with using media use as political awareness but thinks better of it given the wide range of content (1992, 334). The first axiom in his R-A-S model (the Reception Axiom) relies in cognitive engagement (political interest) in its contribution to making send of the message received (*ibid.*, 42). Additionally, he excludes personal influence from his model, limiting it to elite discourse, which takes place via mass media (*ibid.*, 44). Yet for Zaller, political interest is an affective involvement and has little bearing on the stability

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of attitudes (*ibid.*, table 2; see also Feldman 1989). He notes that political interest is more highly correlated with political action (i.e. voter turnout) than political knowledge (*ibid.*, 43). Given that this inquiry is concerned with socializing citizens to democratic, arguably more engaged, political atttiudes, this is relevant. Similarly, for CEE, political interest is important to the development of democratic political culture because an interest in politics is an indicator of the eagerness to be informed (Schmitt-Beck 1999, 227).

Some authors have argued that as individuals slip into an indifferent attitude (i.e. not politically interested), news loses its ability to influence them (MacKuen 1984; Neuman 1986). Neuman (1986) in particular suggests that there is simply not enough evidence that media can teach specific information or enhance political sophistication; yet, Krugman and Hartley (1971) refute this by amassing evidence that people with little political interest can acquire information about national elections (Blumler and McQuail 1969); network news programs (Wamsley and Pride 1972); television documentaries (Fitzsimmons and Osburn 1969); specific events, such as Watergate (Robinson 1972). They denote this 'passive learning' (Krugman and Hartley 1971, 629). Others have expanded on this idea (and in doing so, increased its relevance to Eastern Europe), by suggesting that a tremendous expansion of information sources plus habitual exposure fosters a climate of passive learning (Zukin and Snyder 1984, 630). It seems that media's influence through political interest is both overt and subtle.

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Ideological Orientation:

As transitions continue in Eastern Europe, the correlations between media use and ideology may be entirely unpredictable given the wide ideological dispersion of political parties and that citizens of these countries have not demonstrated strongly held ideological beliefs. The more important question is how ideological orientation serves as a primary political predisposition through which media may be processed. An individual's ideological orientation is likely to influence his media consumption patterns by not only shaping incoming news but also by choosing to consume ideologically congruent information (Dahlgren 1987). This may shape an individual's pattern of consumption by steering him toward national vs. international news, television vs. newspaper, news vs. entertainment, thereby influencing his resulting democratic attitudes. There is evidence that individuals with strongly held ideological orientations were likely to view the information source as hostile to their representative (even if evaluating the *same* source) (Dalton *et al.*1998).

Klingemann also argues that political participation increases as ideological sophistication does, making one aware of the interdependence of political phenomena and implies a high degree of value consciousness (1979, 279; see also Converse 1975; Verba *et al.*1995 as to individuals' recognition *of the importance of* political action). Ideology shapes incoming information as well. Some authors argue that ideology is related to media consumption in that it influences the sources chosen and filters content. Entman has proposed that ideology is a 'screen or filter', a schema that influences the use people make of media messages (1989). He argues that the interaction of ideology (their schemas) and the content of the message shapes the impact of news (*ibid.*, 351). There is

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evidence that individuals with strongly held ideological orientations were likely to view the information source as hostile to their representative (even if evaluating the *same* source) (Dalton *et al.*1998). In the American context, Mutz and Martin (2001) find that PID has a nonmonotonic relationship with exposure to dissimilar views in personal communication; but in contrast, is linearly related to patterns of media consumption. They argue that individuals are not only less able to control the content of media than their own communication networks but also less interested in cultivating disagreement in personal relationships (*ibid.*, 107).

The role of ideological orientation provides the heuristic utility of simplifying information that coincides with individual's ability to create, or construct, attitudes and ultimately actions, whether political or social (Butler and Stokes 1974; Campbell *et al.*1960; Downs 1957; Nie, Petrocik, and Verba 1976; Popkin 1991; Sinderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Short-cuts such as this seem to be the process through which citizens 'calculate' final outputs (preferences to actions) (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; for spatial ideological reasoning see Hinich and Munger 1994). Ideology is one of those short cuts, often employed as a useful heuristic to filter large quantities of information (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, 1995). The necessary and sufficient component is simply a psychological attachment to a party rather than party membership or a commitment in the form of voting for that party. Conceptually, therefore, a partisan is a citizen who identifies with a particular party's ideological stance. Although the literature on the development and alignments of partisans in advanced industrial societies is quite large, for new democracies, the research has been cursory and inconsistent, limited by a relatively short time of party competition in which parties can amass constituents based

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on programmatic, charismatic, or clientelistic appeals. Unlike the resonance of partisanship and the acceptance or rejection of incoming information that emerges in Western studies, given the fluidity of the party system and ideological attachments to parties and even broad political orientations, partisanship is an uncertain heuristic in CEE at the time of this examination.

Although much has been written on the competing goals of democracy (the mixed culture of subject-participant in Almond and Verba 1963; or Eckstein's 'balanced disparites', 1996, 20), there is some consensus over the principles of liberty, equality, individualism, compromise, the acceptance of the procedures of majority rule and minority rights, free speech, and participation (Protho and Grigg 1960, 279-83). Incumbent upon this process is the universal disbursement of civil liberties in an equitably fashion (Dahl 1989). Institutionally, the *sine qua non* of modern democracy is strong political opposition, such that its prime purpose is *be* the government (Lijphart 1999, 6), and is given the ability to do so. This is at the core of the liberal-democratic project. Although "'[e]conomic man' seems to be a species strikingly different from 'democratic man'" (Eckstein 1996, 13), as Rohrschneider has noted (1999, 63), the linkage between these particular political and economic values is that both seek to maximize individual freedoms. Therefore these questions will, to some degree, hinge on individuals' orientation to political freedom. The ideological values expressed by citizens are captured in their expressed attitudes regarding both their preferred economic system type and their attachment to political ideals. Democratic values, at one end of the ideological continuum, are normative commitments to the institutions of democracy and the practices allowed within, with authoritarian ideals are at the other end. Similarly for

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economic values, free market principles are at the opposite end of the continuum from planned economy ideals.

Personal Communication:

Finally, the filter hypothesis suggests that information the individuals are exposed to is filtered through a network of social networks and relationships (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Kenny 1998; MacKuen and Brown 1987; Pattie and Johnston 2001; Schmitt-Beck 2003). Berelson *et al.* (1954) originally argued that there was a relationship between media exposure and personal discussion but that these were mutually reinforcing rather than competing. Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) introduced the ‘filter hypothesis’ arguing the influence of mass media was mediated by personal political communication by either reinforcing or blocking the impact of media information for voters, i.e. it was ‘filtered’. This process depended on the evaluative implications of that information and on the political composition of voters' political communications within his social network. Although some have tried to argue that mass-mediated information is direct and not through interpersonal network (Chaffee 1982); the ‘filter hypothesis’ has remained a mainstay of political communication research, corroborated in cross-national election studies from Britain, Spain, the United States and West Germany (Schmitt-Beck 2003).

Still, others have argued that personal communication is the most important of the factors (Chaffee and Mutz 1988). The most recent research has argued that despite the level and intensity of incoming information for or against a given issue or party, individual social networks provide the clearest acceptance or refusal basis for decisions (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mendelsohn 1996; Mondak 1995a; Schmitt-Beck 1999; Zaller 1992). Social communication networks are relevant essentially because of the

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critical role of the discussants, or as Carey has termed them, 'disputants' (1993, 6). MacKuen and Brown (1987) make this clear that social networks and the political discussion contained within are another information channel, not an independent force but one that shapes information coming from outside. Rather than create this information, social networks are merely intervening mechanisms.

Other manifestations of personal communication theories, such as the two-step flow of communication (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1985; Katz 1957), argue that informed and motivated individuals collected the information and through a series of informal social relationships. Lazarsfeld *et al.*'s study (1944) examined the impact on voters of that year's mass-communicated presidential election campaign in Erie County, Ohio. Audience members were either activated (motivated by the mass communications) or simply reinforced in their beliefs, while reversals were few and far between. They did discover that social categories were important, such that political conversations outnumbered media use. "…[I]deas often flow from radio and print to the opinion leaders and from them to the less active section of the population" (Lazarsfeld *et al.*1944, 155), suggesting patterns of consumption of these 'opinion leaders'. Others simply argued that opinion leadership is largely horizontal, that is, contained within a social category (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1954; see also Black 1982). This horizontal structure further suggests that this 'group' may be drawn out by their socio-political predispositions and social and economic location variables. However, this approach cannot rest on the assumption that the experts are always right nor they are readily accessible to citizens; therefore, short-cuts and opinion leaders do not solve the problem of the uninformed citizen and are not effective substitutes for the 'real thing' (Kinder 1998, 176). Others have demonstrated

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this connective failure between citizens and opinion leaders as poorly informed, as American voters differed from opinion leaders (Bartels 1996a).

The filter hypothesis is predicated on an individual's interpersonal communication and variations of his network composition. As this data set does not contain network data, we must make the assumption that an individual who does not try out his political ideas in discussion with others is more susceptible to the influence of media.[13] Mass media are better at exposing individuals to competing viewpoints than inter-personal communication hence its role as a filter and its contribution to the normative underpinnings of democratic theory (Mutz and Martin 2001, 109-10). "Personal communication thus assumes a role that is functionally equivalent to the role of political predispositions" (Schmitt-Beck 2003, 235).

Yet, given the theoretical basis of the filter hypothesis, if an individual's personal communication is both statistically and substantively significant, we cannot make a plausible argument that CEE's tend toward more homogeneous networks, but simply that this predisposition does shape the impact of media (the 'if' of media effects).[14] Of course, this inquiry is interested in exactly that question. The mere measurement of personal political communication within social networks allows for some understanding of this process (Schmitt-Beck 1999; Zaller 1990). This suggests that the political communication networks and individual political predispositions accentuated the effect when they were congruent with mass media (Campbell *et al.*1960; Conover 1984; Shively 1972; Zaller 1992). Or more simply, various distributions of predispositions are likely to produce wide

[13] Robinson (1983) argues that a lack of political discussion is neutralizing even if an individual watches the news.

[14] The measure for social communication does lack one specific component. Unlike Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) I do not have the ability to determine the like-mindedness of in-group discussion.

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variations of influences *over the same* media. Therefore, the model, like Schmitt-Beck's model incorporating political predispositions, exposure to mass media, and personal social environments (2003, 240), is set up to include media consumption, socio-political predispositions, and democratic attitudes.

The social and economic location variables will include both structural and individual attributes: age, education, location, income; while the socio-political predispositions include ideological orientation, political interest, and networks of personal communication. Individuals' social location and relations, political experience and expectations mediate mass media's influence as they serve as a filter of sorts, tending to affect groups differently. Using socio-political variables allows us to estimate individuals' social and political contexts in which they are embedded. Therefore, this inquiry examines individuals' patterns of media consumption as it is mediated through their social and economic locations and socio-political predispositions to shape their democratic attitudes.[15] Therefore, we arrive at Figure 4:

<Figure 4 about here>

In sum, individuals respond according to differing sets of social, economic, psychological, and political orientations. As Zaller (1992) and Schmitt-Beck (2003)[16] have suggested, socio-political predispositions (as they include social and economic status variables) mediate media' influence. These studies come closest to remedying the 'media effects' issue. By identifying the mediating effect of individual-level qualities rather than assuming simple consumption variation among audience members, this idea goes further in eliciting the estimative influence of media. Various combinations of

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[15] Jaccard *et al*. (1990) call these 'moderated causal relationships'.

[16] In his media study, Schmitt-Beck calls social and economic location variables, social structural variables (2003, 240).

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socio-political predispositions and media consumption heighten the effect of media while other combinations negate its influence.

The next chapter sets out the methodological approach to this inquiry. It will outline the methodological approach, introduce the quantitative techniques to be employed, operationalize the variables, and discuss the methodological difficulties in this type of research.

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Figures:

Figure 1: Mass Media and Political and Economic Attitudes:



Figure 2: Socio-Economic Location, Mass Media, and Political and Economic Attitudes



Figure 3: Socio-Political Predispositions, Mass Media, and Political and Economic Attitudes:



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Figure 4: Socio-Economic Location, Socio-Political Predispositions and Democratic Attitudes:



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Chapter 4: Methodology

This section will define the methodological guidelines of this inquiry, including the selected cases, data to be used, operationalization of indicators, analytical techniques, and test implications that will lend support to these hypotheses. This inquiry is interested in the influence of the media on individuals' development of democratic attitudes. Instead of trying to assert media's primacy, it is interested rather in its contribution to the process of individuals learning new political attitudes. This research is an initial foray into the understanding of the relationship between media and democratization through systematic cross-national and cross-temporal analysis. Statistical significance will lend support to the hypothesized relationships under examination; yet, only theory can assert causality Again, this inquiry will determine the influence of media effects on individual political socialization and conclude with an extrapolation from these findings toward a theoretical argument of mass media influence and democratization.

Case Selection:

Why Central and Eastern Europe? For these citizens, this period was a time of fluid political and social identities. Were media able to provide a common political experience (Bennett 2000) or did the rapid fragmentation of media institutions also impose fragmenting effects on their audience? Studies of media in Central and Eastern Europe have been largely focused on the structural, technological, and institutional changes required of moving mass media institutions away from state financial and ideological control (Corcoran and Preston 1995; Gross 2002, 2004; Hester 1991, 1992; Milton 2000; O'Neil 1997, 1998; Paletz 1995; Rogerson 1997; Rantanen 1998; Sparks 2000; Splichal 1994). This inquiry differs in that it will examine the hypothesized effects of mass media

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on individuals during periods of political and economic transition. This section will establish the distribution of media between countries and confront the question of self-selection by examining the correlations between socio-economic variables and individuals' media consumption patterns.

For the examination of individuals' democratic values and economic evaluations, the cases in this inquiry are the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland. Each of them have made the political and economic reforms consistent with democratizing and market liberalization in the last decade and a half. These countries emerged as democracies at roughly the same time and from approximately the same absence of a competitive media market. As mentioned before, not only the institutional origin of media but citizens' relative lack of experience with media differentiates Central and Eastern Europeans from citizens of AID's in a theoretically useful manner. Without the long-term and habituating relationship between individuals and media, they approach media without knowing exactly what responsibilities, duties, and short-comings they may possess.

Data:

The source of evidence to be used in testing the hypotheses is a collection of individual-level surveys conducted by Intermedia Surveys in Eastern Europe.[1] The central topic of these surveys was originally to provide measures of audience attention to foreign media broadcasts; yet, they provide individuals' contemporary responses to

[1] **Bulgaria**: conducted by CSD; face-to-face interviews; raw sample size: 2031; fieldwork 17 May – 31 May 1997. **Czech Republic**: conducted by AISA; face-to-face interviews; raw sample size: 1003; fieldwork 12 May – 24 June 1997. **Hungary**: conducted by MEMRB, Budapest; face-to-face interviews; raw sample size: 2021; fieldwork 8 March – 25 March 1996. **Poland**: conducted by CEM; face-to-face interviews; raw sample size: 2004; fieldwork 13 May – 10 June 1997. **Romania**: conducted by IMAS, Bucharest; face-to-face interviews; raw sample size: 2124; fieldwork 21 May – 4 June 1997. **Slovakia**: conducted by AISA; face-to-face interviews; raw sample size: 1118; fieldwork 2 May – 2 June 1997.

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media consumption, socio-political predispositions, and social and economic location indicators. These surveys have been carried out annually with approximately 2000 respondents per country per year and used nearly identical questionnaires for the general surveys in these six countries contributing to the cross-national comparability.

The media variables associated with each stage of this research will be presented and operationalized in the respective chapters below. This section will operationalize the common variables from the Intermedia survey instruments and present the indicators. Social location is captured by education, age, and place of residence. Economic location is captured by about monthly household income. Although these are individual level attributes, they are largely structural constraints that shape individuals' democratic attitudes. The questions from the Intermedia surveys include the following (see Table 1):

<Table 1 about here>

The set of socio-political predispositions are captured by measures of ideological orientation, political interest, and personal communication. The questions from the Intermedia surveys include (see Table 2):

<Table 2 about here>

Although Zaller (1992) suggests that strong partisans will be more resistant to countervailing messages, the use of PID in this period of transition is problematic given the political scrum of political parties taking place at that time. This is discussed further below.

The dependent variables from the Intermedia surveys include the following (see Table 3):

<Table 3 about here>

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As each chapter presents a new set of media variables, the operationalization of these variables will be in the respective chapters.

Empirical Methodology:

As we have seen above, the interactive nature of the independent variables suggest changes in the dependent variables as the product of the main and interactive effects of individuals' media consumption and SES/SPP. Congruent with the theory of uses and gratification and the larger literature on media effects discussed in the Theory chapter above, individuals' SES and SPP are not overtly causally related to media consumption but rather moderate the influence of media choices. Therefore, to empirically assess this model in this thesis, I will estimate this model using interaction terms with a multiple regression analytical framework. The use of interaction terms is an often overlooked and underutilized analytical technique. This study is interested not only in the independent, or direct, effects of these variables but also in the multiplicative effects that are both theoretically driven and empirically estimable.

Interactions: Methodology

The most commonly used interaction term regression strategy is achieved by including a multiplicative term (see Cohen and Cohen 1983). Using multiplicative terms or interaction variables in multiple regression, while computationally more complicated, is more likely to tap the underlying relationships between the independent variables as they relate to the dependent variable. In doing so, however, it steers us gently from the scientific siren, simplification, and the challenge comes in the interpretation.

Before I continue, I would like to address the several critiques of this approach (see Friedrich 1982, 798-800). Many researchers have hesitated using interaction terms given

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the difficulty in interpreting the regression coefficients. This is based on the sometimes significant change of the partial coefficients for the non-interactive variables when an interaction term is introduced into the equation. The common reaction is that these partials are nonsensical or that the interactive terms are ‘stealing’ the explanatory power from the additive terms. (see also Jaccard *et al*. 1990, 26-7). This is because adding an interaction term changes the solution to the model.

The non-interactive model describes a general solution to, or general trend in, the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Regression models that incorporate interaction terms estimate the effects of both the singular and combined effects resulting in a conditional solution (Friedrich 1982). Essentially, the difference in the estimated coefficients of strictly additive and interaction models is the difference between a general solution and a ‘conditional’ solution. That is, the additive model partial represents the general trend of X_n and X_m on Y at all levels of X_n and X_m. Conditional solutions present the relationship of X_n and X_m on Y at particular locations or values of X_n and X_m. The partials on the non-interaction independent variables are not the isolated contribution but the conditional effect (depending on the value of the interaction term), that is, the effects change across different values of the independent variables. Significant changes in the partial coefficients of non-interactive terms are the result of estimating that relationship at a particular value (typically the mean, see below). The interactive terms describe how that relationship changes given different values of the interactive terms.

Like in the paragraph above, the statistical significance of independent variables often change upon including an interactive term. Estimation becomes sensitive to the sample it is estimating, that is, trivial changes in the variables lead to non-trivial changes in the

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estimators. While this is not an easily dismissible charge, it must be remembered that interactive models ask more from the data than additive models (Freidrich 1982, 817-8). Only post-estimation analysis can answer this question through checking the robustness of the estimated parameters.

Another issue is the problem of multicollinearity in interactive models. Without revisiting the evils of multicollinearity in multiple regression equations, the most unpleasant outcome is that standard errors are grossly inflated and sometimes correlated, making disentangling the separate contributions of the independent variables and interaction terms much more difficult (Friedrich 1982, 809-17). Computationally, centering the continuous independent variables prior to forming the multiplicative term (Cronbach 1978; Jaccard *et al*. 1990, 31) yields low correlations between the interaction term and the component variables (see below). Similarly, the inflated standard errors are a product of the conditional solution, and can be, depending on the values of the independent variables, smaller than the additive model's (Friedrich 1982, 803).

As a final criticism, some have argued that interactive terms can only be used on ratio level data, owing to the substantiveness of the zero. Jaccard *et al*. (1990, 28-9) demonstrate that interval level data is as well appropriate. Dummy variables can also be used, however, ordinal level data may present a problem. Some have argued that because many social scientists generally ignore ordinality in normal OLS regression, the estimators may render somewhat interpretable results depending on their approximation of interval level data (although it is generally not favored).

The use of interaction effects is the admission that the complexity underlying the posited relationship among variables is not simply additive but includes more complex

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non-additive, or in this case, multiplicative, effects. That is, "…the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable may vary, depending on the level of some other variable" (Friedrich 1982, 797-8). Given the sheer volume of interaction effects that would result from multiplying 5-18 media variables by 7 SES and SPP variables, to determine the presence of significant interaction effects, the following recommended procedure was used (see Jaccard *et al*. 1990).[2]

ANOVA tests are performed on pairs of independent variables (SES and SPP with each media variable) and the subsequent interaction terms on each of the dependent variables to determine the potential contribution of a multiplicative term. The return of a significant F-test on the interactive term, despite the significance on the independent variables, suggests that an interaction is present in the data. This *a priori* testing is not intended to bypass the substantive theory driving this study but rather create manageable models that lend themselves to intelligible interpretation without overwhelming the reader (or obfuscating the substantively significant results).[3]

While some advocates of using this approach concede that the method for determining the presence of significant interaction effects is subject to the criticism of 'snooping' (Jaccard *et al*. 1990), they also argue that the substantive results of excluding statistically insignificant interaction terms is negligible. Yet, the substantive results of *excluding* interaction terms can be significant, ultimately misleading the researcher in interpretation. Therefore, by using this technique, I can determine which interaction terms

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[2] Given the complexity of these interactions, the specific expectations are discussed in the specific chapters. However, the interactive terms are primarily a methodological means of tapping subtle media effects rather than explicitly modeled variables. The primary role is to control for individual-level variation in media consumption and elicit the contribution of media as it pertains to groups (as defined by SES and SPP membership).

[3] I tested each of the full models with all of the interactions and the ones with a reduced number of interactions and there was no substantive change in the interpretation of the smaller interactions model from the larger one. The latter is presented then for clarity of interpretation and a consideration for space.

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to include and which to exclude. Jaccard *et al*. (1990, 24; see also 59-63) further warn researchers that non-significance of the interaction terms in the full model may suggest the presence of a non-linear functional form in that interactive term. To check for this, I painstakingly examined the scatterplots of every possible interaction effect between media variables and SES and SPP on the dependent variables and found no obvious non-linear forms in the plots.

Interpretation:

The interpretation of an equation with multiplicative terms is based on the conditional relationship between the independent variables. While more difficult to present a coherent interpretation, the results are more detailed, providing additional insight into the complex question of media effects. The advantage of using interaction terms in this analysis is confirmed as in every model, the coefficient of determination improved, the standard error of the estimate decreased, and the F-test returned an equivalent or improved score after adding the interaction terms.

I also use centering which is simply subtracting the mean of the observed values from each of them, making the new mean zero.[4] This aids the interpretation without changing the substantive significance of the variables in the model. While the coefficients of the centered model change, they do so to accommodate the additional information generated by the centered data. Additional information can be generated from centering by choosing the zero (the 'centered value') to represent a substantively interesting value. Simply, centering also allows us to estimate the model at the mean values of many of the variables while having no impact on the substantive interpretation of the model.

[4] Centering is done only on the continuous interval level independent variables.

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Including the interaction creates discernable effects that, modeled as competing direct effect, might not emerge. When we add the interaction, we are primarily concerned whether it is significant or not. An insignificant main effect partial coefficient suggests that at its mean, the effect is not statistically significant. However, if accompanied by a statistically significant interaction term, this indicates that that is not true at other values of the main effect. Again, this is revealed in the conditional nature of the multiplicative effects as we are now predicting across a range of values rather than settling on a general, that is to say, uniform solution. Additionally, multiplicative terms in regression analysis can incorporate dummy variables as well. This is relevant as non-continuous (i.e. ordinal and nominal level) variables do not meet the computational demands of multiplicative terms.

Methodological limitations:

As with any social science research there are conceptual and methodological problems. This inquiry is no exception. As has been discussed above, the most salient is the directness or indirectness of media effects. Media effects are understood as impacting an audience as a set of individuals who encounter the media as social beings connected to their social environments (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1982, 184). Yet, the *how* of media effects remained undeveloped. The accumulation of empirical data, particularly in the American context, have been experiments which have typically focused, due to the nature of the research method, on a single communication or specific effect. We do have to make the assumption that exposure is a proxy for reception (an important distinction made by Chaffee and Schleuder 1986; see also Price and Zaller 1993). This inquiry, while limited by the lack of theoretical coherency among comparable cross-national

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studies on which to base its expectations on, will make some effort at broadening that set of studies, and therefore, broadening our understanding of these processes.

Limitations include problems with both the cross-national comparability with not only media concepts but also audiences. Due to the cross-national approach, can we consider the concepts that we are trying to capture to be the same in each country? As with most cross-national surveys, this problem is omnipresent. Cross-national studies are often marred by the comparability of units of analysis (and to some degree so are cross-temporal studies, see Blumler, McLeod, Rosengren 1992; Gurevitch and Blumler 1990; Schmitt-Beck 1999), it may be that long-term habits of consumption (rather than a little exposure) may accumulate impact (see Iyengar 1991). The cross-national approach is problematic, not only because of most theories origination in America, but also because as Schmitt-Beck has asserted (1999, 231), cross-national conceptual validity must not only differentiate between the type of medium and classify each by its political information type but also through individual channels. Therefore, in this inquiry, media will be divided among medium (differentiation between television, newspaper, maybe even radio); frequency of use; differences between media sources such as its source (national, international); and content (news, entertainment).

As media effects have best been demonstrated in the experimental setting, using survey data can be not only more ‘noisy’ but also misleading (Ansolabehere *et al.*1999). Others have also noted some difficulties with using survey data for media responses (Hirsch 1980, 1981; Hughes 1980) However, as this inquiry is not interested in single effects or short-term responses, in order to gauge media’s influence, we will make the assumption that the data are reliable and valid measures of these variables. Further, by

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including as much information that is theoretically demanded, we are testing these models in each country with as much control as has been hypothesized to be relevant. Conceptually, we must assume that they are and attribute variation to un-modeled macro-level processes or the stochastic measurement of the survey instrument.

The argument for the limitations of using survey data to examine media effects is further based on the difficulty of relying on respondents' self-reported measures of media use. Bartels (1993, 1997) has argued that questions regarding media use specifically interested in political campaigns and specific advertisements are often fraught with issues of individuals' inability to recall specific advertisements and accurate accounting for media use.[5] One advantage that this survey analysis has is the examination of broad media usage patterns. By tapping the more easily recalled self-reported broad usage patterns rather than specific political advertisements and campaign placements, this analysis sidesteps the "weak memories" of citizens in recalling episodes of specific media exposure. Within the framework of the general assessment approach of this examination, questions asking respondents to account for basic media use consumption and exposure is less likely to be problematic. Recalling specific exposures or programming is more difficult for individuals than general patterns of media use.

Chaffee and Kanihan (1997) argue that the use of cross-sectional examinations contributes to our understanding of media effects. This analytic approach is justified as a

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[5] In Bartels' contribution to political scientists' understanding of media effects (1993), he argues that analyses of media impact include independent variables that are 'subject to serious measurement error' (*ibid.*, 268), especially self-reported measures of media consumption (particularly in conjunction with political attitudes regarding specific candidates or issues). Yet, he is not clear exactly how or why (see also Hetherington 1996; Pan and Kosicki 1997). His analysis lacks a theoretical link between media and candidate evaluations and relies on correlation as sufficient explanation. Methodologically, he uses 'exposure to network news' as a measure of 'exposure to presidential campaign news' (1993, 269). Bypassing the assumption that exposure is reception, this seems to be a generous proxy measurement, and arguably insufficient.

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first-order test of causal hypotheses (vs. cross-temporal examinations). Their position is that if we are unable to find correlation between media and the hypothesized dependent variable at one period, the proposition that media have effect cross-temporally would be difficult to maintain. This is, this broad examination is quite fruitful in setting the stage for further research.

Finally, this is a relationship, like all social phenomena, that does not occur in isolation. We cannot, in other words, assume *ceteris paribus*. The practice of using SES and SPP variables for controls in media related questions assumes that individuals approach media uniformly and that the differences will wash out by controlling for them. But self-selection suggests that the SES shape individuals demands for media, suggesting an interactive rather than simply a related relationship. Statistical correlation does provide control for the abundance of variables; yet, causality is captured in theory. While some theories are 'easier to see' (i.e. more common sensical) than others, this is not an effort to model the complete and complex process of how individuals learn new political values and assume their new roles in new democracies. It is, however, an attempt to understand one facet of this process. Given the interactive nature of media and their audience, the reciprocity of audience feedback into media development and presentation, this inquiry is simply examining the unidirectional flow of influence.

This is not an explicit causal argument but a model of the indirect or mediated influence of mass media consumption on individuals' democratic attitudes. I have some hesitancy in referring to this relationship as causal; yet, all attempts at theory are inherently seeking to establish such a relationship. As others have remarked, "… we are not able to determine precisely what exactly it is about the media that produces these

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effects" (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer 2000, 14). This inquiry, therefore, must be considered an attempt at constructing the basis to make causal inferences between media consumption of individuals' political attitudes.

Outline of Inquiry:

Once again, I ask the following questions: How do citizens of democratizing countries use media? What effect does making attentive or information-seeking media choices have? What effect does making distraction-seeking media choices have? Have international media contributed to this process or are domestic media the only, or at least dominant, source of media influence? Do the observed effects correlate with cross-national variation in the degree of media institutional reform? To answer these questions in the chapters below, I take the following approach.

I ask the most basic media question. Which media do citizens of countries in transition use various media? Do we see the same consumption patterns, media choices, and responses to these choices? Therefore, the first empirical chapter simply examines the various usage choices of individuals. How do these individuals use media and how does a choice of radio, newspaper, and/or television correlate with particular political and economic attitudes. This question seeks correlations that provide clues to causation. Does television (radio, newspaper) consumption correlate in ways we expect? And if so, why? And if not, why? These answers to these questions establish that not only are individuals' media usage during periods of democratization different from the west, but also that in many cases mediums play different roles.

To address the next two questions, I introduce variation in individuals' content choices for television. While a topic of enormous discussion within the western media

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literature, we must defer to the unknown. Does individuals' consumption of news inform them and cultivate democratic attitudes; that is, does information-seeking aid their understanding of the process of democratization? Conversely, does individuals' consumption of entertainment, that is, distraction-seeking, alienate and isolate them and discourage political engagement in the political changes taking place? This part of the analysis taps a more important question by capturing more specific consumption choices, that is, subtle political behavior in the form of information-seeking or distraction-seeking during a time when the demand of learning new political norms is paramount.

The third part addresses a question central to the democratization literature. Beyond domestic media sources, do international sources of media provide a means for individuals to learn new political norms? The diffusion hypothesis suggests that international media, as they are consumed by citizens of countries moving toward democracy, cultivate norms associated with the sending country. In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, western media penetration into the region was not happenstance but a conscious program of competing with the authoritarian regimes. Therefore the question is simply whether in the transition period, international media have maintained their influence, promoting democratic values.

Finally, given the diversity of media institutional reform in the region, we cannot make the assumption that these countries present identical media from which variation at the individual-level would simply be a matter of citizens' choices. Therefore, to address the cross-national variation in media institutional reform, I place these countries reform process in historical context and use an index of legislative measures, the influx of international media, residual political influence, and technological capacity and create a

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rank ordering of these countries across all of the included media. Given the regional variation in the degree of media institutional reform, I then correlate these rankings with the individual-level findings to determine if the extent of structural disengagement in these countries suggests stages of media's effects on the political socialization process.

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Tables:

Table 1: Social and Economic Location Indicators:

Social and Economic Location Variables:	**Survey Question:**
Age	<AGE> How old are you?
Education	<EDUC> What is the highest level of education you have attained?
Urban/Rural	<URBRUR> Urban or rural?
Income	<HHMOINC> last month's household income before tax and other deductions.

Table 2: Socio-Political Predisposition Indicators:

Socio-Political Predispositions:	**Survey Question:**
Personal Communication	<TALKPOL> When you get together with your friends, would you say that you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, never?
Ideological Orientation	<INDEMSOC> How interested are you in a democratic society? + <INMKTEC> How interested are you in a market economy?
Political Interest	*Please indicate for each topic whether you are: very interested, somewhat interested, not interested, or DK* <INDOMPOL> Interest in Domestic Politics + <INLOCPOL> Interest in Local Politics + <INREGPOL> Interest in Regional Politics + <ININTPOL> Interest in International Politics

Table 3: Dependent Variables:

	Survey Questions:
Institutional Trust	A great deal of confidence, some confidence, not very much confidence, no confidence at all, DK <CFCGOV> How much confidence do you have in Central government? + <CFLOCOGV> How much confidence do you have in local government? + <CFJUDIC> How much confidence do you have in the Judiciary? + <CFPRESCY> How much confidence do you have in the Presidency? + <CFPARLMT> How much confidence do you have in the Parliament?
Sociotropic Economic Evaluation:	<SATECSIT> How satisfied are you with the economic situation in [country] these days?
Egocentric Economic Evaluation:	<SATSTDLV> And how satisfied are you with your own standard of living?

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Chapter 5: Reading, Watching, and Listening: Medium and Frequency

Introduction

During the mid-1990's, all forms of mass media in Central and Eastern Europe were emerging from state control. Multiple domestic, international, and co-owned television stations, newspapers, and even radio stations multiplied in these newly liberalized media markets. "… [T]he shift has been a rapid one from one or two state-run and state-funded channels to a multitude of commercial channels (Paletz, Jakubowicz, and Novosel 1995). This upheaval presented citizens of these states with a variety of new media choices. Media choices effects are not limited to the content and source, but also affect individuals though usage patterns. Simply, the choice of *which* media to consume and *how much* have been theorized to affect individuals.

At this most fundamental level, choosing what to consume and how much to consume provides theoretically interesting questions. From the literature on media effects across different media, we anticipate that newspapers are more informative than television, and as such, more likely to play a positive role in shaping individuals' political attitudes. Although almost entirely ignored in the west and given the historical role of radio in the region, this analysis includes radio consumption as a relevant media variable. Therefore, this section will delineate between the choice of medium and the frequency (or intensity) of consumption in order to begin the process of parsing through the complex effects of mass media on individuals' political and economic attitudes.

As we will see, the distinction across various media and the resultant pattern of effects differ in several ways from Western media theory. For citizens in democratizing states, not only do we find a relatively coherent pattern of influence across television and

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newspaper, but we also find a strong support for a positive radio consumption effect. Additionally, the media effects examined in this chapter provide some initial support for the notion that citizens in countries undergoing democratization may derive some of their attitudes from a 'mediated' presentation or second-hand experience of transition. That is, media choices shape individuals' 'experience' with transition, particularly for attitudes regarding distant, that is non-immediate, political or economic processes.

For CEE, the transformation of media is not simply one of transferring media institutions from state control to various market-based alternatives. During this period of transition, the process of liberalization loosened the restraint of state control in each of the most prevalent popular media (newspaper, television, and radio). These media became more able to reach their, for lack of a better term, 'potential'. An early contribution to the understanding of medium as central to the development of society came from Harold Innis. His technological determinism (albeit related to the development of media in historical eras) stated that the nature of technology greatly influences how the members of a society think and behave (1950, 1951). We must keep in mind that the units of analysis are citizens of countries in transition. Their orientation to media, understanding of politics, economics, and society are in a state of tremendous flux. Therefore, the students of media are compelled to remember the nascent nature of both the sender and receiver.

Medium and Frequency:

Individuals' political evaluations have been argued to be shaped differently by different media (Becker *et al.*1979; Brians and Wattenberg 1996). One of the most studied media is television. It is one of these few media with a general consensus that it

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exerts effects.[1] The effects from television may be cognitive (effects on political knowledge), attitudinal (effects on political opinions), or behavioral (effects on vote decisions – among other political acts) (McQuail 1987, 256; Semetko 1996, 270). The cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral effects of the medium emerge from its function as "…little television fare is designed to enlighten" (Chaffee and Kanihan 1997, 421). By its design television is uninformative because it is a passive medium (Krugman 1965). The consensus among media scholars is that television tends to politically de-mobilize people, keep them at home, and un-inform them.

Putnam has stated the relationship most clearly, in the American context, television is the most salient influence in lowering individuals' social and political interaction and is the single most consistent predictor of social participation (2000, 230-1; see also Schudson 1995, 16-25). A tremendous argument, begging the question: how? He argues that individuals' media consumption habits compete for scarce time, and exert a disengaging psychological effect, particularly of political activity (*ibid.,* 237). He further argues that this pattern of medium usage and disengagement is because of the "psychological impact of the medium itself" (*ibid.*, 242; see also Blumler 1972, 70-104; Franklin 1994, 9-12). Television use in particular isolates individuals from one another, discouraging social interaction and contributing to individuals' disengagement in community life.

Similar to Putnam (2000), earlier research makes the assertion that certain people are effective managers of their time, such that their leisure time is not competitive but additive: i.e. more, more (Meyersohn 1968). However, television, he continues, is not an

[1] In my reading on this topic, only one study of television that studied the effects of television on political behavior concluded that television had little or no discernible influence over the viewer (Blumler 1970). Again, this is complicated by the attempt to link media and behavior.

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activity that is additive, like other social activities, but is the single largest drain on free time. The quantity of consumption may also have interactive effects associated with education as higher levels of consumption do not have similar influences on differently sophisticated groups. Some authors have demonstrated media's power over political novices (Krosnick and Kinder 1990) and others have demonstrated its lessened influence over the more sophisticated, i.e. educated (Butler and Stokes 1974, 225). This highlights the importance of the interactive nature of media and audience, captured here by the inclusion of interaction with both SES and socio-political predispositions.

Despite this, there are those who contend that television, on its own, is not a purely malicious medium. As of the implicit nature of the medium, "… television is, in general: less regulated by agreed codes; more ambiguous in meaning; lacking in clear authorship (or indication of source); more open; more concrete; more universal; more information-rich" (McQuail 1987, 202). Others argue that television contributes substantially to informing citizens, ultimately shaping their attitudes and activity (Volgy and Schwarz 1978, 165). Gerbner *et al.* (1984) assert that dependence on television cultivate consensual or middle of the road political views, that is, broadly agreed upon social and political norms. Further clouding the water, other research suggests the opposite. In Britain, television consumption has been associated with high levels of political knowledge, participation, and personal efficacy (Curtice 1999; Norris 2000; Newton and Brynin 2001). Media have also demonstrated a powerful effect in mobilizing, individuals over issues, including members of environmental movements in Western Europe (Dalton 1994, 182-3). Fortunately, examining television in comparative terms against the

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influence of other popular media allows us to make an argument for its relative influence, whether positive or negative.

Yet, other authors note the competing effects of television as both immobilizing and information-providing (Newton 1999, 581 see also Bennett *et al.*1999), citing content as the distinguishing component. Norris has been the most attentive to countering Putnam over content (2000). Her 'virtuous circle' argument (2002) is that information increases individuals' motivation for more, a cycle for which a negative version does not seem to exist. While others agree that we must look a little farther to the variations in content (Blumler and McQuail 1968; Iyengar 1994), and I examine this distinction in the next section, there is sufficient theory to suggest that the medium choice itself, particularly television, is germane to our understanding of media effects (Postman 1986; Putnam 1995, 2000).[2] As such, television is a particularly interesting medium as to its seemingly dual nature of mobilization and neutralizing potential (Halloran 1970).

Other current research suggests that a comparative examination of consumptive choice between television, newspaper and even radio provides insight into the variation of influence. As one example, Newton states that television "at best amuses and at worst it confuses and alienates politically" (1999, 579; also Robinson 1976; Fallows 1996, 52-65). He continues that medium choice is further important as the mobilizing effect of television is weaker than that of newspaper (*ibid.*, 593) and that television is much more widely dispersed suggesting general apathy due to television's near omnipresence,

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[2] In support for the relevance for an analysis of medium over content, particularly in post-Soviet states, Bisky comments, "…the legs of the dancers on TV are neither socialist nor capitalist…" (1989, 36 in Becker and Szecsko 1989).

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referring to this as 'media-malaise'.[3] Weaver and Buddenbaum make the case that in general, television is considered better suited to influence people's opinions and attitudes, whereas print is considered superior in its capacity to exert cognitive effects, that is, to shape beliefs (1980; see also Comstock 1975; Volgy 1975; Schönbacj 1983; Robinson and Levy 1986; Schmitt-Beck 1998).

However, Putnam argues that newspapers and television do not compete for an audience but are "complements, not substitutes" (2000, 219). Newspapers have been suggested to provide higher levels of public confidence (Miller *et al.*1979) and awareness (Mondak 1995b) in mass publics than television. Unlike television, newspapers are less event-centered, presenting things in a more contextualized manner (Gitlin 1980; Altheide 1987; Iyengar 1990). The choice between reading a newspaper and watching television has been correlated with quality of information differences and political engagement (Newton 1999; Putnam 2000; Schmitt-Beck 2003).

As cited above, Nelson *et al.* (1997) found distinct differences in the level of political awareness depending on the use of newspaper or television, with the former being more able to cultivate awareness.[4] The essential difference among media has been based on format differences, that is, informational quality and intellectuality (Kleinnijenhuis 1991). In the American context, newspapers, more so than television, is the choice of the factually informed (Quarles 1979; Becker and Whitney 1980; McLeod and McDonald 1985; Miller *et al*. 1988; Chaffee *et al*. 1994). Beyond America, however, it is generally agreed that people are typically able to get more information from newspapers than

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[3] Some have contended that the evidence or methods of the video- and media- malaise hypotheses need to be challenged (e.g. Bennett 1998; McKean, Leshner, Meeds & Packard 1995; O'Keefe 1980; Pinkleton and Austin 1998); yet, these have rested their arguments largely on the methodological difficulty in isolating these effects.

[4] Although his research may by its sample selection, it does suggest that a distinction exists.

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television (Kraus and Davis 1976; Chaffee 1977), suggesting a more powerful engaging effect. Simply, newspapers are more 'effective' than television (McClure and Patterson 1976; Eyal 1981). "Newspaper use is consistently associated with informational uses and gratifications" (Chaffee and Kanihan 1997, 425) adding that newspaper reading is an information-seeking activity (*ibid*., 425).

For the printed word, early journalism in the newspapers and magazines of Central and Eastern Europe was handicapped not only by the "old-style writing" (Gross 2002, 92-4) but also by "…a mishmash of opinions and polemics [rather than news or information]" (*ibid*., 25). That is, many new newspapers, filled with contributions of dissidents-turned-journalists, fared poorly in the new era of, at least marginally, free expression. Gross further discusses the stylistic changes required of the new journalists, arguing that before 1989, samizdat and other written dissent was a subtle, "between the lines writing" that consisted of uni-directional manifestos of opposition and defiance. Because of this, these writing styles did not transfer well to widely circulating newspapers and magazines, the nascent marketplace of ideas (*ibid.*, 94).

However, it must be understood that for the reborn media of CEE, there were essentially two trajectories that would grant broadcast and print industries the financial capacity to continue or come into being. The first was a partisan, political one which emerged from an obligation to the state in some form (technological or financial). The second was a commercial role, thereby giving allegiance to the imperatives of free market media, i.e. the profit motive. While neither of these provides the basis for objective presentation, there were few alternatives means. Nonetheless, newspapers such as *Pravo* and (Czech Republic), *Nepszabadsag* (Hungary), *Rzeczpospolita* (Poland), and *Adevarul*

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(Romania) are examples of former communist party organs or organs of the government that moved, albeit gradually, toward becoming the 'Fourth Estate', exerting a watchdog role.[5] Others have argued that "[t]he printed press, its editorial independence, its relationship with political parties, and the extent to which newspapers and magazines express partisan sympathies are also crucial to an understanding of a country's media system" (Semetko 1996b, 261). While the ideological orientation of newspapers themselves are certainly a relevant factor, the sum of these concerns must consider the entirety of mass media in CEE in the formative stages and what we discover in the literature is that variation of effect can be found in the nature of the medium itself.[6] Again, this may be a function of the temporal nature of television and the enduring nature of the written word; but nonetheless, in general, newspapers are better political informants than television (even television news: Patterson and McClure 1976; McLeod *et al*. 1996).

Unfortunately, other media have received much less attention. Radio use will be included here without any theoretical underpinnings. Radio use, despite its powerful role in the pre-television media environment earlier this century, provides little significant results in the modern era (Weaver and Drew 1993, 1995; Chaffee *et al.* 1994). However, as we will see, radio use has remained a mainstay in CEE. This may be attributed to these citizens' residual habit given both its near omnipresence in CEE households and its role

[5] Privatizing media was commercializing them. That is, making them beholden to advertising for financial footing. Discussed in the next chapter is how these legislative and financial pressures were responsible for the internationalization of content.

[6] Secondly, although several authors have noted that print media have become reflections of the western European model of party-oriented newspapers, often explicitly expressing partisan ties (Splichal 1994, 71-3; Semetko 1996, 262; Goban-Klas 1997, 37; Gross 1999a, 22-3), the ideological dispersion of media sources is confronted by including the ideological orientation of respondents in the model. This is one way of controlling for the ideological bias of any particular media. That is, if respondents are choosing media based on ideology (thereby defining that group), individuals' ideologically driven demand to read a particular newspaper will be factored out.

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in pre-transition CEE as a medium of freedom (i.e. *Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, BBC*; discussed further in the source chapter below), it may persist as an influential medium. Therefore, we arrive at the following hypotheses:

Medium Choice:

H_1: A high level of television consumption is negatively correlated with democratic political and positive economic evaluations.

H_2: A high level of newspaper consumption is positively correlated with democratic political attitudes and positive economic evaluations.

H_3: A high level of radio consumption is positively correlated with democratic political attitudes and high economic evaluations.

It stands to reason that if newspapers are more informational and mobilizing than television, a greater amount of newspaper consumption is also more informational thereby likely to positively shapes individuals' political and economic attitudes. Therefore, frequency is important in two ways. First, prolonged exposure to media has more power than one-shot, specific stories for long-term attitudinal development, and even eventual behavioral change (Graber 1993, 202-8; see also Zaller 1992). Media's long-term persuasiveness is not through individual stories but through cumulative impact (again patterns of consumption are paramount).[7] Therefore, those who consume a great deal of media are more likely to respond to media's influence. Secondly, while the content of high frequency consumption may be relevant, in this chapter, we are trying to establish an initial difference in the intensity of consumption. Again as Putnam and Meyersohn have both argued, frequent media consumption is often a competitor for individuals' time to pursue other activities, both social and political.

[7] Unlike the largely experimental agenda-setting, priming, and framing literature, this inquiry is interested in the long-term media consumption patterns as they are easier to assess from survey data and not limited to specific incidences of exposure (i.e. the recall of specific political programming or advertising).

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Robinson argues that TV viewing without also reading a newspaper or engaging in political communication is particularly deleterious to individuals' abilities to understand information received via television (1983), that is, to make sense of the new political and social realities. Therefore, instead of limiting the analysis to the basic consumption patterns, I examine a predominant reliance of one medium over the other to capture any underlying correlation between individuals' media consumption preferences and attitudinal orientation. This suggests the following hypotheses:

Medium Preference:

H_4: Predominant reliance on television is negatively correlated with political and economic attitudes.

H_5: Predominant reliance on newspaper is positively correlated with political and economic attitudes.

Mass Media Technology:

At the most essential level, it is important to ask how widely disbursed are the most common forms of media in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Poland at the time the surveys were conducted. Using the 1996-7 Intermedia Surveys,[8] we can see in Table 1 that in each country, more than 90% of the population sample own a working television set.[9] Similarly, we can see that for all the countries except Bulgaria, more than 80% of the population sample has a working radio in their home.[10]

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[8] **Bulgaria**: conducted by CSD; face-to-face interviews; raw sample size: 2031; fieldwork 17 May – 31 May 1997. **Czech Republic**: conducted by AISA; face-to-face interviews; raw sample size: 1003; fieldwork 12 May – 24 June 1997. **Hungary**: conducted by MEMRB, Budapest; face-to-face interviews; raw sample size: 2021; fieldwork 8 March – 25 March 1996. **Poland**: conducted by CEM; face-to-face interviews; raw sample size: 2004; fieldwork 13 May – 10 June 1997. **Romania**: conducted by IMAS, Bucharest; face-to-face interviews; raw sample size: 2124; fieldwork 21 May – 4 June 1997. **Slovakia**: conducted by AISA; face-to-face interviews; raw sample size: 1118; fieldwork 2 May – 2 June 1997.

[9] <TV> "Do you have a TV set at home?"

[10] <RADIO> "Do you have a working radio in your household?"

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<Table 1 about here>

Although outside the scope of this study, many newer media studies have investigated the role of the Internet in democracies (Bimber 1999; Coleman and Gøtze 2001; Dahlberg 2001; DiMaggio *et al.* 2001; Norris 2001; Davis, Elin, Reeher 2002; Semetko and Krasnoboka 2003). As this examination is over the tumultuous period of transition (the surveys were conducted in 1996-7), the absence of computers, much less the Internet,[11] is obvious (see Table 1). As such, its role will not be examined here. What can be taken from this simple table of percentages is that there is a significant diffusion of basic mass media technology and therefore the differences in media effects will be based on *who* and *how* these media are used. The following sections will address these questions.

Regardless of simply owning a television or radio, to what extent to Central and Eastern Europeans use mass media? It is clearly relevant to understanding effects of mass media on individual-level political socialization to have an estimate of how much these media are used. Although their specific effects will be examined in the coming sections, it is important to set a baseline for media consumption and identify any cross-national variation.

In Table 2, we can see that a majority of individuals in these countries watch a great deal of television.[12]

<Table 2 about here>

[11] <WWW> "Do you use the internet or the world wide web?" The Hungarian 1996 questionnaire did not include this exact question but did ask, <EMAIL> "Do you have access to electronic mail (email) either or home or at work?"
[12] <REGTV> "Could you please tell me how often you watch ANY television nowadays, regardless of channel, and regardless of where you are when you are watching."

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In each country (except Hungary, in which this specific question was not asked), more than 70% of the population sample watch some television daily. Combining the first two categories, more than 80% do at least several days a week.

Using an additive score of domestic and international radio usage,[13] we can estimate how often individuals listen to the radio (see Table 3).

<Table 3 about here>

While not consumed as regularly as television, there is a consistent use of radio cross-nationally. For both questions about domestic and international radio use, the percentages reflect a strong preference for domestic radio. As the most dramatic example, Hungary displays a nearly exclusive use of domestic radio.

In contrast to what we have seen with both television and radio, newspaper readership is more evenly distributed.[14] More than half of the population sample reads a newspaper at least several times a week (see Table 4), although not in Romania.

<Table 4 about here>

We do see, in stark contrast to the other countries, a low percentage of Bulgarians and Romanians (20.65% and 25.28%, respectively) who have not read a newspaper during the week in the past three months. There are slight albeit important differences in the consumption patterns across various media and some distinguishing usage differences across the region. The most significant is that for the Czech Republic and Poland, two of the countries that have made the most progress toward media institutional reform (as we will see later), show the heaviest use of television (both show more than 90% usage at

[13] <REGIRAD> Now please tell me how often in the past 3 months, on average, you have listened to international radio. <REGDRAD> Now please tell me how often in the past 3 months, on average, you have listened to [country's] radio.

[14] <REGNEWSP> "Now please tell me how often in the past 3 months, on average, you have read newspapers."

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least 3-5 days a week). In contrast, we see both Bulgaria and Romania, institutional reform laggards, show the lowest use of newspapers. From this first glance, it is likely to find not only differences across media but also intra-regionally.

Methods: Operationalization

Media consumption will be assessed by the amount of media consumed and the medium itself (television vs. newspaper vs. radio). More recent studies have incorporated consumption amounts as a variable. Schmitt-Beck's exposure measures are made to capture habitual use (i.e. patterns of consumption), not the reception of specific messages (2003, 241). In accordance with that study, we will rely on respondents' self-reported frequency usage.[15] Although others have cautioned researchers that relying on the amount of media exposure to explain effects is risky (McLeod *et al.*1977; Zukin 1977; Iyengar 1979), like Newton (1999, 584), rather than compare media of consumers against non-consumers,[16] this methodological approach is to use comparative frequencies among respondents, that is to say, quantity of consumption. Given the questions included in the surveys, we will be able to distinguish among the amount of newspaper, television, and radio use.

As mentioned above, some individuals may not use media equally. Some may rely or prefer one medium over another. As such, these preference users are very interesting in this study as they represent exclusive users of a medium and are allow us to accurately assign a particular medium's effects to the manifest attitudes. Therefore, as there are no questions that clearly ask which is the preferred medium, individuals will delineated into

[15] The response categories are "every day or almost every day', '4-5 days a week', '2-3 days a week', '1 day a week', and 'less than 1 day a week'.

[16] The number of non-media users is so low that it renders statistical comparisons between the groups impossible.

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'medium preference groups' based on the frequency of their media consumption. As we are most theoretically informed abut the difference between television and newspaper usage, I have constructed usage preferences across these two media. In Table 5 we can see the four categories: low TV - high newspaper; high TV - low newspaper; high TV - high newspaper; low TV - low newspaper. The first two capture proximate measures of television or newspaper preferences while the last two provide a 'no preference' category.[17]

<Table 5 about here>

Medium Effects on Political Attitudes and Economic Evaluations:

This section will test the above hypothesized relationships in regression models that incorporate individuals' social and economic location variables and socio-political predispositions and interactions discussed in earlier chapters. As above, the media variables are operationalized to capture differences across various media use and frequency of use. We expect to see diminishing effects of media as SES variables and socio-political predispositions account for some determination of media use (as seen in the previous chapter). Given the above correlations with 'no media preference' groups, the "no preference group" of high television and high newspaper reading might be an interesting variable to include; however, the correlation of both of the "no preference groups" with high newspaper reading is too high without evoking the problems of multicollinearity.

To interpret the complex interaction models, I will discuss both the main effects as they lend support to, or contradict, the hypotheses above. Secondly, I will discuss the interactive effects as they modify the explanation of the media's role. For clarity, I will

[17] The amount of radio preference in all of the countries was so low as to not be computationally feasible.

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discuss them *ceteris paribus,* that is, I will examine the effect of the interaction terms and their component main effect variables without calculating each related equation. The interpretations are supported by the mathematical solutions of the model and at this point only serve to obfuscate rather than illuminate.[18] This chapter will present the bulk of empirical results to alleviate the need to do in the next chapters which use a similar empirical methodology.

$$\textbf{Political and Economic Attitudes} = \boldsymbol{\alpha} + \boldsymbol{\beta_1}\text{ (NEWSPPREF)} + \boldsymbol{\beta_2}\text{ (TVPREF)} + \boldsymbol{\beta_3}\text{ (RADIO)} + \boldsymbol{\beta_4}\text{ (FREQTV)} + \boldsymbol{\beta_5}\text{ (FREQNEWSP)} + \boldsymbol{\beta_6}\text{ (IDORIENT)} + \boldsymbol{\beta_7}\text{ (POLINT)} + \boldsymbol{\beta_8}\text{ (TALKPOL)} + \boldsymbol{\beta_9}\text{ (AGE)} + \boldsymbol{\beta_{10}}\text{ (INCGRP)} + \boldsymbol{\beta_{11}}\text{ (EDUC)} + \boldsymbol{\beta_{12}}\text{ (CITYSIZE)} + \boldsymbol{\beta_a}(X_n X_m) + \ldots + \boldsymbol{\beta_b}(X_{n+t} X_{m+t}) + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$$

Given the complexity and number of findings, in order to make them coherently contribute to our understanding of the role of mass media in the political socialization process in democratizing countries I will present them together, discussing the main, interactive, and other significant effects in conjunction with the hypotheses of this chapter.

<Tables 6, 7, and 8 about here>

From these three regression analyses, we encounter a seemingly wide variety of findings; however, individuals' media choice effects are rather consistent effects when given more than a passing glance. Newspaper reading exerts a consistently positive effect on both institutional trust and sociotropic economic evaluations. While only significant in four instances, this lends some support to H_2. Television demonstrates less coherence. Only significant in three cases, it is both positively and negatively correlated, although all

[18] I have calculated nearly all of the mathematical solutions to the models below by inserting various values of the main and interactive effects in the equation. For our understanding of the processes modeled here, the substantive importance is captured in my interpretation of media effects.

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three emerge in economic evaluations. This provides little support for H_1, and as the next chapters will show, delineating among content and source clarifies television's role.

This study is predicated on the notion that citizens of democratizing countries are likely to exhibit not only different media use but also responses to subsequent media effects. This is laid bare by the uniform, positive, and most frequent main effect, radio. In nine instances, radio consumption exerts a positive effect in all of the countries except for Romania. More interestingly and unlike the other media effects, its contribution is evenly divided among institutional trust (3), sociotropic economic evaluation (3), and egocentric economic evaluation (3). Given the historical role of radio in the region as a pre-transitional link to the international community, this effect is not unexpected but it has been ignored by modern media theory. This not only lends tremendous support to H_3, but also serves to underscore my argument that media studies have been wrought in isolated cases, limiting their export. Media use in democratizing countries is, if not *sui generis,* then certainly, a new species.

In order to make comparative observations about the independent contribution of media to the political socialization process, it is important to note how they fared against the traditional determinants of these political attitudes and economic evaluations. Not surprisingly, income is a consistent, positive contributor to individuals' economic evaluations. In line with previous theory, as individuals' income level increases, and with it their insulation from economic risk, so does their economic evaluations. Education is often negatively correlated with institutional trust (there is one instance of a positive correlation). However, it must be noted that in each case, education's influence is

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eclipsed by either main effect media variables or an interactive effect (based on the standardized betas).

As a socio-political predisposition, political interest is most important to institutional trust. Given what we have seen above, this lends a lot of support to this model as education, newspaper, and radio usage all capture individuals' engagement in the political process thereby suggesting an informative underpinning to higher levels of institutional trust. It seems that general attentiveness, including media consumption choices that reflect individuals' propensity for information-seeking, contributes to positive assessments of the performance of new political institutions.

For economic evaluations, the most important socio-political variable is social communication. Interestingly, and as we will see as well later, talking with friends and family about political and economic issues is always negatively correlated with political and economic evaluations. One could argue that in doing so, individuals' are commiserating and reinforcing each others' general concerns about the performance of the economy and new political institutions. However, as we will see below, in many cases, social communication as an interactive variable, finds its negative influence abated by media variables, particularly newspaper which is associated with information-seeking. This suggests that media compete with individuals' personal communication networks as sources of information and that media, specifically newspaper, are sources that contribute to positive political socialization. Finally, for sociotropic economic evaluations, urbanity exerts a generally negative effect.[19] This is particularly relevant to a media study as rural residence removes citizens from the direct observation of the new political and economic

[19] This is mathematically achieved by putting in using a dummy variable (0=urban, 1=rural). The variable was created to capture a significance that non-urban residence might have.

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order and suggests that media provide one of the few ways to “take part in” these changes.[20] The urban/rural divide is also more frequently observed in the interaction terms which allow us to identify the media that bridge this divide.

Across all of the political attitudes and economic evaluations, individuals’ preferences for television or newspaper, that is a predominant use of one or another media, provide very little in the way of independent explanatory power. A strict diet of television with little accompanying newspaper reading or heavy newspaper reading with little television does not exert a significant main effect in all cases (save institutional trust in Slovakia). Therefore, H_4 and H_5 find little support. However, as an interactive effect, preferences play a much more prominent role.

At the broadest level, the interactions shed a bright light on the role of media in the process of political socialization. The role of urbanity, as mentioned above, is buttressed by its frequency in which it shows up in the interactions.

<Figure 1a about here>

In Figure 1a, we see that at low levels of television use in the Czech Republic, those in an urban setting have a much lower level of institutional trust than their rural counterparts. However, as the level of television consumption increases, the disparity between urban-dwellers’ institutional trust and rural-dwellers’ disappears. Or conversely, rural residents’ trust drops and urbanites’ increases. For rural residents, television has its hypothesized effect while the opposite is true for city-dwellers. Urbanity also plays a role in sociotropic economic evaluations.

<Figure 2a about here>

[20] This is not to suggest that all urban-dwellers are all active political actors but simply that the proximity to political and economic events is likely to provide more access to these changes whether through an increased amount of coverage (bigger and more channels and newspapers) or opportunity to participate.

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For Bulgarians (see Figure 2a), rural residents who primarily rely on television show a dramatic drop in their sociotropic economic evaluations, while urban-dwellers manifest only a slight decrease. For Hungarians (see Figure 2c), both television use and urbanity are negatively correlated with sociotropic economic evaluations as main effects. That is, without the interactions, city dwellers that do not use a lot of television are much more likely to have high evaluations of the general economy.

<Figure 2c about here>

However, as the interaction provides a conditional solution to the relationship between media, SES/SPP, and economic evaluations, we find that urban dwellers are nearly immune from changes in the amount of television consumed while rural residents see a significant increase in the level of their evaluations as television consumption increases, effectively making residence insignificant. We saw a similar relationship in the first model as there is a negative relationship between age and institutional trust (see Figure 1b). However, with increased television consumption, this effect is mediated, arguably even reversed.

<Figure 1b about here>

Finally, newspaper reading in Hungary is positively correlated with sociotropic economic evaluations, combating the independent effects of rural residence. As we can see in Figure 2d, newspaper consumption has virtually no effect on rural residents; however, for urban dwellers, increasing the amount of newspaper consumption greatly increases their sociotropic economic evaluation.

<Figure 2d about here>

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Newspapers show up often in the interaction effects. For sociotropic economic evaluations, newspaper consumption interacts with both social communication (Poland) and age (the Czech Republic). As mentioned above, social communication exerts a negative main effect. As we can see in Figure 2f, at low levels of newspaper consumption, increased levels of social communication is negatively correlated with national economic evaluations.

<Figure 2f about here>

However, as this newspaper consumption increases, those who discuss political and economic issues more frequently show no decrease, or a positive effect, on their evaluations. For the Czech Republic (see Figure 2b), we must remember that age, as a main effect, is positively correlated with individuals' sociotropic economic evaluations.

<Figure 2b about here>

As newspaper consumption increases, older Czechs do not respond as much as the younger ones do. We can see a sharp increase in younger newspaper readers' evaluations. In Poland (see Figure 1c), the interaction between newspaper consumption and political interest is the most powerful independent variable in explaining individuals' level of institutional trust.

<Figure 1c about here>

Once again, at low levels of newspaper consumption, there is little difference between the politically interested and disinterested. However, at a high level of newspaper consumption, the politically interested show an increase in their level of institutional trust. Or alternatively, among the political disinterested, no amount of newspaper reading

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has an effect. We see this effect in Hungary as well among the ideologically differentiated (see Figure 3a).

<Figure 3a about here>

With no preference for newspaper, individuals' ideological orientation does little to distinguish their egocentric economic evaluations. Identifying a newspaper preference clearly benefits Hungarians ideologically associated with democratic and free-market ideals, while those ideologically opposed see a distinct drop in their evaluative levels.

Newspapers' effects are not only limited to general readership but also preference. In Poland (see Figure 2e), while the more educated show a slightly higher level of sociotropic economic evaluations, when including a preference for newspapers, this difference between education becomes exaggerated.

<Figure 2e about here>

That is, the higher educated respond to newspapers positively while the lower educated respond negatively. In Slovakia (see Figure 1d), for no preference for newspapers among income groups, there is little difference in the levels of institutional trust.

<Figure 1d about here>

However, when newspaper preference is included, lower income groups increase their levels of institutional trust while higher income groups decrease theirs. Interestingly, the only SEE/SPP interaction variable for Slovakia is income. For egocentric economic evaluations, Slovakia has two significant interactions with income, radio and television preference both of which are the two strongest predictors of Slovakians' personal economic evaluations.

<Figure 3c about here>

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For radio (Figure 3c), any level of consumption has no effect on lower income group members. At higher income levels, increased radio consumption lends itself to higher egocentric economic evaluations. Finally, in Figure 3b, we can see that without a television preference, there is only a slight difference between income groups with higher income groups having higher economic evaluations.

<Figure 3b about here>

However, with the inclusion of a television preference, that difference is amplified, such that, lower income groups respond to television as hypothesized while higher groups do not.

Clearly, the inclusion of interaction terms help explain the role of media particularly in conjunction with individuals' SES and SPP profiles. Despite the underwhelming performance as a main effect, for members of low SES/SPP profiles[21], television is often in the hypothesized direction as being a negative influence on political attitudes and economic evaluations. The same is generally true for newspapers as increasing consumption influences these citizens positively. The same hypothetical support is not generated for higher SES/SPP members.[22] While newspaper consumption is a positive influence two-thirds of the time, television exerts the opposite effect, raising political attitudes and economic evaluations. Radio, in its only interactive appearance, is as hypothesized for this group. The findings of the main effect section are reflected in the interactive section with the distinction that we can more clearly track the influence of consumption choices on particular groups. In sum, these findings of individuals' media

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[21] This includes low income, young, low educated, rural residents who do not talk often about politics, have low political interest, and do not share a great deal of ideological orientation toward democratic politics.
[22] This includes high income, older, highly educated, urban dwellers who talk often about politics, have high levels of political interest and are ideologically oriented toward democratic politics.

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choices establish the basis of media not only as an influential political choice that citizens make, but also an influence that is determined by *who* is using *what*.

Conclusion:

This section carved out the first of three facets of theorized media effects on individuals, namely the differences in individuals' choice of media and the amount that is consumed. This section has highlighted two substantive insights into the role of media in democratizing countries that distinguish it from western media studies.

The clearest media difference between democracies and democratizing countries is the role of radio as a significant and positive contributor to the political socialization process. Given the dearth of analysis concerning the effects of radio, it is conspicuously the most consistent main effect media variable. In this analysis, its influence is uniformly positive; yet, for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the difference between the levels of individuals' media consumption may not rest entirely on their media preference or predilections.

McLuhan offers a more subtle argument for the variation of effects across different media (1964). His central thesis is that the nature of the medium itself, *regardless* of the content of that medium, propagates effects in the populations that use them (1964).[23]

> "*What we are considering here, however, are the psychic and social consequences of the designs or patterns as they amplify or accelerate existing processes. For the 'message' of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or patterns that it introduces into human affairs*" (*ibid.,* 8).

[23] Succinctly summed in his famous mantra, "The medium is the message". He uses, by way of analogy, the changing technology of travel, particularly the railways and even the airplane, arguing that these changed the commonly held definition of borders and opportunity by enlarging the scale of human function at such a profound level in the collective human psyche as to escape notice. He adds that they did this despite the cargo (i.e. content).

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From this, he argues that it is the structure of information, as per the demands of particular media, that shapes the reception and therefore transform perception (again, regardless of content). He distinguishes media further as 'hot' and 'cool' media (*ibid.,* chapter 2). A hot medium, is one that extends a single dimension in "high definition", which is to say, filled with data (*ibid.,* 22-3). As such, it requires little participation as it does not leave much to be filled in by the audience. He cites both radio and newspapers are hot media. Cool media, in contrast, are low definition and "…so little is given [that] … much has to be filled in by the [observer]" (*ibid.,* 23). Completion by the audience is required, engaging them in high participation. Television is the exemplar of McLuhan's cool medium. While seemingly counterintuitive, its failure to disseminate information is not because of the presentation, but rather its inability to handle 'hot topics', topics with a great deal of information, because it requires such high participation (*ibid.,* 309). It is because of what is required of the audience, and what they are willing to invest, that shapes various media's impact.

It is in this fashion, and almost single-handedly, that McLuhan discusses radio. "Radio affects most people intimately, person-to-person, offering a world of unspoken communication between writer-speaker and the listener. That is the immediate aspect of radio. A private experience" (*ibid.,* 299). It is the isolated use of radio that makes it more competitive medium to both television and newspaper. In comparison to the other media, McLuhan states, "Although the medium is the *message*, the controls go beyond programming….so the effects of radio are quite independent of its programming" (1964, 305, italics in original). In light of his

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argument and given the findings presented in this section, it comes as less a surprise to find that radio demonstrates the most consistent media choice effect.

Finally, contributing to the larger inquiry of media in democratizing countries, another substantive finding is the distribution of media effects across the dependent variables. We see a preponderance of media effects on both institutional trust and sociotropic economic evaluations, while egocentric economic evaluations show little response to individuals' media choices. The former represent political and economic events far removed from the direct or immediate experiences of most individuals. Individuals are able to observe the functioning of political institutions and the national economy largely through second-hand involvement, delivered via media. Both institutional trust and sociotropic economic evaluations require citizens to evaluate political and economic phenomena that are beyond their immediate experience.

For egocentric economic evaluations, we see a diminished number of media effects. This is not unexpected. Egocentric economic evaluations are more personal experiences that citizens do not need large amounts of distal information to generate opinions. Egocentric economic evaluations are an assessment of the ebb and flow of personal economics and do not entail a search for a great deal of additional information. We know that few people have first hand experience with the workings of the national economy and personal observation of the daily function of political institutions. This distribution of effects across the dependent variables lends some initial support to the notion that media are the intermediaries of citizens' political orientation and as such, provide an increasing number of experiences from which to

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derive opinions and attitudes, playing a more important political role than formerly identified.

Given this distribution of effects across these different dependent variables, we might make the tentative assertion that media play a larger role in shaping individuals' attitudes on matters that require information that cannot be assessed directly. Media are therefore the *intermediaries* of individuals' political experience. While newspaper and radio wield observable, mostly positive effects, television, it seems, requires more analysis. The next two chapters will parse through facets of television to determine what else is at play.

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Tables and Graphs:

Table 1: Media Ownership and Access:

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Own a television set:	93.80%	98.11%	97.48%	98.90%	90.02%	97.58%
Owns a radio	74.20%	88.93%	80.7%	96.46%	79.99%	94.19%
Uses Internet	0.98%	6.28%	5.10%	3.74%	1.18%	4.47%
Total	2031	1003	2021	2004	2124	1118

Table 2: Television consumption, regardless of channel or location:

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
daily/most (6 or 7) days/week	75.43%	81.16%	n/a	81.89%	72.41%	73.97%
Several (3, 4, 5) days/week	8.57%	10.77%	n/a	8.43%	8.33%	14.58%
1 or 2 days/week	3.50%	4.19%	n/a	4.29%	5.56%	7.16%
at least once in the past 3 months	0.94%	0.80%	n/a	1.90%	1.74%	1.07%
have not used in past 3 months	1.48%	0.90%	n/a	1.05%	1.37%	0.54%
DK/NS	4.09%	0.30%	n/a	1.35%	0.61%	0.27%
NA	6.01%	1.89%	n/a	1.10%	9.98%	2.42%
Total:	2031	1003	n/a	2004	2124	1118

Table 3: Domestic (international) radio:

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
daily/most (6 or 7) days/week	58.30% (5.91%)	56.13% (3.39%)	71.10% (2.38%)	55.94% (2.74%)	50.61% (5.27%)	58.41% (11.54%)
several (3, 4, 5) days/week	14.28% (3.89%)	17.35% (3.99%)	6.58% (1.48%)	18.21% (4.49%)	15.16% (3.30%)	18.16% (8.68%)
1 or 2 days/week	6.15% (3.74%)	7.68% (5.48%)	6.14% (2.38%)	13.27% (7.53%)	10.17% (3.77%)	8.77% (7.16%)
at least once in the past 3 months	7.24% (11.52%)	8.57% (16.95%)	2.42% (2.28%)	4.89% (11.93%)	8.57% (11.16%)	8.14% (21.38%)
have not used in past 3 months	13.34% (72.72%)	9.57% (66.50%)	1.29% (87.18%)	7.58% (73.20%)	15.11% (73.40%)	5.99% (45.97%)
DK/NS	0.69% (2.22%)	0.70% (3.69%)	11.63% (4.30%)	0.10% (0.10%)	0.38% (3.11%)	0.54% (5.28%)
Total:	2031	1003	2021	2004	2124	1118

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Table 4: Newspaper:

	Bulgaria	**Czech Republic**	**Hungary**	**Poland**	**Romania**	**Slovakia**
daily/most (6 or 7) days/week	30.18%	43.37%	59.52%	29.84%	18.83%	44.54%
several (3, 4, 5) days/week	20.43%	21.83%	13.11%	29.54%	16.76%	25.49%
1 or 2 days/week	15.56%	21.64%	17.96%	27.64%	20.15%	15.47%
at least once in the past 3 months	12.51%	8.77%	4.70%	6.49%	18.46%	11.18%
Have not used in past 3 months	20.65%	4.29%	1.73%	6.44%	25.28%	3.04%
DK/NS	0.69%	0.10%	2.97%	0.05%	0.52%	0.27%
Total:	2031	1003	2021	2004	2124	1118

Table 5: Newspaper vs. Television:

	Newspaper: Low	Newspaper: High	
Television	*No Preference Low Consumers*	**Newspaper Preference**	Low
	Television Preference	*No Preference High Consumers*	High

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Table 6: Institutional Trust, Media Choice, and Frequency:[24]

		Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Television Preference		0.6752 (.0677)	-0.2351 (-.0238)	0.2488 (.0230)	0.3158 (.0321)	0.5444 (.0534)	**1.439* (.1417)**
Newspaper Preference		-1.143 (-.0281)	0.1834 (.0065)	0.3074 (.0133)	-0.4311 (-.0163)	-0.0080 (-.0001)	1.515 (.0744)
Radio Consumption		0.0592 (.0228)	**0.2290* (.0920)**	**0.1065* (.0484)**	**0.1414* (.0511)**	0.1241 (.0477)	0.0739 (.0350)
Television Consumption		-0.2963 (-.0429)	0.4573 (.0678)	**0.5317** (.1038)**	0.3792 (.0573)	-0.2231 (-.0350)	0.3616 (.0573)
Newspaper Consumption		0.1127 (.0336)	0.0473 (.0120)	**0.3660* (.1012)**	**0.3858* (.0937)**	0.1200 (.0336)	0.5039 (.1304)
Ideological Orientation		**0.3314*** (.1362)**	-0.0170 (-.0068)	**0.1486* (.0637)**	0.0393 (.0165)	0.0757 (.0298)	0.2040 (.0903)
Political Interest		**0.1379** (.1047)**	**0.2784*** (.2114)**	**0.2425*** (.1994)**	-0.1331 (-.1050)	0.0204 (.0158)	0.0934 (.0790)
Social Communication		0.0372 (.0051)	**-0.6133* (-.0911)**	**-0.4631** (-.0678)**	0.0511 (.0073)	0.0609 (.0078)	-0.1912 (-.0301)
Age		-0.0021 (-.0078)	-0.0169 (-.0641)	0.0081 (.0292)	-0.0087 (-.0302)	-0.0014 (-.0048)	**0.0303** (.1153)**
Income		0.1256 (.0184)	0.2431 (.0349)	**0.5057*** (.0805)**	**0.5234** (.0790)**	0.2237 (.0288)	0.3530 (.0575)
Education		-0.6274 (-.0505)	**1.324** (.1154)**	**-0.3963* (-.0497)**	**-0.7324* (-.0622)**	**-0.7588** (-.0740)**	-0.4499 (-.0417)
Urbanity		0.4238 (.0397)	-0.3565 (-.0353)	-0.1228 (-.0125)	0.1610 (0.0165)	-0.1725 (-.0168)	0.3716 (.0422)
TV Pref.:	*Social Comm.*				-0.4776 (-.0391)	-0.6947 (-.0613)	
	Urbanity		1.4338 (.0986)				
	Political Interest					-0.0070 (-.0039)	
Newspaper Preference:	*Political Interest*						
	Income Group						**-3.277** (-.1167)**
	Education		-3.430 (-.0741)				
	Urbanity		1.3859 (.0253)			-6.095 (-.0491)	
	Ideological Orientation						0.2800 (.0222)
TV Con.	*Political Interest*		-0.0099 (-.0062)				
	Age		-0.0209 (-.0576)	**0.0166** (.0611)**			
	Urbanity		**-1.374* (-.1255)**				

[24] OLS correlation coefficient (Standardized beta), significance: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. †p<.055

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Newspaper Consumpti	*Social Communication*					-0.0565 (-.0101)	
	Political Interest				**0.0612* (.1863)**	-.0628 (.1590)	
Radio Consumption:	*Political Interest*					0.0074 (.0112)	
	Age					-0.0014 (-.0095)	
	Ideological Orientation		-0.0294 (-.0224)				-0.0477 (-.0448)
	Social Communication	0.1620 (.0450)					
	Urbanity	0.0968 (.0653)					
Constant		15.306***	14.198***	15.814***	14.846***	15.315***	13.800***
N		1360	701	1742	1548	1784	738
Adjusted R^2		0.0405	0.0653	0.1031	0.0297	0.0306	0.0510

Figure 1a: Czech Republic: Frequency of Television and Urbanity:



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Figure 1b: Hungary: Television Consumption and Age



Figure 1c: Poland: Newspapers Consumption and Political Interest:



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Figure 1d: Slovakia: Newspaper Preference and Income Group:



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Table 7: Sociotropic Economic Evaluation, Media Choice, and Frequency:[25]

	Bulgaria	**Czech Republic**	**Hungary**	**Poland**	**Romania**	**Slovakia**
Television Preference	0.0557 (.0238)	0.0286 (.0145)	0.0577 (.0311)	-0.1075 (-.0527)	0.0540 (.0289)	0.1649 (.0789)
Newspaper Preference	0.2997 (.0303)	-0.3500 (-.0618)	**-0.4057** (-.1017)**	-0.0301 (-.0055)	0.2356 (.0238)	0.1944 (.0464)
Radio Consumption	**0.0469* (.0743)**	0.0287 (.0577)	**0.0238** (.0630)**	-0.0047 (-.0081)	-0.0118 (-.0248)	**0.0381* (.0877)**
Television Consumption	0.0036 (.0022)	-0.0679 (-.0496)	**-0.0723* (-.0820)**	**0.1169* (.0850)**	0.0111 (.0095)	0.0649 (.0500)
Newspaper Consumption	-0.0066 (-.0081)	0.0986 (.1253)	**0.1050*** (.1688)**	0.0329 (.0385)	**0.0888** (.1353)**	0.0701 (.0882)
Ideological Orientation	**0.0921*** (.1557)**	0.0320 (.0638)	0.0116 (.0289)	0.0192 (.0388)	0.0055 (.0118)	0.0096 (.0207)
Political Interest	0.0152 (.0474)	0.0115 (.0437)	**0.0232*** (.1111)**	0.0152 (.0579)	**0.0211** (.0890)**	0.0243 (.1000)
Social Communication	-0.0550 (-.0313)	**-0.1212* (-.0901)**	-0.0516 (-.0440)	**-0.1687*** (-.1158)**	**-0.1525*** (-.1059)**	**-0.1132* (-.0864)**
Age	0.0012 (.0177)	**0.0144* (.2734)**	-0.0007 (-.0150)	0.0001 (.0014)	-0.0010 (-.0185)	0.0019 (.0352)
Income	**0.1042* (.0626)**	0.0581 (.0417)	**0.0739** (.0684)**	**0.2019*** (.1468)**	**0.1111** (.0779)**	0.0024 (.0019)
Education	-0.0782 (-.0259)	0.0496 (.0216)	0.0153 (.0112)	0.0559 (.0229)	**-0.1024* (-.0544)**	0.0112 (.0051)
Urbanity	0.2076 (.0800)	**-0.2338** (-.3525)**	**-0.1163* (-.0691)**	**-0.1146* (-.0565)**	**0.1409** (.0747)**	0.0499 (.0275)
*TV Preference * Urbanity*	**-0.3159* (.1016)**					
Newspaper Preference: Education			-0.1429 (-.0187)	**0.5966* (.0675)**		
Newspaper Preference: Urbanity			0.3376 (.0442)			
Newspaper Preference: Age						0.0142 (.0511)
*TV Consumption * Urbanity*			0.1225 (.0406)	0.0527 (.0237)		
Newspaper Consumption: Age		**-0.0047** (-.3525)**				
Newspaper Consumption: Urbanity			-0.0673 (-.0615)			
Newspaper Consumption: Social Comm:				**0.0879** (.0700)**		
Constant	1.947***	2.2068***	2.668***	2.796***	2.185***	2.227***
N	1360	701	1742	1548	1784	738
Adjusted R^2	0.0425	0.0465	0.0436	0.0670	0.0245	0.205

[25] OLS correlation coefficient (Standardized beta), significance: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, †p<.052.

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Figure 2a: Bulgaria: Television Preference and Urbanity:



Figure 2b: Czech Republic: Newspaper Consumption and Age:



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Figure 2c: Poland: Newspaper Preference and Education:



Figure 2d: Poland: Newspaper Consumption and Social Communication:



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Table 8: Egocentric Economic Evaluation, Media Choice, and Frequency:[26]

		Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Television Preference		-0.0206 (-.0080)	0.0636 (.0282)	-0.0016 (-.0008)	0.0427 (.0209)	-0.1123 (-.0537)	0.1250 (.0531)
Newspaper Preference		0.6261 (.0599)	-0.0055 (-.0009)	-0.0110 (-.0025)	0.2949 (.0535)	0.4679 (.0422)	0.0327 (.0069)
Radio Consumption		0.0472* (.0707)	0.0479* (.0842)	0.0238* (.0566)	-0.0127 (-.0220)	0.0005 (.0010)	0.0227 (.0464)
Television Consumption		-0.0407 (-.0230)	0.0419 (.0268)	-0.0293 (-.0298)	0.0835 (.0606)	0.1003* (.0767)	-0.0852 (-.0581)
Newspaper Consumption		0.0454 (.0525)	0.0679 (.0754)	0.0373 (.0538)	0.0310 (.0362)	-0.0034 (-.0046)	0.0827 (.0922)
Ideological Orientation		0.1507*** (.2408)	0.0415 (.0723)	0.0011 (.0025)	0.0095 (.0192)	0.0082 (.0157)	0.0329 (.0628)
Political Interest		-0.0055 (-.0163)	0.0171 (.0567)	-0.0031 (-.0131)	0.0326*** (.1236)	0.0311*** (.1175)	0.0119 (.0436)
Social Communication		-0.0187 (-.0100)	-0.0974 (-.0633)	-0.1238*** (-.0947)	-0.1327*** (-.0909)	-0.1332** (-.0828)	-0.1360* (-.0921)
Age		-0.0038 (-.0542)	0.0032 (.0527)	-0.0049*** (-.0932)	-0.0089*** (-.1488)	-0.0043** (-.0735)	-0.0036 (-.0594)
Income		0.1932*** (.1097)	0.2908*** (.1824)	0.2533*** (.2105)	0.2384*** (.1730)	0.1921** (.1205)	0.0722 (.0507)
Education		-0.1653 (-.0517)	0.1292 (.0492)	-0.0078 (-.0051)	0.0246 (.0100)	0.0339 (.0161)	0.0870 (.0347)
Urbanity		0.1233 (.0499)	-0.1075 (-.0465)	0.0421 (.0225)	0.0575 (.0283)	0.1054 (.0500)	-0.0220 (-.0108)
TV Preference:	*Ideological Orientation*	-0.0509 (-.0518)					
	Age						-0.0025 (-.0232)
	Income Group						0.2689* (.0982)
Newspaper Preference:	*Ideological Orientation*			0.1792** (.0737)			
	Income Group		-0.2348 (-.0222)				0.1203 (.0185)
	Education	-0.9016 (-.0513)					
	Age						0.0202 (.0644)
	Urbanity						0.0221 (.0035)
TV Consumption:	*Political Interest*				0.0113 (.0298)		
	Education			-0.0045 (-.0431)			
	Age		0.0020 (.0242)				

[26] OLS correlation coefficient (Standardized beta), significance: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

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	Urbanity						0.2030 (.0873)
Radio Cons	*Political Interest*					-0.0021 (-.0151)	
	Income Group		0.0007 (.0008)				**0.0664** (.0951)**
Constant		2.049***	2.8050**	3.142***	3.139***	2.378***	2.652***
N		1360	701	1742	1548	1784	738
Adjusted R^2		0.0858	0.0649	0.0839	0.0766	0.0486	0.0479

Figure 3a: Hungary: Newspaper Preference and Ideological Orientation:



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Figure 3b: Slovakia: Television Preference and Income Group:



Figure 3c: Slovakia: Radio Consumption and Income Group:



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Chapter 6: You are What You Watch: Content and Political Socialization

Introduction:

One means to understand the influence of individuals' media consumption on political and economic attitudes is to distinguish between the various content options of consumption. At the core of the media effects debate is differentiation of content. Known as the 'high/low' debate, the literature suggests discernable differences in individuals' attitudes and opinions that correlate with the predominant consumption of either news and/or informational programming (high content) or entertainment (low content). Using media to satisfy informational, observational, or entertainment needs shapes the impact that particular media has, by engaging, informing, or distracting the audience member. For countries in transition, patterns of distraction or information seeking among citizens are clearly of importance to the political socialization process. Largely predicated on the effect of content disparities between programming types, individuals' choices of *what* to consume also shape their orientation to politics, by informing or disengaging them.

The varied content consumption of media indicates how the media is being used, implying the user's intention by his consumption pattern. This is particularly relevant to this inquiry as it provides insight into the behavioral choices individuals make in choosing between content in lieu of the political demands of transition. Content choice captures behavioral choices during periods of transition, more so than socio-economic location and socio-political predispositions are able to reveal. It contributes to a fuller understanding of how citizens cope with, adapt to, or ignore transition. In this section, consumption variation in content will be examined for their hypothesized effect on individuals' attitudes and evaluations. The consumption patterns of individuals, which

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implies their intentions in using media, taps into their media consumption purpose. Choices between entertainment and news, for example, imply that individuals are using media for different purposes, respectively, distraction or information. For this analysis, content is delineated between high content, low content, and news content. Based on the literature and considering that the analysis takes place over a period of tremendous political, economic, and social change, we expect that informational content usage (high content and news) to be a choice toward information-seeking and correlated with higher levels of democratic political and economic attitudes. The reverse effect is expected for low content usage, an indication of distraction.

What we find is information and naïve distraction usage that distinguishes patterns of media consumption in democratizing countries that from the West. Patterns of content consumption in these countries show that attitudes and evaluations respond only marginally to information an individual seeks out through news and high content. Interestingly, those who consume content in a pattern of distraction often demonstrate higher political and economic attitudes. Bu this is not universally so, depending on *who* is seeking distraction. While the former may be described as understanding to difficulties of and complexities of transition, the latter suggests an 'ignorance is bliss' approach to dealing with the terms of transition. We also find that the interaction of content variables and individuals' various SES and SPP profiles both temper and strengthen effects in a relatively consistent manner, with high content and news consumption mitigating the strong and often negative influence of particular attributes and low content consumption affecting attitudes and evaluations in a conflicting manner according to individuals' SES/SPP profile.

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Media Content:

Differences between media find less theoretical purchase in lieu of the interaction of medium and content (Iyengar 1994); therefore, in order to further flesh out these media effects, variation of individuals' consumption of content is an important contribution to our understanding. This interaction is more salient to the consumption patterns of individuals and is more likely to produce observable effects on individuals' political and economic attitudes as there is room for positive and negative effects within the same medium (Blumler and McQuail 1968; see also Trenamen and McQuail 1961). It also underscores patterns of media consumption behavior associated with the political socialization process.

Mass media, and television in particular, are not consumed randomly or haphazardly. Newton suggests the same as, "…television pulls in different directions according to its content" (1999, 594), concluding that news mobilizes and entertainment alienates (although the latter relationship is much weaker; see also Carpini *et al.*1994; Putnam 2000). The distinction between 'low' and 'high' content is an extension of a more fundamental debate positing differences between 'high' and 'low' culture, or even elite vs. mass culture (DeFluer and Ball-Rokeach 1982, 167).

High culture refers to cultural demands, including history, art, and news. Therefore, high content includes programming that presents information, whether it is in news or educational format. Documentaries, news programming, informational or educational programming are aft cited examples of this. Low culture is regarded as popular culture, that is, impermanent mass-produced and mass-consumed entertainment. Low content is represented by entertainment or non-informational programming. It is, as described

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above, a component of leisure activity. Sitcoms, sports, cartoons, and dramatic programming are examples of low content. Further, while other media differences do exist (e.g. tabloid vs. journalistic newspapers) the division between low and high content will be only for television, for which consumption is near universal and therefore, in which the effects are most likely to be observable.[1] Unlike the above section, the rest of this chapter focuses on the variation in content within a single medium, television.

Why would we expect media news to play a significant and positive role in the political socialization process? “News media are expected to inform, present diverse views on the issues of the day, set the agenda, and help shape public opinion on *all* matter related to democratization” (Gross 2002, 90). Some have argued that television news may provide the strongest influence on individuals’ political and economic evaluations (Iyengar 1984; Miller and Krosnick 1996). As Graber has argued for the engaging properties of news, “[n]ews alerts the public to the ‘range of political alternatives’” (2003, 154). Others have also found that television news consumption was a significant predictor of public opinion (Page and Shapiro 1992). Newton reveals (1999, 592), that in Britain, “…watching television news has exactly the opposite effect of watching a lot of television in general”. Continuing, respondents who watch TV news claim to know more about politics, rate themselves as more politically interested, informed, and understanding. Chaffee and Kanihan (1997) have argued that even if information-seeking is not a priority for individuals, television news can provide some political understanding. The strata of the public who pay the most attention to news stories and display receptivity

[1] Although directional effects of news have been argued (Haight and Brody 1977; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987; Page 1996, chapters 1, 5; Page and Shapiro 1992, Chapter 9,10) non-directional effects, or the mere presence of issue coverage (vs. entertainment) has also been cited (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; MacKuen and Coombs 1981; Weaver *et al.*1981); and therefore, the distinction between news and high content and low content is more than adequate for this empirical inquiry.

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to new information also display the highest sense of political efficacy and trust in government (Bennett *et al.*1999; Norris 2000a, b).

However, television news is not unanimously considered beneficial to individuals' political knowledge, information, and engagement. Patterson and McClure (1976) provided the founding survey for the lack of information in television news. They argue that television news is less informative than newspaper and may be able to convey only fragments of real political information (Patterson and McClure 1976; Becker and Whitney 1980). Yet, this chapter is examining a difference across a single medium (although newspapers are partially incorporated, see below).

While given slightly less attention, entertainment content has exhibited contrary effects. In Germany, Holtz-Bacha's (1990, 73-85) political alienation and low participation are associated with high entertainment media use. While Putnam (2000) has presented evidence of television's general disengaging influence on individuals, Norris (1996) more finely tunes Putnam's earlier version of this (1995) by arguing that rather than it is not simply watching television but what is watched, that is, high vs. low content, better explains civic participation. Her argument is predicated on high content (and news) as engaging and fostering political activity, while low content cultivates political apathy and avoidance.

The divide between news and entertainment consumption is important as news has been shown to be normatively contributory in that it encourages culturally appropriate behaviors and attitudes and vilifies transgressors (Alexander 1981). Within the discipline of mass communication, one scholar has posited the relationship between media and culture such that media were responsible for the cultivation of the dominant images of a

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society (Gerbner 1980). This 'cultivation theory' rests on the assumption that media tend to offer uniform and relatively consensual versions of social reality and their audiences are 'acculturated' accordingly. By disseminating the norms of a collective society, mass media are, in other words, the purveyors of a society's culture. Based on the founding notion that media can serve as a molder of society, cultivation theorists have argued that the symbolic world of the media, particularly television, shapes and maintains (i.e. cultivates) audiences' conceptions of the real world (Gerbner and Gross 1976). Although entertainment has been argued to contain subtle and underlying cultural myths, for citizens of countries enduring political and economic transformation, the informational packaging and specific attention to the relevant issues of the day (particularly the political and economic reforms) makes news more relevant to the development of political and economic attitudes.

The difference may be that entertainment tends to be passively consumed while viewers *actively* interpret news (Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992).[2] These arguments against low content or entertainment television are a negative argument. Rather than engaging individuals cognitively and informing them, low content affects individuals both psychologically (as Putnam prefers, 2000) and physically (by simply monopolizing their time, which Putnam also notes). Earlier research has also supported the latter, making the assertion that certain people are effective managers of their time, such that their leisure time is not competitive but additive: i.e. more, more (Meyersohn 1968).

[2] This is in contrast to McLuhan's notion that the media themselves are hot and cold rather than the audience members being active or passive (1964). Whether the medium through which broadcasts are sent or the attention at reception given to them, the arguments are congruent. At this point, this inquiry is limited to the immediate effects rather than the debate between the engagement of senders and receivers.

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However, television, Meyersohn continues, is not an activity that is additive, like other social activities, but is the single largest drain on free time.

As we have seen in previous chapters, mass media consumption among the populations, particularly television, is high. As political and social changes become increasingly complex, the need for information increases and subsequently requires more of the citizenry. As individuals do have clear abilities to learn new norms (Sniderman 1975; McClosky and Brill 1983; Rohrschneider 1999), the informational and communicative needs of new democrats are significant and that information must reach them in some manner. It is out of this reliance on or the patterns of consumption of media that citizens, to some degree, draw from it to form political beliefs and opinions (Ball-Rokeach 1985). In some studies, scholars argue that media do serve as the main source of information (Blumler 1970; Seymour-Ure 1974; Paletz and Entman 1981; Robinson and Levy 1986); yet, others argue that media are more effective at simply transmitting political information than inculcating democratic values (Carey 1996). This lies at the heart of this inquiry. Given the nascent nature of Eastern European news and entertainment networks and programs as they scramble to assemble coherent programming, rather than examine individual news programs, given the cross-national component of this research, we want to examine the general influence of content (news vs. entertainment).

This research constrains its examination to a trichotomous division of content (news, high content, and low content), a differentiation that provides sufficient consumption differences to be theoretically informative in examining variation in individual's democratic attitudes. These choices reflect individuals' predilection for entertainment or

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information. Therefore, the content question taps into a more fundamental motivation of individuals. The content question may, therefore, illuminate more than just choices between channels. Therefore the following hypotheses are posited.

H_1: The consumption of news positively correlates with democratic political and positive economic evaluations.

H_2: The consumption of high content positively correlates with democratic political and positive economic evaluations.

H_3: The consumption of low content negatively correlates with democratic political and positive economic evaluations.

As in the previous chapter, it is unlikely that respondents would watch equal amounts of each type of programming. Like the preferential use of newspaper or television in the previous section, a preference for one content over the other is much more likely. In order to further distinguish between the effects of various content, I construct a set of variables that captures respondents' preference for one or the other types of content. Other respondents may also be interested in watching a great deal or very little of both.

Therefore, in Table 1, we can see the 2 x 2 matrix of content use by respondents.

<Table 1 about here>

This leads us naturally to the following hypotheses:

H4: A preference for news consumption positively correlates with democratic political and positive economic evaluations.

H_5: A preference for low content negatively correlates with democratic political and positive economic evaluations.

As an added component to the study of content, the next section introduces a more complex examination of individuals' content choices. Given the theoretical distinction between the engaging properties of high content/news consumption and the distracting qualities of low content consumption, in order to further tap into mixed media

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consumption patterns, I have constructed multiplicative variables intended to capture respondents' levels of distraction and attention. The "Ignore" index consists of the amount of low content television watched times the amount of television watched regardless of when and where.[3] In doing so, it integrates two facets of media use, frequency and content, returning a pattern of *media use* that may imply political and economic disinterest. In Figure 1, we can see the cross-national distribution of the "Ignore Index".

<Figure 1 about here>

We see a distribution of distraction that is relatively consistent. However, in both Bulgaria and Romania, while the peak of the "Ignore" indexes for both are lower than the rest, the curves do not turn downward at the highest levels of distraction. In accordance with our preliminary guess from above, both of these countries are first and second in the highest categories of entertainment television times amount spent per week watching television. The other countries show uni-model distributions that suggest moderate amounts of 'distraction'.

To complement the 'Ignore' Index, I also constructed an "Attention Index" (see Figure 2). This multiplicative variable is the amount of news television consumed times the frequency with which the respondent reads a newspaper.[4] It is intended to capture respondents' content and media choices for information seeking, again demonstrating a pattern of *media use* that may imply political and economic interest.

<Figure 2 about here>

[3] "Ignore" Index = <ENTTV>*<REGTV>; where <ENTTV> is the additive sum of the low content interest questions and <REGTV> is the frequency with which the respondent watches television.
[4] "Attention" Index = <NEWS> * <REGNEWSP>; where <NEWS>is the amount of interest in watching international and domestic news and <REGNEWSP> is the frequency with which the respondent reads a newspaper.

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It is clear that the respondents in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia show moderate to strong combined use of television news and newspapers. Also evident is the even distribution of respondents across all levels of ‘attention’ in both Bulgaria and Romania. As the curves are essentially flat, there seems to be a uniformly dispersed media consumption pattern of attention across all levels. Overall, we see some cross-national disparity in the aggregate percentages of individuals’ choices in content as they reflect a predilection for information or distraction.

The ‘ignore’ and ‘attention’ indexes are a means of empirically capturing more complex media use patterns of individuals. Given what we have seen above, both Bulgaria and Romania seem to be the least ‘attentive’ and most likely to use media in a pattern of ‘distraction’ rather than ‘attention’. As such, the following hypotheses emerge.

H_6: The ‘ignore’ index negatively correlates with political and economic attitudes.

H_7: The ‘attention’ index positively correlates with political and economic attitudes.

As mentioned above, citizens’ media choices to consume different types of programming is a latent behavioral reflection of their intention. For this analysis, those who use high levels of news and high content, whether in general, as a preference, or in conjunction with newspaper (the Attention Index), will be considered “information-seeking”. Oppositely, individuals’ who consume a high level of low content, whether in general, as a preference, or in conjunction with high levels of general television consumption (the Ignore Index), will be considered “distraction-seeking”. This distinction links media content choices to the political socialization process as individuals’ content choices manifest an engagement or disengagement with the

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transition process, choices that are theoretically linked to the development of political attitudes and economic evaluations.

Methods: Conceptualization and Operationalization

Content choices will be conceptualized along three television programming choices, high content, news, and low content. The news variable will be the additive score of the responses to questions about individuals' levels of interest in watching both international and domestic news.[5] The high content variable will be the additive score of respondents' answers to interest questions regarding documentaries on politics, history, culture, and art.[6] The low content variable will be the additive score of respondents' interest levels in entertainment television programming.[7] For this examination, only five of the six countries are included as the Hungarian questionnaire did not include these questions. The SES, socio-political predisposition, and dependent variables remain the same as in the previous chapters.

I present the distributions of content usage as it demonstrates some initial evidence for significant cross-national variation. The following tables and figures depict the distribution of news, high content, and low content in these countries. For news viewing (see Figure 3), we can see an increasing trend, with modes at 4 and 6 which represent the

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[5] For all of the content choice questions, the following statement was made: "What kind of television programs are you interested in watching? Are you very interested, somewhat interested, or not at all interested in watching the following types of shows" <ININEWS> 'Interest in watching International News on television" and <INDNEWS> 'Interest in watching Domestic News on television."

[6] <INDOCPOL> 'Interest in watching documentaries on politics', <INDOCIPL> 'Interest in watching documentaries on international politics', <INDOCHST> 'Interest in watching history documentaries', <INDOCLOC> 'Interest in watching documentaries on life in other countries', <INDOCCUL> Interest in watching documentaries on Culture and Literature', <INDOCART> 'Interest in watching documentaries on Fine Arts', <INDOCSCI> 'Interest in watching documentaries on Science and Technology'.

[7] <INSERCOM> 'Interest in watching comedy series', <INSERSCF> 'Interest in watching series of science fiction', <INSERANI> 'Interest in watching series of animation', <INSERPOL> 'Interest in watching police stories', <INSERDRA> 'Interest in watching drama series', <INSERADV> 'Interest in watching series on adventure'.

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responses 'somewhat interested' and 'very interested' for both sources of news, respectively.[8]

<Figure 3 about here>

In almost every country, more than 50% are at least 'very interested' in one source of news[9] (Slovakia is at 47.21%).

Broadening the content criteria to include 'high' content, we can see in Figure 4 that there is a more Normal distribution of responses to questions regarding individuals' interest in historical, political, and cultural programming.

<Figure 4 about here>

While only slightly different than the rest, both Romania and Bulgaria show more evidence of declining interest. Despite the spike in the first and middle category in Bulgaria, both countries seem to increase only slightly and then clearly decline suggesting a more frequent disinterest in high content programming, than in the other countries which demonstrate a more central, uni-modal distribution. This demonstrates lower levels of high content television consumption on the part of the Bulgarian and Romanian respondents than in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia.

<Figure 5 about here>

In Figure 5, we can see evidence of a similar cross-national distribution in low content. While the rest of the countries show a sharp decline in heavy interest in watching 'low' content, in both Romania and Bulgaria, responses to interest in watching a great deal of entertainment television do not diminish. Given both this and the above

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[8] It must be noted that for CEE, despite that commercial news media remain largely apolitical displaying mostly sensational stories (Sükösd and Bajomi-Lázár 2003, 16), it contains more political and economic information than a comedy series would, for example.

[9] Again, as the news variable is the sum of domestic and international news consumption questions, the variation of source will be addressed in the following chapter.

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distribution of high content consumption, a preliminary guess might be that we might find Bulgarian and Romanian respondents using television more for distraction than information.

Similarly, I delineate among content viewing preferences of respondents. Table 2 gives the cross-national distribution of these content preference categories.[10]

<Table 2 about here>

Between one in four and one in five respondents in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland fall into the *news preference* category, with the Czech Republic registering the highest percentage of individuals with news preference. Interestingly, the lowest percentage of *news preference* was in Slovakia while the highest percentage was in the Czech Republic (with the latter having twice as many as the former). For the opposite category (*entertainment preference*), we see a decline in the percentage in the preference for entertainment use. We see the reverse of the news preference relationship in the Czech Republic and Slovakia; with more than twice the respondents in Slovakia preferring entertainment to news than in the Czech Republic. Nonetheless, all of the percentages are low (<11%), demonstrating that a low percentage of respondents use television for purely entertainment purposes. Except for Poland and Slovakia, a majority of respondents consume high levels of both and we see only a small percentage of respondents in each country using low levels of both.

<Figure 6 about here>

As a graphical representation of Table 2 (see Figure 6), in general, we see consistency over each of the consumption categories in al of the cases. At this most basic, descriptive level, it is substantively interesting for countries in democratic transition that *news*

[10] These are constructed as dummies such that a respondent is either in the particular usage cell or not.

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preference is in a greater percentage than *entertainment preference* in every country. No clear cross national pattern emerges from these descriptive statistics; yet, we do see some reoccurring relationships between countries.

Full Model:

The full model includes socio-economic location and socio-political predisposition variables as well as the content variables. As in the previous chapter, the main effects and interaction effects are interpreted *ceteris paribus*.

$$\textbf{Political and Economic Attitudes} = \boldsymbol{\alpha} + \boldsymbol{\beta_1} (\text{HIGHCONTENT}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_2} (\text{NEWS}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_3} (\text{LOWCONTENT}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_4} (\text{NEWSPREF}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_5} (\text{ENTPREF}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_6} (\text{IGNORE}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_7} (\text{ATTENTON}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_8} (\text{IDORIENT}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_9} (\text{POLINT}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{10}} (\text{TALKPOL}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{11}} (\text{AGE}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{12}} (\text{INCOME}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{13}} (\text{EDUC}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{14}} (\text{URBRUR}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_a}(X_n X_m) + \ldots + \boldsymbol{\beta_b}(X_{n+t} X_{m+t}) + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$$

In Tables 3, 4, and 5 show the results of the OLS regression model on the dependent variables: institutional trust, sociotropic and egocentric economic evaluations. As in the last chapter, I present the models together to allow a cumulative examination of the main and interactive effects.

<Tables 3, 4, and 5 about here>

Again, the expectations of this chapter were that individuals' content choices of television exert competing effects. Low content, or primarily entertainment programming, was expected to depress attitudes and evaluations by "distracting" citizens from the on-going political and economic processes. News and high content programming was expected to cultivate higher attitudes and evaluations by "informing" citizens on the political and economic issues *de jour*. These distinctions were further operationalized by delineating not only between broad content consumption choices but also by tapping preferences for one or the other and including indices of more complex

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media use that also capture more complex consumption patterns of "distraction-seeking" (the Ignore Index) and "information-seeking" (the Attention Index).

The main effects of each model show us two things. One, individuals' basic content choices, whether high or low content program consumption, do little to affect attitudes and evaluations. Only sporadically do we see the independent effects of content choices on the levels of individuals' institutional trust and economic evaluations. Still, when low content does show up (the Czech Republic, EEE; Slovakia, IT), it is in the hypothesized direction. The same cannot be said for high content and news. Even among the preferential use of high and low content, there is only a single instance of each, albeit in the direction hypothesized. In light of these findings, direct support for H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4, and H_5 is difficult to conjure. But as we saw in the last chapter, these influences are not limited to main effects and we find a great deal more support for these hypotheses in the interactive effects, once again demonstrating *who* is central to our understanding.

The Ignore and Attention indices do more to fill out the main effect findings. Intended to capture more complex media usage patterns, these indices offer some contest to the lack of main effect results. Most obviously, both had uniformly positive effects. While this is in direct contrast to the expected effect of the Ignore index (H_6), for the Attention index, this provides a great deal of support for H_7. This support is seconded by the Attention index capturing ¾ of the number of observed effects. For citizens in countries undergoing democracy, the combined use of newspaper and news programming provide a means to improve their political attitudes and economic evaluations.

Examining the effects cross-nationally produce no outstanding patterns. What should be noted is that, in contrast to the previous chapter, the number of effects is more evenly

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distributed across the dependent variables. I propose that this is not an insubstantial finding as individuals' content choices, that is, information- or distraction-seeking, reveal themselves as more significant political behavioral choices than choices among media. This has helped us further parse the media choices of individuals in democratizing countries.

As before, the measure the extent of influence media content choice exerts on political attitudes and economic evaluations, it is necessary to include the contributions of the SES and SPP variables as well. For institutional trust, political interest is the most common and uniformly positive SPP variable. In congruence with the underlying premise of information- and distraction-seeking, respondents' increasing interest in political and economic events correlates with increases in political attitudes and economic evaluations. As we saw above, particularly for Romanians, this is reflected in the positive correlations with news use (both preference and the Attention index) and below in the interactions in which political interest and news combine to exert a positive influence. As in the previous chapter, income was a consistently and uniformly positive influence on individuals' economic evaluations; however, they are often overshadowed by the influence of the content media variables.

Social communication is negatively correlated with egocentric economic evaluations. Like the previous chapter, increased discussions about political and economics with colleagues seem to depress citizens' levels of political attitudes and economic evaluations; however, as also before, media play an interactive role in mediating this effect. Finally, Bulgaria demands an additional observation. Across all of the dependent variables, ideological orientation is positively correlated and is the most substantial

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variable according to the standardized coefficients. As Bulgarian respondents report ideological congruence with democratic political values and a market liberal economics, their institutional trust and economic evaluations increase.

Although the Ignore index does not provide much as a main effect, the interactions suggest that “distraction-seeking” is reliant on *who* is doing the ignoring. We expected that consuming a lot of low content and watching a lot of television would be bad for the development of political attitudes and economic evaluations (H_6). This would identifiable by a general negative effect on whoever was engaging in this activity, graphically, a downward shift of the entire line. Instead, as the interactions demonstrate, this does not happen. We see discrete influence related to the audience members’ SES and SPP profiles.

What then, is the role of low content as an interactive effect? Does distraction-seeking entail a strict negative influence?

<Figure 7c about here>

In Romania, levels of institutional trust are positively influenced by a main effect of political interest (see Figure 7c). However, when coupled with low content consumption we can see how this type of content exerts its divergent effects. At low levels of low content use, the difference between the levels of institutional trust among the politically interested and disinterested is negligible. When these same groups consume a great deal of low content, the politically disinterested exhibit lower levels of trust while the politically interested show much higher levels.

<Figure 8a about here>

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The same effect is observed in Poland (Figure 8a). As we have seen in Romania above, despite the positive main effect of income, in conjunction with increasing low content consumption, lower income Poles lower their sociotropic economic evaluations while high income Poles increase theirs. Romania displays this divergent effect of low content again in sociotropic economic evaluations (Figure 8c).

<Figure 8c about here>

We see the exact same effect as with institutional trust, with the politically interested benefiting from increased consumption of low content, while their disinterested counterparts find their evaluations decreasing. For Bulgaria, increasing consumption of low content has little effect on older citizens (Figure 9b).

<Figure 9b about here>

However, like the others above, for younger Bulgarians, an increase in low content shows a significant increase in their egocentric economic evaluations. Finally, in Slovakia, at low levels of low content consumption (Figure 8e), ideological orientation shows a slightly negative relationship with sociotropic economic evaluations. At high levels however, this relationship reverses itself such that those ideologically democratic exhibit high levels of sociotropic economic evaluations while the lesser democratically ideological lower theirs.

<Figure 8e about here>

While the above interactions lend support to low content's deleterious effects on individuals' political attitudes and economic evaluations, low content does not always affect these groups in this manner.

<Figure 7b about here>

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For individuals' levels of institutional trust in Poland (Figure 7b), high levels of low content exacerbate the negative effect of social communication among the most talkative and exerts little, if positive, effect on the least talkative. For the Bulgarians, low content demonstrates this again (Figure 9a).

<Figure 9a about here>

The positive correlation between education and egocentric economic evaluations is inverted by high levels of low content use. That is, Bulgarians with low education increase their evaluations with high levels of low content consumption while the highly educated lower theirs.

Do high content and news make such an impressive showing? Does information-seeking find more purchase among the interactive effects than the main effects? For the Czech Republic, at low levels of high content use, social communication continues to impose its negative influence on institutional trust (Figure 7a).

<Figure 7a about here>

However, when these groups consume increasing amount of high content, social communication's negative influence is abated. Although non-talkative citizens do not experience a remarkable improvement in their trust levels, individuals that engage in a lot of political and economic discussion with friends and watch a lot of high content demonstrate much higher levels of institutional trust than those who do not consume as much high content. This is one of the few instances of the general increase of all groups, however uneven.

<Figure 9c about here>

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Poland also shows this effect between a news preference and social communication (Figure 9c). When the non-talkative prefer news, they see a dramatic drop in their egocentric economic evaluations while those often engaged in political discussions see a tremendous rise. Once again, social communication's negative influence is abated and in this case, reversed.

<Figure 9d about here>

This is seconded by general news consumption in Poland on egocentric economic evaluations (Figure 9d), although those who do not discuss political often show little change despite the level of news consumption (like the Czech Republic above).

<Figure 8b about here>

In Romania, independent of news' influence (low levels of consumption) income positively correlates with sociotropic economic evaluations (Figure 8b). At higher levels, lower income group members increase their evaluations while higher income group members' decrease theirs.

<Figure 9e about here>

We see the same pattern in Slovakia (Figure 9e). Despite income's positive main effect, a preference for news exerts the same effects on members of different income groups. Finally, also in Slovakia (Figure 8d), age has little effect on sociotropic economic evaluations. Introducing a news preference generates a significant improvement in older Slovaks' evaluations and a significant worsening for younger ones.

<Figure 8d about here>

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Discussion:

Given what we have seen above in both the main and interactive effects, what can we say about media content choices and individuals' political socialization? For the media variables under examination, high content, including news programming, does not present substantial evidence of its positive influence as a main effect. Despite the Attention index's clear contribution to our understanding of information-seeking, it is a complex media use variable that takes us in a new direction of multi-media usage rather than directly answering the question of whether high content is an independently positive influence. Yet, the observed differences between information- and distraction-seeking do not present a general solution but a conditional one.

Fortunately, news and high content's role is not limited to the main effects. As an interactive effect, we see that high content does play a role depending on who is using it. For lower SES/SPP members, news is positive half of the time. For higher SES/SPP members, it is more commonly positive but still far from confirming its positive role.[11] As such, it is worth noting one of news and high content's consistent roles. News and high content do consistently counter the negative effect of social communication. These are likely competing information-seeking processes that consist of the positive role of high content (and news) versus the negative role of social communication. I would assert that by expanding ones' horizon of events through media, one is able temper the more narrow political and economic discussions. This indicates that among this group of political talkers, news and high content *do* play a role as information providers. However, overall, an influential pattern of information-seeking is not apparent and even with these

[11] This may be related to the still inchoate news television outlets. This is discussed in much greater detail in the macro-level chapter below.

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added results, in combination with the tepid main effect results, it is difficult to make a strong assertion in support for H_1 and H_2.

Low content, in contrast, exerts its negative effect in a curious manner. For lower SES/SPP members, using or preferring low content is predominantly in the direction it is hypothesized. Others may argue that it is the SES/SPP that exert the negative influence, however as we have seen, the significant interactions show that *in addition* to the SES/SPP profiles of these audience members, low content exacerbate these effects. The same cannot be said for the higher SES/SPP members. Their use of low content in fact quite often contributes to higher levels of institutional trust and economic evaluations. Again, beyond the SES/SPP profiles, low content media significantly and substantively improves this group's political attitudes and economic evaluations.

Our observation of this conditional effect informs our understanding of the influence of content. For low SES/SPP group members, low content more often than not exerts its negative influence on individuals' political attitudes and economic evaluations. It seems that this distraction-seeking is limited to groups that may be more susceptible to the influence of media. That is, those with low education levels, smaller incomes, fewer political conversations, and less political interest are more likely to be distracted from political and economic events associated with rapid transition, resulting in less information and therefore lesser-informed attitudes and evaluations.

For members of high SES/SPP groups, seeking out media in a pattern of distraction also influences political and economic attitudes. One might describe it as 'head in the sand', 'ignorance is bliss', or 'rose colored glasses' approach to political attitudes and particularly economic evaluations. Given the tumultuous period of rapid economic and

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political transition, ‘tuning out’ may have provided individuals with just enough *non-information* to distract their attention from these difficulties. As information-seeking provided a number of competing effects, by not paying attention, or distracting themselves with low content, these citizens gloss over difficulties, both nationally and personally, to arrive at optimistic evaluations. Engaging in distraction-seeking left many individuals to make ‘information free’ assessments. This may be an indication of higher income group members’ availability of free time (and additional income) to consume low content, while for lower income group members, rather than a leisure activity, this may be more of a pattern of distraction. Therefore, we find conditional support for the negative effect of low content, but support nonetheless for H_3.

Conclusion:

This section has presented the evidence for individuals’ choices in content as they influence their political attitudes and economic evaluations in the democratizing countries of CEE. We have seen that while information-seeking media content choices do not illuminate the influence of news and high content on individuals, low content choices do. That of course depends on *who* makes those low content choices. This latter finding leads us to proffer a preliminary guess that media, as it is consumed by different groups, subtly reinforces disparities between SES/SPP groups, that is, act as a political cleavage of sorts, advantaging some while disadvantaging others. I will address this idea in the last chapter.

As presented above, the effects of content consumption only somewhat correspond to the hypothesized effects generated in the West. We begin to see a significant deviation from established media theory toward a theory that is more compatible with the specific institutional, personal, and national changes that take place during democratic political

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transitions. While further limited to a single time period, cross-national variation in the role of content choices reflects some correlation with the progress of democratization as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland showing slightly more selective content preference (and a generally Western patterns of effects) and less significant influence by media than Romania and certainly Bulgaria.

These cross-national differences are addressed in a chapter below that provides a historical examination of media institutional change in the transition period. The following chapter examines a third facet of media effects on individuals' political and economic attitudes. Providing a direct test of the diffusion hypothesis, the next chapter explores the differences between domestic vs. international media sources. The literature on media source suggests a subtle but unmistakable effects due to the implicit message carried by various media source, in this case, Western and national broadcasting sources.

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Tables and Figures:

Table 1: Content Preference Matrix:

	Low Content: *Low*	Low Content: *High*	
	Low Both	Low News/High Entertainment	*Low*
High Content	High News/Low Entertainment	High Both	*High*

Figure 1: "Ignore" Index:



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Figure 2: “Attention” Index:



Figure 3: News Consumption:



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Figure 4: High Content Consumption:



Figure 5: Low Content Consumption:



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Table 2: Distribution of Content Preference:

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
High News/Low Entertainment:	20.04%	31.06%	21.26%	25.19%	14.01%
High Entertainment/Low News	7.69%	4.89%	5.98%	5.56%	10.96%
Both High	51.66%	55.85%	36.69%	61.30%	39.56%
Both Low	10.28%	6.57%	5.49%	7.09%	9.83%

Figure 6: Cross-National News/Entertainment Preference:



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Table 3: Institutional Trust and Content Usage:[12]

		Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
High Content		-0.0329 (-.0336)	0.0998 (.0891)	0.0397 (.0371)	0.0180 (.0165)	**0.1153* (.1180)**
News		-0.1302 (-.0324)	-0.0691 (-.0162)	-0.3260 (-.0785)	-0.3080 (-.0685)	0.0365 (.0103)
Low Content		0.1530 (.1067)	-0.1952 (-.1135)	0.0870 (.0486)	-0.0280 (-.0188)	**-0.2958* (-.1896)**
News Preference		-0.0765 (-.0076)	-0.3700 (-.0399)	0.4586 (.0489)	0.7073 (.0680)	0.2173 (.0250)
Entertainment Preference		-0.4295 (-.0183)	1.564 (.0559)	-1.347 (-.0595)	0.8467 (.0325)	-1.032 (-.0590)
Ignore Index		-0.0042 (-.0163)	0.0132 (.0448)	**0.0319* (.1080)**	0.0211 (.0828)	0.0393 (.1491)
Attention Index		-0.0210 (-.0390)	0.0320 (.0548)	**0.0560* (.0894)**	0.0143 (.0245)	-0.0062 (-.0115)
Ideological Orientation		**0.3645*** (.1489)**	-0.0577 (-.0229)	0.0244 (.0103)	0.1095 (.0434)	0.1031 (.0456)
Political Interest		**0.1625** (.1222)**	**0.2082** (.1576)**	0.0792 (.0622)	**0.2139*** (.1672)**	0.1077 (.0909)
Social Communication		0.1442 (.0199)	-0.5449 (-.0803)	-0.0281 (-.0040)	-0.2943 (-.0374)	-0.0811 (-.0127)
Age		0.0023 (.0085)	-0.0209 (-.0790)	-0.0014 (-.0049)	0.0010 (.0034)	0.0119 (.0444)
Income		0.0674 (.0097)	0.1920 (.0275)	**0.5281** (.0798)**	0.2377 (.0305)	0.2170 (.0352)
Education		**-0.8779* (-.0705)**	**0.9756* (.0847)**	-0.3893 (-.0334)	**-0.7739** (-.0756)**	-0.5792 (-.0525)
Urbanity		0.3093 (.0286)	0.2150 (.0211)	0.1075 (.0110)	-0.1245 (-.0121)	0.5709 (.0646)
*News * Education*		0.5939 (.0592)				
High Content:	*Political Interest*	-0.0012 (-.0045)		-0.0018 (-.0064)		
	Education			-0.0953 (-.0366)		
	Social Communication		**0.1293* (.0812)**			
	Ideological Orientation	0.0259 (.0510)		0.0098 (.0.180)		
	Age		-0.0025 (-.0420)			
Low Content:	*Political Interest*	0.0066 (.0184)			**0.0414*** (.1130)**	
	Ideological Orientation					0.0491 (.0642)

[12] OLS correlation coefficient (Standardized beta), significance: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

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	Income Group					0.1555 (.0718)
News Pref	*Urbanity*		0.0025 (.0002)			
	Social Communication					-0.4126 (-.0406)
Entertainment Pref:	*Urbanity*	1.321 (.0978)				
	Age		-0.0192 (-.0120)			
	Social Communication			**-1.866* (-.0624)**		
	Ideological Orientation		1.165 (.1157)			
Constant		16.134 ***	12.881***	11.975***	13.866***	11.906***
Adj. R^2		0.0448	0.0718	0.0340	0.0379	0.0572
Total		1299	710	1473	1765	726

Figure 7a: Czech Republic: High Content Consumption and Social Communication:



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Figure7b: Poland: Entertainment Preference and Social Communication:



Figure 7c: Romania: Low Content and Political Interest:



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Table 4: Sociotropic Economic Evaluations and Content[13]

		Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
High Content		0.0204 (.0861)	-0.0091 (-.0405)	-0.0117 (-.0524)	-0.0032 (-.0161)	-0.0053 (-.0266)
News		-0.0759 (-.0779)	-0.0180 (-.0210)	-0.0381 (-.0441)	**-0.1155*** (-.1413)**	-0.0434 (-.0603)
Low Content		0.0522 (.1504)	-0.0488 (-.1418)	-0.0304 (-.0817)	-0.0002 (-.0009)	0.0145 (.0458)
News Preference		0.1200 (.0494)	-0.1411 (-.0761)	-0.0363 (-.0186)	**0.1460* (.0772)**	-0.0725 (-.0410)
Entertainment Preference		-0.1489 (-.0262)	-0.0994 (-.0178)	0.0246 (.0052)	-0.2737 (-.0578)	-0.1815 (-.0510)
Ignore Index		-0.0046 (-.0739)	-0.0017 (-.0289)	**0.0075* (.1224)**	0.0041 (.0880)	0.0009 (.0171)
Attention Index		0.0075 (.0577)	**0.0155* (.1323)**	**0.0151** (.1157)**	**0.0149*** (.1405)**	0.0072 (.0656)
Ideological Orientation		**0.0823*** (.1387)**	0.0288 (.0570)	0.0178 (.0359)	0.0223 (.0487)	0.0169 (.0367)
Political Interest		0.0146 (.0452)	0.0118 (.0445)	0.0159 (.0600)	**0.0224** (.0962)**	**0.0303* (.1258)**
Social Communication		-0.0675 (-.0385)	-0.0994 (-.0733)	**-0.1468*** (-.1010)**	**-0.1174** (-.0822)**	-0.1103 (-.0852)
Age		0.0026 (.0390)	-0.0035 (-.0664)	0.0004 (.0059)	-0.0007 (-.0126)	-0.0009 (-.0161)
Income		**0.1011* (.0602)**	0.0542 (.0388)	**0.2096*** (.1523)**	**0.1167** (.0823)**	0.0116 (.0093)
Education		-0.0648 (-.0215)	0.0144 (.0062)	0.1044 (.0431)	-0.0859 (-.0462)	-0.0154 (-.0069)
Urbanity		0.0462 (.0176)	**-0.2196** (-.1077)**	-0.1081 (-.0531)	**0.1405** (.0752)**	0.0635 (.0353)
News	*Political Interest*	0.0012 (.0050)				
	Income Group				**-0.0849** (-.0676)**	
	Age					0.0030 (.0697)
High Content	*Ideological Orientation*	-0.0021 (-.0504)		0.0016 (.0382)		
	Political Interest					0.0014 (.0268)
Low Content	*Urbanity*		0.0420 (.0694)			
	Ideological Orientation					**0.0179** (.1150)**
	Social Communication	0.0193 (.0382)				
	Income			**0.0271* (.0509)**		

[13] OLS correlation coefficient (Standardized beta), significance: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

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	Political Interest				**0.0057*** (.0855)**	
News Preferenc	*Ideological Orientation*		0.0248 (.0301)			
	Age					**0.0095* (.1157)**
Entertainment Preference	*Age*					0.0017 (.0092)
	Social Communication				-0.3864 (-.0540)	
	Ideological Orientation				-0.0527 (-.0255)	
Constant		2.1094**	2.0915***	2.069***	1.677***	2.087***
Adj. R^2		0.0355	0.0314	0.0617	0.0393	0.0320
Total		1299	710	1473	1765	726

Figure 8a: Poland: Low Content Consumption and Income Group:



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Figure 8b: Romania: News and Income Groups:



Figure 8c: Romania: Low Content Consumption and Political Interest:



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Figure 8d: Slovakia: News Preference and Age:



Figure 8e: Slovakia: Low Content Consumption and Ideological Orientation:



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Table 5: Egocentric Economic Evaluations and Content[14]

		Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
High Content		0.0242 (.0963)	0.0135 (.0521)	-0.0003 (-.0013)	0.0019 (.0086)	0.0033 (.0147)
News		0.0246 (.0238)	-0.0236 (-.0227)	-0.0355 (-.0412)	**-0.0719* (-.0779)**	-0.0306 (-.0378)
Low Content		0.0183 (.0495)	**-0.1081** (-.2768)**	0.0232 (.0624)	-0.0173 (-.0565)	-0.0372 (-.1042)
News Preference		-0.0292 (-.0113)	-0.1226 (-.0583)	0.0386 (.0198)	0.0934 (.0437)	-0.1050 (-.0527)
Entertainment Preference		0.0640 (.0106)	-0.1495 (-.0236)	**-0.3530* (-.0750)**	0.0624 (.0117)	-0.3044 (-.0760)
Ignore Index		-0.0035 (-.0522)	0.0097 (.1454)	0.0015 (.0242)	0.0047 (.0907)	0.0400 (.0658)
Attention Index		**0.0135* (.0974)**	0.0080 (.0606)	0.0021 (.0164)	**0.0114** (.0954)**	0.0098 (.0788)
Ideological Orientation		**0.0780** (.1238)**	0.0492 (.0859)	0.0073 (.0147)	0.0224 (.0432)	0.0363 (.0701)
Political Interest		-0.0164 (-.0479)	0.0113 (.0375)	**0.0330*** (.1248)**	**0.0283*** (.1077)**	0.0171 (.0632)
Social Communication		-0.0301 (-.0161)	-0.0922 (-.0599)	**-0.2000*** (-.1376)**	**-0.1389** (-.0861)**	**-0.1610* (-.1105)**
Age		-0.0042 (-.0589)	0.0025 (.0421)	**-0.0079*** (-.1304)**	**-0.0041* (-.0692)**	**-0.0079* (-.1295)**
Income		**0.1984*** (.1113)**	**0.3079*** (.1942)**	**0.2314*** (.1682)**	**0.1713*** (.1071)**	**0.2923*** (.2066)**
Education		-0.1648 (-.0514)	0.1419 (.0542)	0.0157 (.0065)	0.0302 (.0144)	0.0251 (.0099)
Urbanity		0.1400 (.0504)	-0.1071 (-.0463)	0.0569 (.0280)	**0.1248* (.0592)**	0.0317 (.0157)
News	*Ideological Orientation*		-0.0028 (-.0059)			
	Education			0.0266 (.0128)		
	Political Interest			-0.0084 (-.0371)		
	Social Communication			**0.0895* (.0703)**		
High Content	*Political Interest*		0.0011 (.0148)			
	Income Group				-0.0066 (-.0188)	
	Education		-0.0187 (-.0325)			
	Social Communication	-0.0148 (-.0399)				

[14] OLS correlation coefficient (Standardized beta), significance: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

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	Age				-0.0002 (-.0163)	
	Urbanity	0.0046 (.0096)				
Low Content	*Education*	**-0.0565* (-.0599)**				
	Urbanity					-0.0022 (-.0040)
	Income Group			0.0129 (.0242)		
	Age	**-0.0013* (-.0660)**				
News Preference	*Ideological Orientation*		0.0120 (.0128)			
	Income Group					**-0.2146* (-.1019)**
	Age					0.0093 (.1007)
	Social Communication			**0.1699* (.0788)**		
Entertainment Preference	*Social Communication*			-0.0706 (-.0114)		
	Ideological Orientation	0.1723 (.0666)	-0.0043 (-.0204)			
	Education					1.734 (.0652)
	Age		-0.0112 (-.0308)			-0.0089 (-.0423)
Constant		2.095***	2.158***	3.017***	1.826***	2.287***
Adj. R^2		0.0839	0.0974	0.0807	0.0477	0.0494
Total		1299	710	1473	1765	726

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Figure 9a: Bulgaria: Low Content Consumption and Education:



Figure 9b: Bulgaria: Low Content Consumption and Age:



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Figure 9c: Poland: News Preference and Social Communication:



Figure 9d: Poland: News Consumption and Social Communication:



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Figure 9e: Slovakia: News Preference and Income Group:



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Chapter 7: The Diffusion Hypothesis: Broadcasting Democracy

Introduction:

This chapter moves from the narrow examination of domestic media to include international media as clearly these countries are not immune to the broadcasts of foreign media. In Central and Eastern Europe, the role of foreign media has been important not only to the structural and institutional development of national media[1] but also to the broader shaping of appeals for democratic political order. As established sources of formerly surreptitious broadcasts, Western media have been penetrating Eastern Europe for many purposes for many years. Following transition, many provided the only arguably objective, hence reliable, and consistent informational source. In doing so, they provided exposure to and encouragement for democratization (in the form of cultural and political example). This is the diffusion hypothesis.

The hypothesis is not one of market-based competition for an audience but rather the cultural differentiation among established and nascent media institutions. Programming carries cultural information that implicitly provides a normative framework of the source location. Therefore, individuals' media consumption decisions render subtle but discernable effects in their political attitudes. The diffusion hypothesis has been argued to exist but has not received sufficient theoretical and empirical attention. Therefore, this paper is an empirical test of that hypothesis.

International media are theorized to shape beliefs and attitudes in two ways. First, particularly related to this geo-political region, international media are historically significant given their pre-transition role in penetrating the Iron Curtain with not only 'generic' western media broadcasts but also broadcasts aimed at undermining those

[1] This includes not only technological assistance but also investment and training as well.

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states' stranglehold of information. This is relevant in understanding Central and Eastern Europeans' political and economic values in times of transition as this external source of media provided a perceived forum of non-propagandized information. After the collapse of the authoritarian regimes in CEE, citizens' use of the continuing broadcasts into the region (particularly of radio) may be related to the belief that they were the only source of 'trustworthy' information.

Second, the diffusion hypothesis states that use of western media implicitly cultivates more western values, specifically democratic political and liberal market economic attitudes. This second argument is theoretically plausible on two levels. One, international media, especially television, has been argued to be vicarious participation in the global village (McLuhan 1964). International media consumption exposes the audience members to events, developments, and even personalities beyond the borders of their nation. In doing so, presents a 'much larger world' than the audience member most likely encounters daily. This broad perspective is likely to nurture values and attitudes of international quality, presenting intellectual, cultural, political and economic alternatives, beyond the narrow and immediate lives of the audience members. In presenting these alternatives, particularly for this region, Central and Eastern Europeans may demonstrate a *de facto* manifestation of new (specifically Western) values being presented as they were eager to leave the old one behind.

Two, even more specifically, Central and Eastern Europeans' consumption of western media broadcasts are likely to sway individuals' attitudes toward democratic and free market ideals by the assumption that 'that is how things work', or more normatively, 'that is how things *should* work'. Western media implicitly perform this function as within

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western media deviation from western political and economic institutional norms is vilified and adherence to these norms is rewarded.

What must be noted is that both of these micro-level processes are not overt or manufactured but rather simply unwitting outcomes of Western media institutions. This chapter, therefore, examines the theory behind international media as an instrument of attitudinal change, the distribution of international media use in these countries, and constructs a model of international media use between international and domestic media sources.

International Media and Central and Eastern Europe: A History:

Before addressing the basis for examining the hypothetical difference in the influence of various media sources on individuals' political and economic attitudes, it is important to present a brief history to highlight the relationship between democratic values and international media, particularly radio. Central and Eastern Europeans' historical relationship with international media reinforces the basis for this argument as a reliance on international radio broadcasts may have left a residual reliance on international broadcasts as more trustworthy than domestic sources. This relationship, by extension, may have spilled over into the first decade of transition and even into other media, such as international television.

The importance of international media in the region before 1989 cannot be dismissed. Both the Soviet and CEE regimes were keen to maintain strict domination of information via media. However, in pre-transition Central and Eastern Europe, despite technological and ideological barriers, these countries were not hermetically sealed. In some cases, the

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exchange of content was a formal affair, particularly for television.[2] Yet, these exchanges were political processes and predominantly distributed on state television broadcast. Therefore, this connection was only marginally instrumental in exposing citizens of the east to visions of the west.

There were also “The Voices”.[3] *BBC World Service, Radio Liberty, Deutsche Welle*, and *Voice of America* were radio broadcasts designed and implemented as portals into the west. While *Radio Liberty* was specifically targeted at Russia proper, *Radio Free Europe, Voice of America,* and *BBC World Service* served CEE (in order of the most frequently listened to). While *VOA* was virulently anti-Communist (Nelson 1997, 175),[4] the *BBC* actively avoided ideological contestation, attempting instead to provide a resource of balanced information that gave alternative interpretations of state reported events (Tusa 1999, 10).[5] Although The Voices’ pre-transition contribution to the demise of the Soviet Union’s domination of the region cannot be reliably estimated, anecdotal evidence suggests that these broadcasts were anticipated and increasingly relied upon as 1989 neared (Walker 1992; Heil 2003).

It was during the time of regime collapse in the late 1980’s that these radio broadcasts galvanized their role in the impending demise of the Soviet Union. This is exemplified in many of the countries in the region as ‘real time’ history. Western radio broadcasted events taking place before their Eastern counterparts could, or would. These events and their de-politicized, factual presentation gave many of these citizens an exercise in real

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[2] There were Western and Eastern companies that dealt with the regular exchange of programming (albeit quite edited): Eurovision for Western Europe and Intervision for Central and Eastern Europe.
[3] This moniker was commonly used according to an article by John Tusa, managing director of BBC World Service, 1986-1992 (see Walker 1992, 128).
[4] *Deutsche Welle* was like *VOA*, German broadcasts implying a better life there.
[5] Tusa states that this was done in order not to turn listeners off. In contrast to the more ideological *VOA,* the *BBC* was interested in attracting listeners through an objective presentation of facts and letting the listeners decide.

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time information For the Romanians, the *BBC*'s near-simultaneous reporting of the student revolts and subsequent military response in Timişoara (15-19 December 1989) led to an outpouring of support for and activity in the subsequent national revolution.[6] For the Hungarians, it was the buildup to and live broadcast of the 1989 reburial of Imre Nagy, the 1956 revolutionary hero, at which the earliest and nascent democratic appeals were made. Szántó states (1999, 24), "[Imre] Nagy's reburial was the first occasion where Hungarians could watch history unfold in real time. Being so connected to the flow of events was entirely foreign to life under socialism". For the Poles, the visit of Polish Pope Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul the Second) to Gniezno in 1981 was broadcast live via Western radio transmitting more than a million Polish voices.[7]

For all of CEE and Russians alike, the Chernobyl disaster of 26 April 1986 was reported extensively by western radio and only mentioned, in passing, on Soviet Russian news broadcasts eight days later. As Walker argues (1992, 135-6), presented with these events in 'real time', citizens of CEE heard history happening, engaging citizens in the transformation of their countries, arming them with the information that their countrymen were resisting and of their regimes' responses to these events. Others have made a similar argument for media playing a reifying role in transition, letting CEE citizens know that democratization is in fact happening (Bennett 1998, 201). Through the persistent attempts of relaying real time information to the citizens of CEE, Western broadcasts served to underscore what these citizens already knew but could not say: that the king had no clothes.

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[6] These events in Timişoara are considered the impetus for the collapse of Ceausescu's regime.

[7] This was in contrast to the state television's station showing only small groups of old women. While Poles were relatively free to listen to *BBC* before then, in response, the Polish authorities began jamming the shortwave broadcasts between 1981 and 1988.

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These radio broadcasts also linked citizens between countries. This was formalized into the East European Information Agency (originating in Prague, but including Poland and Hungary). In 1988, the EEIA began disseminating news among various dissident groups (armed with radios) and to *RFE*, the *BBC*, and *VOA* (Stokes 1993, 153). The 'real time' presentation of change via Western radio broadcasts linked the various populations, broadcasting the realization that these were not isolated events. Each of these events was broadcast not only in the country in which they occurred but in all of CEE.

Due to technological differences between the west and the east, it was only in 1983 that the USIA started a satellite television network, WORLDNET developed in order to penetrate CEE.[8] Other channels were soon to follow; Sky Channel, CNN, Euronews, and the BBC World Service TV. At the end of the 1980's, these and other Western broadcasts were pouring into CEE and were increasingly incorporated into national broadcasting.[9]

Diffusion of Democracy:

As we can see, this history between Western broadcasts and the citizens of CEE suggests a relationship in which residual trust existed between them, one that may have continued into the period of transition. The difference in the effects of media sources is most clearly captured by the diffusion hypothesis. The diffusion hypothesis stems from the notion that extra-national media sources which are received by viewers in other countries carry with them the norms, themes, and values of the sending country. It uniformly suggests a west to east direction as a means to eventual regime change.[10] For societies in transition, Lerner argues that 'western media', in as much as if diffuses into

[8] Hungary was the first to accept these broadcasts in 1985 (Nelson 1997, 178).
[9] Doing so at a level inversely proportional to their distance from the West.
[10] De Fleur (1970) has argued that the diffusion of media must include the diffusion of the technology of media itself, many times a difficult hurdle in lesser-developed countries (although less in the case of CEE).

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these countries, raises expectations and aspirations, widening horizons, ultimately enabling people to want better alternatives for themselves (1958; see also Schramm 1964). In these countries, we would expect to see democratic attitudes correlated with a high (or at least disproportionate) consumption of Western broadcasts and print media.

Diffusion as a source of individual political development is at the core of many theories of democratization; yet scholars generally use the term abstractly, deferring to an international zeitgeist of democracy, demonstration, and occasionally international pressure (particularly over issues such as human rights or ideological congruency) (Lipset 1960; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996; Mainwaring 2000). Huntington explicitly cites international media as the conduit for the 'demonstration effect' among democratizing nations (1991). Hesse makes note of the proliferation of East Germany viewers in pre-1989 of West Germany television (1990) and Rohrschneider later links this to the development of democratic values (1999).

According to Rohrschneider, values can diffuse from West to East and in some cases, have done so (1999, 22-25), implicating mass media. While his argument is couched largely in terms of individual conversion, specifically in terms of individuals' capacities to exchange one set of values for another, this argument rests on mass media's varying cultural accoutrements embedded in broadcasts and print media. His diffusion axiom stipulates, "…value diffusion from democratic to non democratic nations is possible if ideological values require little restraint and self-reliance and if they require few revisions of socialist ideals" (*ibid.*, 24). This taps into the central argument of this inquiry. Not only did some attitudes diffuse, but individuals' socio-political predispositions (in the form of congruent political predispositions) shaped the

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incorporation of these attitudes and values. He argues that pragmatic or specific attitudes as diffused: liberal democratic rights (freedom of opinion, free elections, right to oppose government, *not ideals*) are evidently diffused; while egalitarian and plebiscitarian ideals (contest between competitive political and economic values and socialist values) are predominantly learned (*ibid.*, 100). *And*, diffusion is two-fold: exposure to information about western democracies creates a preference for civil liberties and an efficient economy, but the ability to behave democratically, to follow market rules, and to develop corresponding ideals is substantially affected by citizens' exposure to appropriate institutions (*ibid.*, 243).

In the American context, Newton (1999) makes mention that an international vs. national vs. local source of news may also make a large difference as to individuals' political awareness and concerns by presenting the context of information. As mentioned above, international media consumption provides the basis for the development of international, or more cosmopolitan, values. That is, they provide a more comprehensive presentation of goings-on in the global environment, focusing on events outside the region. Enlarging the scope of issues and events provides the basis for individuals to develop a more encompassing *Weltanschauung*. A strict reliance on domestic media is likely to be narrower in the presentation of information, that is, only concerned with its relevance to the nation, thereby limiting the scope of events and issues addressed.

However, there is the possibility that a reaction to the influx of international media, by presenting the 'new culture', can have the effect of driving people back to what they know. It is possible that the speed and quantity of Western media in the post-transitions years may overwhelm some individuals who are less prepared or willing to adapt to the

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new political culture. We might see those individuals with nationalist or socialist values responding poorly to international media, thereby reinforcing their political attitudes regarding political engagement. The authoritarian ideological orientation may also be an individual's defense mechanism to the unfamiliar (Sullivan *et al.* 1982). International media may present scenarios of modern society that are 'threatening' to some groups of people who have some hesitancy to the rapid social, economic, and political changes required of these new democracies.

Despite the theorizing, the specific process of diffusion, that is, how citizens receive and attend to messages from abroad, is generally left underdeveloped. We would expect that citizens who consume a greater amount of international (i.e. specifically Western) media would be more likely to be exposed to the implicit cultural norms of an established democratic society and therefore manifest higher levels of democratic attitudes (see Fuchs and Roller 1994). Additionally, although the new media of CEE have made progress towards bringing both institutional and journalistic norms in line with Western standards of reporting and entertainment,[11] we can make the assumption that they will, through no fault of their own, be less likely to carry cultural messages imbued with the norms of democracy.

Given these countries' proximity to modern democracies (and Western media sources' capacity for extensive, international penetration) and their initial attempts at media institutionalization, diffusion theory suggests that the international media is more likely to carry the norms of a democratic political culture than national media during the

[11] This is not to say that Western media represent the acme of media objectivity and play the role of a pure marketplace of ideas, but that in comparative terms, have certainly had a longer legacy of attempting to practice and achieve these normative goals (see Curran 1991a, b).

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transition period. We would expect to see statistical and substantive significance of the international media variables in the model.

Conceptually, the most basic distinction is the general consumption of international and domestic media. While the diffusion hypothesis leads up to expect that a high level of international media consumption will correlate with higher levels of democratic and liberal market attitudes. We arrive, therefore, at the following general hypotheses:

H_1: International media use is positively correlated with democratic political attitudes and high economic evaluations.

H_2: Domestic media use is negatively correlated with democratic political attitudes and high economic evaluations.

However, as media is a complex phenomenon, simply correlating international and domestic media use with individuals' political and economic attitudes may overlook the more complex media use patterns of individuals. Individuals' choices in media consumption are more likely to reflect more subtle variation across frequency and content as well. For example, an individual may not only consume a great deal of international media but through his own media choices demonstrate near exclusivity of international media, that is, a preference for international media. This individual should be more likely to demonstrate democratic attitudes than another that demonstrates a preference for domestic media use. To test for this more specific media effect, I have constructed a source preference matrix (see Table 1).

<Table 1 about here>

This creates a distinction between heavy international media consumers and heavy domestic media users. The distinction is applied to both television and radio. This brings us to the following hypotheses:

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H_3: A preference for international media (television or radio) will positively correlate with democratic political attitudes and high economic evaluations.

H_4: A preference for domestic media (television or radio) will negatively correlate with democratic political attitudes and high economic evaluations.

Given the pre-transitional relationship between the citizens of CEE and Western media, it would lend insight in determining the residual level of trust or confidence in international vs. domestic media. We can examine attitudes regarding this difference between international and domestic media by using a measure of CEE citizens' orientation to international and domestic media by estimating how much confidence citizens' express towards media. This question asks respondents just that and in Table 2 we can see the cross-national response distribution.[12]

<Table 2 and Figure 1 about here>

What we do see is not entirely unexpected. Respondents in the Czech Republic show an overall higher level of confidence in media than the others. Respondents in Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania all show lower levels of confidence in media. As it follows, the aggregate cross-national distribution of individuals' media choice is not surprising (see Tables 3 and 4).

<Tables 3 and 4 about here>

Comparatively, we see an overwhelming use of domestic media sources in both the use of television and radio. Yet, for television usage, the 'both high' category suggests that although the exclusive preference for international media may be small, it is used in conjunction with domestic media. By percentages, the order of most to least used would be: exclusive domestic television, high use of both, a low use of both, and exclusive

[12] <CFMEDIA> "How much confidence do you have in the media?" This was coded to make the following analyses more intuitive: 1=no confidence, 2= not very much confidence, 3= DK/NS, 4=some confidence, 5= a great deal of confidence.

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international television. The same does not seem to be so for radio in which the 'both low' category suggests a much weaker overall consumption pattern. The use of radio seems to be preponderantly domestic followed by a low use of both (except Slovakia and Poland).

Clearly, what must be noted is that the number of cases for both sets of domestic media preference (television and radio) is quite low. While this does not bode well for the empirical results for the preference component, as we see next, the use of international and domestic media is extensive and suggests there are a number of adequate distributions of source usage.

As a final component, to further delineate among international and domestic media sources, I include an additional facet to this question. Given what we have seen in the previous chapters, there is support for the idea that audience members who use high content generally display more sophisticated political attitudes and higher levels of political knowledge while low content users display political apathy and a low level of political knowledge. As above, individuals that consumed news will be identified as "information-seekers" and those that consume entertainment will be "distraction-seekers". As this content preference has a theoretical influence on audience members' political attitudes, I included content variables as well, so that, not only were international and domestic broadcasts tested but also international and domestic entertainment and news broadcasts as well. I am interested if the information- and the distraction-seekers make a distinction between media sources as well.

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To address this question, I include questions that distinguish between the amount of interest in watching international and domestic news and entertainment.[13] In doing so, we introduce a more complex media consumption pattern, combining the effects of source and content. News content consumption is more likely to be correlated with democratic attitudes, while entertainment is more likely to be negatively correlated with them. Yet, introducing the source component, the effects are in a matter of degree. This leads us to the following hypotheses.

H_5: International news consumption media will be positively and more powerfully correlated with democratic political attitudes and high economic evaluations than domestic news consumption.

H_6: Domestic entertainment consumption will be negatively and more powerfully correlated with democratic political attitudes and high economic evaluations than international entertainment consumption.

As an extension of the preferences for international and domestics sources, we can delineate further along content conceptualization.

<Table 5 and Figure 2 about here>

In Table 5, we see that Slovaks are least likely to be 'very interested' in watching international news and most likely to be 'not interested', that is to say, the most ambivalent. Romanians generally show the most overall interest in watching international news with the smallest percentage of 'not interested' responses. Overall, it seems that the Czechs are the highest international television news consumers. In Table 6, both the Czechs and the Romanians show the highest 'very interested' response percentages (and

[13] For news: <ININEWS> Interest in watching International news on television. <INDNEWS> Interest in watching domestic news on television. For entertainment: *International* (an additive index of the following): <INSERFRA> Interest in watching Series/films from France on television. + <INSERGER> Interest in watching Series/films from Germany on television. + <INSERWEU> Interest in watching Series/films from other West European countries on television. + <INSERUSA> Interest in watching Series/films from USA on television. + <INSEROTH> Interest in watching Series/films from other continents on television. *Domestic*: <INSERCOU> Interest in watching Series/films from [country] on television. The response categories are: Not interested, somewhat interested, very interested.

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lowest 'not interested' percentages). The Slovaks seem to be the least enthusiastic domestic news consumers with the least difference between the 'somewhat interested' and 'very interested' response percentages.

<Table 6 and Figure 3 about here>

The aggregate distributions of domestic vs. international media source consumption as it differs over entertainment content can be seen in Tables 7 and 8.

<Tables 7 and 8, Figures 4 and 5 about here>

Overall, CEE's appear to be lukewarm in their attraction to international entertainment. Both the Bulgarians and Slovaks show the highest percentage of 'very interested', in international entertainment series watching. Additionally, the Romanians demonstrate some ambivalence with two strong percentages in the middle, 'somewhat interested' response category. The Czechs clearly show the most interest in watching domestic entertainment series. In fact, they demonstrate a comparatively strong domestic preference in most categories. The Slovaks, Romanians, and Bulgarians seem to be the least interested in domestic entertainment.

Methods: Data and Empirical Methodology

Once again, this examination uses the cases of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia and the Intermedia surveys. For the overall variation in domestic/international media use, the questions are as follows. For television, respondents were asked how often they chose to watch international and domestic television.[14] Given the historical role of radio in the region (see discussion above), I

[14] <REGITV> Now please tell me how often in the past 3 months, on average, you have watched international television stations (e.g. Sky, CNN, BBC World Service TV). <REGDTV> Now please tell me how often in the past 3 months, on average, you have watched [country's] television. The response categories are: Daily/most (6 or 7) days a week; Several (3, 4, or 5) days a week; 1 or 2 days a week; at

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include questions regarding international and domestic radio use.[15] Although genuine 'international' programming would be an unwieldy concept to unpack, in terms of ownership and programming, the questions as respondents to estimate the amount of international and domestic media they consume. The international stations (both television and radio) include those listed above. Domestic sources include the following (see Table 9 and 10).

<Tables 9 and 10 about here>

We will make the assumption that they were able to adequately distinguish between the two.[16] The following section will examine the cross-national distributions of the source variables, examine the bivariate correlations between international and domestic media with the dependent variables, and test the models of media source variation on individuals' political and economic attitudes.

Full Model:

The main effects and interaction effects are interpreted *ceteris paribus*.

$$\textbf{Political and Economic Attitudes} = \boldsymbol{\alpha} + \boldsymbol{\beta_1}(\text{DOMTV}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_2}(\text{INTLTV}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_3}(\text{DOMRAD}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_4}(\text{INTLRAD}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_5}(\text{DOMNEWS}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_6}(\text{INTLNEWS}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_7}(\text{DOMENT}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_8}(\text{INTLENT}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_9}(\text{DOMTVPREF}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{10}}(\text{INTLTVPREF}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{11}}(\text{DOMRADPREF}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{12}}(\text{INTLRADPREF}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{13}}(\text{IDORIENT}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{14}}(\text{POLINTIND}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{15}}(\text{TALKPOL}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{16}}(\text{AGE}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{17}}(\text{INCOME}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{18}}(\text{EDUC}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_{19}}(\text{URBRUR}) + \boldsymbol{\beta_a}(X_n X_m) + \ldots + \boldsymbol{\beta_b}(X_{n+t} X_{m+t}) + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$$

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least once in the past 3 months; have not used in past 3 months; DK. While this chapter is interested in the individual-level media effects, given that international media sources are cross-nationally consistent (they are the same, i.e. the BBC is the BBC), national level differences in media will be assumed to be nominally cross-nationally consistent as well.

[15] < REGIRAD> Now please tell me how often in the past 3 months, on average, you have listened to international radio. <REGDRAD> Now please tell me how often in the past 3 months, on average, you have listened to [country's] radio. The response categories are: Daily/most (6 or 7) days a week; Several (3, 4, or 5) days a week; 1 or 2 days a week; at least once in the past 3 months; have not used in past 3 months.

[16] International television is usually dubbed or synchronized.

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This model is a more methodologically sophisticated means of examining the effects of individuals' source media choices and is intended to isolate the effect of the diffusion hypothesis. Below are the tables for the regression output (see Tables 11, 12, and 13).

<Tables 11, 12, and 13 about here>

This analysis is complex by examining not only differences between the source of media but also by incorporating differences across media and content. At the outset, I will adhere to the examination of the differences between international and domestic sources but will later discuss the more subtle and competing hypothetical intra- and inter-media effects. As above, the results presented often look as though they lack coherency however, as we will see, we are able to learn a lot about the diffusion hypothesis and the role of international media on the political socialization process in countries undergoing democratization.

Overall, the basic international and domestic media choices do not present an overwhelming return. Individuals' choices of international media, at the core distinction between source of television and radio, in fact, offer few correlations and fewer positive ones at that. Preferences for one or the other do little to contribute as well. However, if we aggregate the source variables, international media does in fact prove to be a rather positive influence and more than domestic media, Romania being a good example. What we find is a preponderance of positive international influence in the overlap of institutional trust and international entertainment. Individuals' levels of institutional trust most benefit from international media, particularly entertainment. This intersection is also relevant to the inquiry at large. Once again we find that egocentric economic evaluations have the fewest significant media variables, followed by sociotropic economic

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evaluations and institutional trust. This buttresses the argument for media as a means for individuals' *observation* of distant political and economic phenomena to significantly influence those attitudes and evaluations.

It is also important to note that unlike the analyses that we have seen in previous chapters, we only find one example of the conditional relationship in the interactive section in which one groups' attitudes or evaluations increase while another's decreases. This provides some tentative support for H_1 and sheds some insight on H_6. It must be remembered that it is difficult to generate testable hypotheses from complex media variables. International entertainment is a good example as entertainment is hypothesized to be a negative influence while international sources of media are hypothesized to be positive. Therefore, which is to be the more prominent influence, the international component or the entertainment component? And as we have seen in the previous chapter, entertainment is not uniformly negative.

Although domestic media has been hypothesized to be a negative influence (H_2, H_4, H_5 and H_6), this is an indirect means of testing international media sources. There is little theory to suggest that domestic sources are worse than international sources as the diffusion hypothesis does not make this distinction. Although in these cases, given the nascent, highly-competitive and political process of media institutional reform (as we will see in the next chapter), it is not unreasonable. What we discover about domestic sources, in contrast to the international sources, is an inductive process of learning about domestic media. Unfortunately, so far, the main effect results here do not generate a coherent set of findings about domestic media.

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For institutional trust, political interest is the most salient socio-political predisposition. In five of the six cases, an individuals' level of political interest are positive and powerfully correlated with individuals' level of trust in institutions. For individuals' sociotropic economic evaluations, political interest remains in three of these cases, joined by the negative influence of social communication. In addition, income is also a significant, positive influence. However, for individuals' SEE, urbanity plays a competing role. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, urban residents have higher levels of SEE while in Romania and Slovakia, it is the rural residents who exhibit the higher levels. Finally, for egocentric economic evaluations, income is positively and universally significant. Social communication, like in SEE, exerts a negative influence in half of the cases.

The significance of these SES and SPP variables reinforce the *observation* argument of media providing access to distant political and economic phenomena as income and social communication, two individual attributes, increasingly become important as the 'distance' to the dependent variables shrinks. This is supported by the role of political interest in the institutional trust and SEE models, suggesting that 'paying attention' to these distant political and economic phenomena are central to individuals' attitudes and evaluations.

Do the interactions provide more insight as to the role of international media in the interaction variables?

<Figure 6a about here>

In Bulgaria (Figure 6a), at low or causal consumption of international radio for all education levels, little changes. However, at a high level of international radio

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consumption, all education groups increase their level of institutional trust. This is mirrored in the interaction between international radio and urbanity as well (see Figure 6b).

<Figure 6b about here>

Urban and rural residents alike see an improvement in their levels of institutional trust at high levels of international radio. What then of other international media? For international television in Poland (see Figure 6d), all education groups increase their level of institutional trust.

<Figure 6d about here>

While true, like international radio in Bulgaria, those at the higher education levels see the biggest increase. In Hungary (see Figure 7c), both international television and urbanity has negative main effects.

<Figure 7c about here>

However, international television in conjunction with urbanity increases rural residents' sociotropic economic evaluations while at the same time lowering urban residents', ultimately, at high levels of consumption, raising both groups' levels of sociotropic economic evaluations significantly. In Poland as with all of the countries, income has an independent, positive influence on egocentric economic evaluations.

<Figure 8b about here>

In Figure 8b, however, we can see that a preference for international television reverses this effect. That is, lower income group members increase their evaluations while higher income group members lower theirs.

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Overall, it would seem that international media do play a positive role on particular groups. For institutional trust, the positive influence is a general increase of each of the different SES/SPP groups. While for economic evaluations, international media exert contrasting influences on these same group members similar to what we have observed above. That is, lower SES groups respond as hypothesized while higher SES groups respond in the opposite direction. As we move beyond strict media source choices, we find further evidence for the conflicting influence of source and content.

Given that international media and news content have been both hypothesized to be a positive influence on individuals' attitudes and evaluations, it comes as little surprise to see that in Poland (see Figure 8a), international news exerts a strong mitigating effect on social communications' negative main effect.

<*Figure 8a about here*>

However, unlike what we have seen before with social communication, the least talkative lower their egocentric economic evaluations, whereas in previous interactions with social communication and news (see previous chapter), news has increased the most talkative groups' attitudes and evaluations without lowering the lowest group.

In an unsurprising manner, given what we have seen in the Content chapter above, international entertainment has a similar effect. In Bulgaria (see Figure 7a), international entertainment combats the negative influence social communication.

<*Figure 7a about here*>

Yet, like Poland above, not only does international entertainment increase the SEE of the usually low-evaluating talkative group, it lowers the less talkative's evaluations.

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Again, we see the competing effect of a single variable across different groups. The Czech Republic demonstrates this effect of international entertainment as well.

<Figure 7b about here>

In Figure 7b, we see almost the exact relationship as in Bulgaria (although the Czechs demonstrate a higher general level of SEE). While there is less of an observable difference between social communication groups as a low level of international entertainment, at high levels, the politically chatty evidence a dramatic increase in their evaluations while less talkative show a slight decrease.

Including the content component to the source variables helps to change our analysis from a black and white examination between two competing sources to a more colorful examination of the interaction of source, content, and the groups that use them. Although, from what we have seen in the last chapter, it is difficult to assign all of the positive influence to the international component of these complex variables. This is discussed further below; however, first we must assess the contribution of the domestic interactive variables.

Domestic radio exerts a competitive positive effect on social communication's influence on Poles' institutional trust (see Figure 6e).

<Figure 6e about here>

Social communication's negative influence is offset for the most communicative by high domestic radio consumption. Those as the lowest range of social communication are scarcely affected. For Slovakia (see Figure 6f), at low levels of domestic radio, institutional trust varies positively with individuals' level of political interest.

<Figure 6f about here>

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However, at high levels, we see the contradictory effects of increased usage. For the politically interested, their trust levels decrease while the disinterested increase their own. Introducing the content component, domestic news reveals its role quite often. In Poland (see Figure 7d), social communication's strong negative influence is tempered by increases in domestic news consumption.

<Figure 7d about here>

For Romania, domestic news does double duty. In Figure 7e, at low levels of domestic news consumption, the differences between education groups remains pronounced.

<Figure 7e about here>

At high levels, however, this distinction between groups is erased if not reversed to some degree. The same effect can be observed in domestic news' interaction with income in Romania (see Figure 7f).

<Figure 7f about here>

Once again, by decreasing higher income group members' sociotropic economic evaluations and lower income groups members' evaluations, high levels of domestic news eliminate the disparity between these groups.

Discussion:

The results of the main effect variables presented a weak case for isolated contribution of international media (and little discernable findings for domestic media). At the broadest level, the interaction effects provided much more evidence for the positive effect of international media. Without differentiating between audience members, international media, more often than not, increased the levels of individuals'

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political attitudes, in particular, and economic evaluations, albeit less so. Domestic media presented little of the same broad coherency.

To determine the overall effect of international media, we need to make two empirical summaries. First, we need to assess the role of international media, despite the accompanying content and medium, to determine if in fact international media has a broad positive influence on the political socialization of citizens of countries undergoing democracy. Second, we need to parse through the complex variables to assign, as best we can, the medium, content, or source which provides the bulk of responsibility for the significant relationships we find.

One of the advantages of the interactive variables is the ability to identify who is affected. As we have seen above, it seems that different SES/SPP groups respond differently to the same media choice. Therefore, in order to assess the role of international media, I delineate between lower and upper SES/SPP groups.

For higher SES/SPP group members, international media made a near uniformly positive contribution; however, for lower SES/SPP groups, despite fewer instances, this was also true. More interestingly, domestic media had generally negative effects on higher SES/SPP groups while for lower SES/SPP groups, the effect was uniformly positive. That is, international media serves a broadly positive role while domestic media has a separating effect determined by the audience members' SES and SPP profile, with the lower groups benefiting from this.

How sure can we be that these more complex variables are capturing the 'international-ness' of international media and the effects we see, and have seen, as not the function of the medium or content? To find out, I examine the same interactive

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variables but instead of using source as the divisor, I use medium and then content. What we find lends not only support to the 'international-ness' of media choices but also buttresses the findings from the previous chapters.

If we divide the influences of medium between television and radio, we find that despite the source, radio usage, in support of its general role from the Medium and Frequency chapter, has a near universal positive effect on both lower and upper SES/SPP groups. Television, on the other hand, splits its contribution along these same SES/SPP lines. As in the same chapter above and despite the source, television usage exerts a generally negative effect on lower SES/SPP group members while exerting a positive role on higher SES/SPP group members.

We find similar support for content differences. News consumption, both international and domestic, contributes more to the attitudes and evaluations of lower SES/SPP group members than to those of the higher SES/SPP group. For these groups, entertainment, or low content, consumption undermines lower SES/SPP group members' attitudes and evaluations while boosting the higher SES/SPP group members'. This, as with the distinction between medium, supports the findings of the previous chapter. Therefore, these findings support that notion that international media are generally contributory to the process of political socialization, although different components of media exert their role as well.

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Conclusion:

As the culmination of this study of individual-level effects, this generally parallels with what we have seen above. In this chapter, we have examined the role of international media on the process of political socialization in democratizing countries. We find that international media do contribute to the development of political attitudes and economic evaluations; however, the influence of domestic media depends on *who* is the audience. Both findings are relevant, the first independently and the second in bearing with this inquiry.

Before we can crown international media the undisputed purveyor of democracy, we must remember that that simply being defined as international is not completely sufficient. There were few instances of a main effect of either international sources of media or preferential use of international media. As interactive variable, international media, whether television, radio, news, or entertainment, contributed either broadly (with no distinction between users' SES/SPP attributes) or contributed to the lower SES/SPP groups.

Why is this substantively significant? Higher SES/SPP groups have often responded to the effects of media in a positive manner, 'ignoring' the negatively hypothesized effects or responding appropriately to positively hypothesized effects. While this is not universally so, this group's attitudes and evaluations rarely suffer at the influence of media, certainly less in comparison to their lower SES/SPP counterparts. This may be a function of their ability to weather the transition using their educational, structural or even predispositional advantages. That is, they are, if not immune, certainly able to buffer the rapid and tumultuous social, economic, and political changes better than the more

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exposed and less advantaged strata of lower educated, lower income, politically disengaged citizen. There is also the possibility that due to these structural and predispositional advantages these groups have greater access to "informed" sources other than media. This, coupled with the lack of negative influence of both television and low content that we have seen here and in previous chapters, suggest media may become less a source of distraction and more an activity of leisure.

Despite the observed effects, the paucity of significant results for domestic media strains our ability to generate a broad, coherent hypothesis about its effects. On the other hand, domestic media are not essential to confirm diffusion as a means to political socialization. More substantively interesting findings from this chapter include continued support for the notion that media provide second-hand observation or vicarious participation in political and economic transition, providing sources from which individuals use to derive their political attitudes and economic evaluations.

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Tables and Figures:

Table 1: Source Preference:

For Both Radio and Television		*International Media Use*	
		Low	*High*
Domestic Media Use	*Low*	Low Consumer	**International Media Preference**
	High	**Domestic Media Preference**	High Consumer

Table 2: Confidence in Media:

Confidence in Media	**Bulgaria**	**Czech Republic**	**Hungary**	**Poland**	**Romania**	**Slovakia**
A great deal	8.91%	6.18%	7.22%	5.19%	16.81%	5.72%
Some	39.49%	71.09%	59.18%	59.73%	50.28%	65.83%
Not Very Much	36.53%	18.05%	22.27%	27.30%	26.08%	22.45%
None:	6.99%	3.59%	6.93%	4.79%	3.81%	3.94%
DK/NS	8.07%	1.10%	4.40%	2.99%	3.01%	2.06%
Total:	2031	1003	2021	2004	2124	1118

Figure 1: Confidence in Media:



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Table 3: Source Preference: Television:

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Domestic	57.80%	75.97%	59.08%	65.97%	61.91%	48.66%
International	1.58%	0.30%	0.59%	0.95%	1.60%	2.33%
Both High	31.07%	21.73%	37.70%	30.89%	26.37%	44.19%
Both Low	9.55%	1.99%	2.62%	2.20%	10.12%	4.83%
Total:	2031	1003	2021	2004	2124	1118

Table 4: Source Preference: Radio:

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Domestic	65.14%	66.00%	74.72%	73.50%	62.62%	55.72%
International	1.48%	0.70%	0.59%	0.85%	1.74%	2.50%
Both High	14.28%	15.85%	9.95%	14.02%	13.70%	30.14%
Both Low	19.10%	17.45%	14.75%	11.63%	21.94%	11.63%
Total:	2031	1003	2021	2004	2124	1118

Table 5: Interest in Watching International News:

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Not Interested	17.99	16.46	n/a	14.64	11.46	22.74
Somewhat Interested	45.89	39.84	n/a	50.68	45.99	46.39
Very Interested	36.13	43.7	n/a	34.68	42.55	30.87
Total:						

Figure 2: Interest in International News



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Table 6: Interest in Watching Domestic News:

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Not Interested	7.66	3.45	n/a	6.26	4.9	8.98
Somewhat Interested	38.25	25.15	n/a	40.38	34.58	41.89
Very Interested	54.09	71.4	n/a	53.36	60.52	49.14
Total:						

Figure 3: Interest in Domestic News



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Table 7: Interest in Watching International Entertainment Series:

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Not Interested	11.32	8.96	n/a	7.28	7.4	6.71
	1.95	5.54	n/a	5.86	2.85	2.61
	2.35	6.08	n/a	8.43	4.71	4.61
	3.27	9.59	n/a	9.04	4.88	5.71
	4.37	10.45	n/a	13.8	9.43	10.42
Somewhat Interested	27.8	27.93	n/a	25.9	23.74	31.76
	10.74	10.77	n/a	15.83	23.36	10.22
	8.67	6.18	n/a	6.24	9.59	6.41
	5.23	5.33	n/a	2.68	5.32	5.71
	4.31	2.35	n/a	1.75	3.62	4.11
Very Interested	19.99	6.82	n/a	3.18	5.1	11.72
Total:						

Figure 4: Interest in International Entertainment



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Table 8: Interest in Watching Domestic Entertainment Series:

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Not Interested	14.07	6	n/a	10.37	15.28	11.9
Somewhat Interested	45.15	31.5	n/a	46.78	49.87	52.86
Very Interested	40.79	62.5	n/a	42.86	34.85	35.24
Total:						

Figure 5: Interest in Domestic Entertainment



Table 9: Domestic Television in CEE:

Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Worldnet Channel 1 Efir 2 Nova TV Seven days TV TNT	CT 1 CT 2 TV NOVA Prima/Premiera TNT	SAT Pro 7 RTL 2 RAI 1 RAI 2 ORF 1 ORF 2 Galavision Duna	TNT TV Programme I TV Programme II Polsat TV Polonia TV Wisla	TVR1 TVR2 PROTV Antena 1 TNT	TNT STV 1 STV 2 VTV Markiza

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Table 10: Domestic (National and Local) Radio in CEE:

Bulgaria	**Czech Republic**	**Hungary**
BNR – Horizont	Cesky Rozhlas 1	Radio 2000
BNR - Hristo Botev	Cesky Rozhlas 2 Praha	Radio Kossuth FM (Magyar Radio)
Radio-chain Vitosha-Atlantic	Frekvence 1	Radio Petofi
Radio FM+	Radio Nova Alfa	Radio Juventas
Darik Radio	Hellax	Radio Bartok
Radio Express	Kanal Svob.Evropa	Radio Danubius
Clasik FM+	Contact Liberec	Radio Calypso
FM+	Plzeo	Gyori Radio
7 days	Radio Krokodyl	Radio Bartok
Glarus	Radiournal	Cervinius Radio
Bravo FM	Ergrensis	Drava Radio (KFT)
TNN	Dragon	Radio Bridge
Kanal Kom	Rubi Unieov	Fehervar Radio (KFT)
Vitosha	Preston	City Radio
Atlantik	Radio Diein	Regio Radio
Maija	Radio Hana	Jonatan Radio
		Radio Domino
		Radio Eger (KFT)
		Radio Esztergom
		Gocsej Radio
		Radio Sopron
		Satarnus Radio
		Radio Kossuth AM
Poland	**Romania**	**Slovakia**
Polish Radio Program I (GO)	Radio Contact	Radio Slovensko 1
Polish Radio Program II (Dwojka)	Radio Romania Cultural	Rock FM
Polish Radio Program III (Trojka)	Radio ProFM	Fun Radio
Radio ZET	Uniplus	Slovensky rozhlas 1
RMF FM	România Actualitati	KIKS
Radio Maryja	Europa Nova	RadioN
Radio Kielce	Galaxy	TWIST
Radio Alex	Top '91 Suceava	NITRA
Radio Szczecin	Transilvania	Slovensky rozhlas 2
Radio Opole	Word-Est Vaslui	Devin
Eska Pr III	Radio Iasi	CRO 1
Radio Rzeszow	Argus Tulcea	Beta
Radio Kolobrzeg	Radio Galati	Sloboda
Radio Koszalin	Horion	Svobodna Evropa
Radio Bielsko	Radio Târgu-Jiu	Hlas Ameriky
Radio Alfa	Skay	Rebecca
Radio Wanda	Radio Brasov	Tatry
Radio Krakow	Radio Giurgiu	TOP
Radio Katowice	România Tineret	DCA
Radio City	Radio Dâmbovita	CRO 6
Radio Gdansk	Alfa	
Radio Olsztyn	Sonvest	
Radio Bialystok	Metronom Râmnicu-Vâlcea	
Radio Lodz	Radio Sibiu	
Radio Warszawa		
RMS PM		
Radio Obywatelskie		
Radio Centrum		
Radio Lublin		

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Table 11: Source: Institutional Trust:[17]

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Domestic Television	-0.0235 (-.0042)	0.6318 (.0853)	**0.5210** (.1029)**	0.2272 (.0346)	-0.1960 (-.0347)	**0.7802** (.1716)**
International Television	-0.2324 (-.0778)	-0.1355 (-.0321)	0.0280 (.0121)	0.0827 (.0260)	0.2064 (.0600)	0.1038 (.0368)
Domestic Radio	0.2075 (.05623	0.2735 (.0797)	0.1605 (.0604)	0.0009 (.0002)	0.0650 (.0183)	-0.0268 (-.0079)
International Radio	-0.3591 (-.0853)	0.1302 (.0288)	-0.0655 (-.0150)	0.0785 (.0166)	0.1232 (.0267)	0.1475 (.0504)
Domestic News	-0.3733 (-.0472)	**-1.130* (-.1242)**	n/a	**0.7028* (.0878)**	-0.5219 (-.0596)	0.1861 (.0269)
International News	0.0426 (.0061)	**0.6583* (.1009)**	n/a	**-0.5826* (-.0818)**	-0.1948 (-.0250)	-0.4530 (-.0760)
Domestic Entertainment	0.1247 (.0175)	-0.1403 (-.0182)	n/a	0.2005 (.0281)	-0.1627 (-.0216)	-0.1839 (-.0276)
International Entertainment	**0.1509* (.0938)**	**0.1782* (.1009)**	n/a	**0.2438*** (.1230)**	**0.2490*** (.1186)**	0.0219 (.0137)
Domestic TV Preference	-0.6964 (-.0678)	0.0804 (.0060)	0.0268 (.0028)	-0.0309 (-.0029)	-0.0629 (-.0057)	0.1108 (.0128)
International TV Preference	-2.123 (-.0559)	-3.160 (-.0376)	-1.191 (-.0262)	1.800 (.0375)	-1.325 (-.0325)	**3.397** (.1450)**
Domestic Radio Preference	-0.7571 (-.0714)	-0.3979 (-.0404)	0.1762 (.0170)	0.7165 (.0713)	0.2670 (.0254)	-0.3605 (-.0416)
International Radio Pref	1.195 (.0269)	1.488 (.0250)	-1.420 (-.0186)	-0.0852 (-.0017)	0.8538 (.0193)	-0.8817 (-.0407)
Ideological Orientation	**0.3330*** (.1356)**	0.0063 (.0025)	**0.1693* (.0727)**	0.0059 (.0025)	0.1107 (.0436)	0.1680 (.0741)
Political Interest	**0.1613** (.1220)**	**0.2402*** (.1830)**	**0.2472*** (.2034)**	**0.0929* (.0733)**	**0.2067*** (.1600)**	0.1197 (.1016)
Social Communication	0.2570 (.0356)	-0.5311 (.0774)	**-0.4143* (-.0607)**	-0.0510 (-.0073)	-0.3277 (-.0416)	-0.2316 (-.0363)
Age	0.0022 (.0082)	-0.0148 (-.0554)	0.0072 (.0263)	-0.0007 (-.0024)	**0.0157* (.0543)**	**0.0397*** (.1511)**
Income	0.1047 (.0153)	0.3731 (.0534)	**0.5566*** (.0887)**	**0.4635* (.0700)**	0.0988 (.0129)	0.3662 (.0601)
Education	-0.6674 (-.0536)	**1.115* (.0959)**	-0.2612 (-.0329)	-0.5071 (-.0432)	**-0.7533** (-.0734)**	-0.1959 (-.0179)
Urbanity	0.5336 (-.0497)	-0.1263 (-.0124)	-0.1672 (-.0171)	-0.1282 (-.0131)	0.1389 (.0135)	0.4820 (.0551)

[17] OLS correlation coefficient (Standardized beta), significance: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

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		Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
*Domestic TV * Political Interest*		-0.0548 (-.0438)					
Int'l TV	*Education*				**0.4231* (.0581)**		
	Urbanity			-0.1387 (-.0350)			
Domestic Radio	Age	-0.0015 (-.0076)					
	Urbanity	-0.1139 (-.0193)					
	Political Interest		-0.0744 (-.0798)			0.0151 (.0175)	**-0.1034* (-.1184)**
	Social Communication				**0.3879** (.0736)**		
	Ideological Orientation		0.0594 (.0348)				0.0237 (.0141)
Int'l Radio	*Social Comm.*	0.2032 (.0357)					
	Education	**0.8325** (.0993)**					
	Urbanity	**0.7531** (.0891)**					
Domestic News	*Age*		**-0.0642** (-.1228)**				
	Social Comm.				0.3873 (.0325)		
International News Ideological Orient.*			-0.0206 (-.0061)				
Dom Ent	*Ideological On.*	0.0222 (.0067)				-0.0092 (-.0025)	
	Age				-0.0083 (-.0194)		
Int'l Entertainment	*Political Interest*	0.0098 (.0246)					
	Urbanity		-0.0744 (-.0246)				
	Ideological Orientation				0.0304 (.0313)		
	Age					-0.0013 (-.0111)	
*Domestic TV Pref. * Social Communication*							-0.0748 (-.0089)
Int'l TV Pref	*Ideological On.*	-0.8225 (-.0501)					-0.5079 (-.0487)
	Political Interest	-0.7061 (-.0607)					
Dom Rad Pref	*Social Comm*	-0.1678 (-.0188)					
	Ideological Orientation		-0.0869 (-.0272)				
Int'l Rad. Pref	*Education*	-3.914 (-.0313)					
	Social Comm.				-2.747 (-.0382)		
Constant		16.610***	14.557***	15.773***	14.462***	15.645***	14.228***
Adjusted R^2		0.0632	0.0695	0.0951	0.0479	0.0355	0.0593
N		1298	656	1727	1452	1696	663

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Figure 6a: Bulgaria: International Radio Consumption and Education:



Figure 6b: Bulgaria: International Radio Consumption and Urbanity:



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Figure 6c: Czech Republic: Domestic News Consumption and Age:



Figure 6d: Poland: International Television Consumption and Education:



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Figure 6e: Poland: Domestic Radio Consumption and Social Communication:



Figure 6f: Slovakia: Domestic Radio Consumption and Political Interest:



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Table 12: Sociotropic Economic Evaluation and Source: [18]

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Domestic TV	-0.0524 (-.0386)	-0.0212 (-.0143)	**-0.0649*** **(-.0743)**	0.10556 (.0406)	-0.0467 (-.0450)	0.1170 (.1267)
International TV	0.0141 (.0194)	-0.0197 (-.0234)	0.0129 (.0323)	0.0632 (.0954)	**0.0823**** **(.1303)**	0.0037 (.0065)
Domestic Radio	0.0799 (.0893)	0.0237 (.0345)	0.0298 (.0650)	0.0221 (.0285)	-0.0031 (-.0047)	-0.0190 (-.0276)
International Radio	0.0324 (.0318)	0.0458 (.0506)	0.0217 (.0288)	-0.0351 (-.0356)	-0.0100 (-.0118)	0.0638 (.1074)
Domestic News	-0.0846 (-.0441)	-0.1750 (-.0961)	n/a	0.0497 (.0298)	0.0552 (.0343)	-0.0766 (-.0544)
International News	0.0074 (.0044)	0.0960 (.0736)	n/a	-0.0104 (-.0070)	-0.0583 (-.0407)	0.0031 (.0026)
Domestic Entertainment	0.0815 (.0472)	**-0.1349*** **(-.0876)**	n/a	-0.0274 (-.0184)	-0.0514 (-.0372)	**0.1247*** **(.0923)**
International Entertainment	-0.0044 (-.0112)	0.0335 (.0948)	n/a	0.0039 (.0095)	0.0129 (.0336)	-0.0158 (-.0487)
Domestic TV Preference	-0.0576 (-.0231)	-0.1491 (-.0556)	**0.1683*** **(.1009)**	0.0942 (.0427)	0.0878 (.0431)	0.0220 (.0125)
International TV Preference	-0.0841 (-.0091)	-0.7123 (-.0434)	**-0.4023*** **(-.0513)**	0.5054 (.0505)	-0.1547 (-.0206)	0.0837 (.0176)
Domestic Radio Preference	-0.1818 (-.0706)	-0.0091 (-.0046)	-0.0032 (-.0018)	0.0407 (.0194)	0.0364 (.0188)	0.1625 (.0923)
International Radio Preference	0.1025 (.0095)	-0.0531 (-.0045)	-0.0709 (-.0054)	0.1011 (.0094)	-0.1015 (-.0125)	-0.0831 (-.0189)
Ideological Orientation	**0.1024***** **(.1718)**	0.0463 (.0912)	0.0178 (.0444)	0.0151 (.0302)	0.0200 (.0428)	0.0095 (.0206)
Political Interest	0.0137 (.0427)	0.0135 (.0514)	**0.0229***** **(.1091)**	0.0145 (.0549)	**0.0276***** **(.1162)**	**0.0298*** **(.1244)**
Social Communication	-0.0279 (-.0159)	-0.1100 (-.0802)	-0.0536 (-.0456)	**-0.1739***** **(-.1194)**	**-0.1124**** **(-.0776)**	**-0.1334*** **(-.1029)**
Age	0.0016 (.0239)	-0.0027 (-.0512)	-0.0003 (-.0063)	0.0004 (.0060)	0.0007 (.0126)	0.0018 (.0345)
Income	0.0873 (.0525)	0.0461 (.0330)	**0.0724**** **(.0668)**	**0.1998***** **(.1446)**	**0.1112**** **(.0787)**	0.0159 (.0128)
Education	-0.0590 (-.0195)	0.0416 (.0179)	0.0060 (.0043)	**0.1455*** **(.0594)**	-0.0435 (-.0231)	-0.0010 (-.0005)
Urbanity	0.0165 (.0063)	**-0.2685***** **(.1322)**	-0.0713 (-.0422)	-0.0618 (-.0303)	**0.1563**** **(.0824)**	**0.2228*** **(.1253)**

[18] OLS correlation coefficient (Standardized beta), significance: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. †p<.053

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		Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Domestic TV	*Income Group*				0.0615 (.0327)		
	Urbanity				0.0249 (.0111)		
International Television	*Education*	-0.0546 (-.0330)					
	Age	-0.0020 (-.0426)					
	Political Interest		0.0036 (.0152)				
	Ideological Orientation		-0.0068 (-.0138)				
	Social Communication						-0.0413 (-.0488)
	Urbanity			**0.0423* (.0583)**	0.0054 (.0042)		
Int'l Radio	*Age*	0.0005 (.0086)	-0.0018 (-.0376)				
	Ideological Orientation				-0.0014 (-.0026)		
Domestic News	*Education*					**-0.1875* (-.0718)**	
	Political Interest				-0.0012 (-.0028)		
	Income Group					**-0.1362* (-.0564)**	
	Social Communication				**0.1875** (.0754)**		
International News Social Communication*			-0.0301 (-.0157)				
*Domestic Entertainment * Social Communication*		-0.0378 (-.0152)					
International Entertainment	*Age*						-0.0004 (-.0236)
	Social Communication	**0.0443* (.0797)**					
	Urbanity		-0.0008 (-.0037)				
	Income Group		**0.0475* (.0934)**				
Domestic TV Pref	*Urbanity*				-0.0561 (-.0261)		-0.2250 (-.1123)
	Age	-0.0018 (-.0211)					0.0004 (.0057)
*Domestic Radio Preference * Ideological Orientation*				-0.0015 (-.0031)	0.0065 (.0106)		
*Int'l Radio Preference * Ideological Orientation*				0.0029 (.0005)			
Constant		2.109***	2.369***	2.560***	2.640***	2.133***	2.150***
Adjusted R^2		0.0419	0.0371	0.0325	0.0791	0.0293	0.0225
N		1298	656	1727	1452	1696	663

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Figure 7a: Bulgaria: International Entertainment and Social Communication:



Figure 7b: Czech Republic: International Entertainment and Income Group:



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Figure 7c: Hungary: International Television Consumption and Urbanity:



Figure 7d: Poland: Domestic News Consumption and Social Communication:



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Figure 7e: Romania: Domestic News Consumption and Education:



Figure 7f: Romania: Domestic News Consumption and Income Group:



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Table 13: Egocentric Economic Evaluation and Source:[19]

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Domestic TV	-0.1071 (-.0748)	0.0036 (.0021)	-0.0389 (-.0401)	-0.0539 (-.0393)	0.0211 (.0183)	**0.1586* (.1508)**
International TV	0.0646 (.0845)	-0.0769 (-.0804)	0.0118 (.0268)	0.0554 (.0835)	**0.0980* (.1396)**	0.0046 (.0071)
Domestic Radio	0.1031 (.1093)	0.0629 (.0810)	0.0384 (.0756)	0.0075 (.0097)	-0.0485 (-.0671)	-0.0375 (-.0478)
International Radio	0.0388 (.0360)	0.0511 (.0498)	0.0276 (.0222)	-0.0290 (-.0294)	0.0348 (.0370)	0.0103 (.0152)
Domestic News	0.0351 (.0173)	0.0741 (.0359)	n/a	0.0478 (.0286)	-0.0960 (-.0537)	0.0892 (.0557)
International News	0.1350 (.0757)	-0.0579 (-.0392)	n/a	-0.0331 (-.0222)	0.0409 (.0257)	-0.0147 (-.0107)
Domestic Entertainment	0.0554 (.0304)	-0.0655 (-.0375)	n/a	0.0451 (.0303)	-0.0796 (-.0519)	-0.0937 (-.0609)
International Entertainment	0.0010 (.0025)	0.0027 (.0066)	n/a	0.0028 (.0069)	0.0017 (.0040)	-0.0187 (-.0506)
Domestic TV Preference	0.0379 (.0144)	-0.2468 (-.0812)	0.0743 (.0402)	0.0519 (.0235)	0.0240 (.0106)	-0.0189 (-.0094)
International TV Preference	-0.1995 (-.0205)	-0.4839 (-.0254)	-0.1589 (-.0183)	0.0268 (.0027)	-0.2153 (-.0259)	0.3884 (.0717)
Domestic Radio Preference	-0.2792 (-.1029)	-0.0361 (-.0162)	-0.0488 (-.0245)	-0.0466 (-.0222)	0.2572 (.0856)	-0.0501 (-.0250)
International Radio Preference	0.3855 (.0339)	-0.2383 (-.0177)	0.2354 (.0161)	0.6102 (.0564)	0.0250 (.0028)	-0.2788 (-.0556)
Ideological Orientation	**0.1207*** (.1921)**	0.0741 (.1288)	0.0094 (.0222)	0.0125 (.0251)	0.0262 (.0507)	0.0050 (.0095)
Political Interest	-0.0171 (-.0507)	0.0200 (.0671)	-0.0031 (-.0131)	**0.0325*** (.1227)**	**0.0346*** (.1314)**	0.0159 (.0583)
Social Communication	-0.0048 (-.0026)	-0.0865 (-.0557)	**-0.1243*** (-.0952)**	**-0.1414*** (-.0969)**	0.0064 (.0040)	**-0.1837** (-.1245)**
Age	-0.0040 (-.0567)	0.0037 (.0604)	**-0.0059*** (-.1127)**	**-0.0088*** (-.1457)**	-0.0027 (-.0453)	-0.0031 (-.0510)
Income	**0.1886*** (.1075)**	**0.2912*** (.1838)**	**0.2579*** (.2148)**	**0.2191** (.1584)**	**0.1932*** (.1232)**	**0.2352*** (.1668)**
Education	-0.1584 (-.0497)	0.0822 (.0312)	-0.0019 (-.0012)	0.0221 (.0090)	0.0635 (.0303)	-0.0206 (-.0082)
Urbanity	0.0613 (.0223)	-0.1107 (-.0481)	0.0553 (.0295)	0.1431 (.0700)	0.1504 (.0714)	-0.0161 (-.0080)

[19] OLS correlation coefficient (Standardized beta), significance: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

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		Bulgaria	Cz Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Domestic TV	*Urbanity*				0.0463 (.0206)		
	Education			-0.0407 (-.0201)			
	Political Interest			-0.0096 (-.0406)			
International TV	*Education*					-0.0288 (-.0307)	
	Age	-0.0028 (-.0603)					
	Social Communication	-0.0119 (-.0107)				-0.0503 (-.0478)	-0.0257 (-.0267)
	Urbanity						0.0730 (.0709)
Dom Radio	*Income Group*		-0.0005 (-.0005)				
	Education						0.1510 (.0739)
Int'l Radio	*Age*	0.0011 (.0162)					
	Ideological Orientation	-0.0236 (-.0472)					
Domestic News	*Ideological Orientation*	0.0139 (.0140)	-0.0133 (-.0138)				
	Political Interest				-0.0148 (-.0328)		
	Social Communication				0.0652 (.0262)		0.0014 (.0006)
Int'l News	*Education*				0.0491 (.0141)		
	Social Communication				**0.1432* (.0668)**		
Dom. Ent.	*Political Interest*		-0.0214 (-.0453)				
	Urbanity				-0.0260 (-.0103)		
International Entertainment	*Education*					0.0176 (.0243)	
	Urbanity	-0.0312 (-.0476)	0.0388 (.0567)				
	Income Group		0.0354 (.0612)				
	Political Interest						-0.0042 (-.0455)
Dom TV Pref	*Social Communication*					-0.1745 (-.0894)	
	Ideological Orientation					-0.0196 (-.0308)	
*Int'l Television Preference * Income Group*					**-1.182* (-.0679)**		
Dom Radio Pref	*Urbanity*	0.1496 (.0465)			-0.0922 (-.0402)	0.0370 (.0154)	
	Ideological Orientation		-0.0207 (-.0286)				
	Income Group				0.0194 (.0116)		
*Int'l Radio Preference * Political Interest*					-0.1172 (-.0415)		
Constant		2.235***	3.098***	3.121***	3.130***	2.146***	2.722***
Adjusted R^2		0.0943	0.0607	0.0770	0.0816	0.0646	0.0526
N		1298	656	1727	1452	1696	663

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Figure 8a: Poland: International News Consumption and Social Communication:



Figure 8b: Poland: International Television Preference and Social Communication:



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Chapter 8: Media Institutional Reform and Political Socialization: A Multi-level Argument

Introduction:

This examination has thus far established a pattern of individual-level media consumption that, independently and in conjunction with socio-economic status and socio-political predispositions, correlates with individuals' political and economic attitudes. The results suggest that behavioral choices in media consumption by individuals in transitional societies shape resultant political and economic attitudes and do so in an interactive pattern of both distraction and information-seeking. That is, differences across media, content, and source do exact an influence on individuals' political and economic attitudes.

While many scholars have noted that both political and market factors have exerted a negative influence ultimately retarding the development of mass media in Central and Eastern Europe (Becker 1990; Splicahl 1994; Jakubowicz 1995; Novosel 1995; Sparks and Reading 1998; Mills 1999: Coman 2000); in each of the cases under examination, reform has been undertaken. However, this reform in the newly liberalized media institutions does not represent a uniform pattern. The differing degrees and direction of reform are reflected in the legislation of the liberalization of broadcast and print mass media, the degree of updated technological capabilities, the *de facto* press and broadcast liberties, and the extent of residual political influence. This chapter therefore argues that the aggregate patterns of observed media influence on individuals' political and economic attitudes correlate with the various degrees of media institutional reform, suggesting a multi-level process. This is a methodological means of assigning each country a rank based on a number of national-level variables associated with the

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liberalization of former state media, including television, newspaper, and radio and contextualizes the individual-level findings in national-level settings.

Analogous to the de-monopolization of the economies and political institutions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), media institutional liberalization was a contest between the *zeitgeist* of democratic transition and the stubborn state structures of the former regime. This included the transference of control over broadcasting, publications, regulations, frequencies, editorial issues, licensing, ownership, *inter alia.* Simply, it included a cessation of state control and political domination toward an independent, commercially based media market. The attempts of achieving an autonomous media were largely political, making it a necessity of regulation (in the form of anti-trust and competition ensuring) and licensing (Sparks 2000, 42). Given that the chapters above have provided evidence of the frequency and intensity of individual-level media effects across the cases, this chapter argues that the different processes of "structural disentanglement" (Rantanen 1998, 125) are responsible for the varied effects we see at the micro-level.

This chapter will introduce the theory of media dependency as the basis for the multi-level argument and set out brief histories of media reform in these cases to provide the basis for operationalizing the macro-level indicators by integrating several factors into an index of media institutional reform. In discussing the cases, it is important to discuss the legislative process of media liberalization, provide the recent history of print and broadcast media, address the impact of international involvement, and identify domestic and international media companies and private entrepreneurs that rushed to fill the vacuum of the new media markets.

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Media Dependency:

The theory of media dependency captures the hypothesized relationship between the macro-level process of institutional reform (or varying states of media institutions' independent robustness) and the micro-level uses and reliance on media. Media dependency suggests that in times of national-level political and/or economic uncertainty, it is more likely that people are more dependent on media as a source of information and guidance (Ball-Rokeach 1985).

As political and economic transition and consolidation are certainly periods of a tremendous and rapid reformation of the 'order of things', citizens seek something to provide an understanding to the events. Individuals do have clear abilities to learn new norms (Sniderman 1975; McClosky and Brill 1983; Rohrschneider 1999) and the informational and communicative needs of new democrats are significant and information must reach them in some manner. Individuals seek out information to provide understanding of the new order and media provide one basis for understanding and interpreting a new reality. As political and social changes become increasingly complex, the need for information increases and subsequently requires more of the citizenry. In some studies, scholars have argued that media do serve as the main source of information (Seymour-Ure 1974; Paletz and Entman 1981; Blumler 1970; Robinson and Levy 1986); yet, others remain unconvinced, arguing that media are more effective at simply transmitting political information than inculcating democratic values (Carey 1996). However, at the critical juncture of democratic transition, the value of political information to these citizens as a basis for new political values and attitudes cannot be dismissed.

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For the cases under examination here, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the 1990's were such a period for this region. The rapid and tumultuous economic transformations yoked large strata of these populations with overwhelming economic strain and perpetuated, perhaps more devastatingly, long-term economic uncertainty. Similarly, the transitions from one-party rule and allegiance to ideological rigidity toward institutions of democratic governance, the de-politicization of nascent public spheres, and popular political enfranchisement each required a process of individual and collective reorientation towards both political phenomena and objects.

Media dependency, again, posits that during times of dramatic change individuals rely heavily on media. While it suggests information-seeking, we have seen significant effects of low content and high television consumption as negative influences and thereby "tuning out", particularly for lower SES/SPP groups may be substantively interesting as well. That is, in addition to a 'reliance' and information-seeking, distraction has also played a role. And again, to do these findings correlate with the varying degrees of nations' media institutional reform?

Therefore, it is less clear whether this is as a means to accumulate information or retreat from a troubling reality through diversion. To make this theory more satisfying, we have to describe a viable process of attention and distraction that coherently links media institutions and individuals' patterns of media consumption. Unfortunately, media dependency has rarely been empirically tested, largely because of the rarity of such transitions and even rarer applicable data. Therefore, are we to expect a high reliance on types of media, or content, or sources? And which types? For countries that have legislated little media reform and have controlled the expansion of independent and

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foreign owned media (e.g. television in Romania), should we expect to see a high use of television news and domestic sources? Or, just as likely, an effort of individuals to find and read newspapers and seek out international sources? Or, should we expect to find patterns of heavy entertainment use, signally a 'tuning out'?[1] All of these are 'a reliance on media', yet each is directed by a different individual-level motivation.

These confound the development of a clear hypothesis or set of hypotheses. As media dependency theory provides a lack of specific relationships between the degree of reform and individual-level effects, it is difficult to establish the necessary directional, or causal, condition to hypothetically link these phenomena. However, from what we have seen in the previous chapters, we need not ascribe a 'blanket' effect. That is, during the most difficult periods of transition, it is possible many sorts of media use are apparent. What has separated them is, once again, *who* is using them. Therefore, the most concrete observation given the media institutional reform process in these cases will most likely be that countries which have demonstrated significant progress toward normalizing a free media environment (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland) will likely have different patterns of micro-level media effects than those that have not demonstrated significant liberalization (Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia).[2] The results will inform our understanding.

[1] For example, a country with a higher level of media institutional reform (.e.g. nearly all forms of mass media in the Czech Republic), these patterns might signal something entirely different (i.e. a preference and trust in domestic sources, a cosmopolitan-ization of media use, distraction as a luxury of leisure time).

[2] Again, 'different' remains undefined. This inductive examination is compelled to put events before theory.

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Media Reform in Central and Eastern Europe:

The central question of this chapter is, stated simply, given the collective uncertainty about the effects of mass media in CEE, do the different stages of media institutional reform offer a cross-national explanation for the effects we see at the individual-level? If so, media effects can be argued to be subject to the processes of transition. If not, individual-level media effects provide the basis for a transformation of our understanding of the effects of mass media.

The approach taken here most closely approximates the understanding of reform as process of movement between discrete categories that lead away from an authoritarian control of mass media to what could be called, borrowing from the transitions literature, 'consolidated'. Randall (1998, 245) calls it a "stage-ist" approach, arguing the key "stages" are differentiated by differential values placed on media.

> *"…media's contribution to democracy might seem to lend support for a 'stage-ist' thesis that the media tend to be most supportive of democracy at particular political conjuncture, when they are themselves emerging from political control, are strongly identified with the process of democratization and, moreover, benefit from the publics' enormous hunger for news and for political change. At an earlier 'stage', their contribution inevitably be more restricted but to the extent that they offer alternative accounts of social and political reality and even that they draw people into a sense of shared public space, they can be seen as helping to pave the way to democratization. As the process of transition approaches the consolidation stage, the media's contribution becomes more equivocal. When deprived of state financial support and facing public whose news appetite has been blunted by growing cynicism, they increasingly become prey to the pressures of commercial survival."* (Randall 1998, 245).

At low stages, the media reform process correlates with the progress of democratization as media provide some of the initial forums of 'public space'. However,

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nearing ‘consolidation’, media undergo a transformation from information provider to merely survivors of the new commercial market.[3]

She also argues that this begs the question of the similarity to the democratization processes across regions (*ibid.*), and this historical determinism has not gone overlooked. In the institutions literature, Kitschelt *et al*. (1999) posited a developmental model incorporating legacies of Communist rule intersecting with the complexities of institutional incentives and political-economic arrangements. They discuss the programmatic crystallization of party systems in Eastern Europe as a function of (again) the legacies of communism along with the democratic institutions in place. They examine the 'competition' between the legacies and current institutions over four areas of party competition and seek to define parties' message coherence. This notion is not lost on the other areas of liberalization and reform. Some scholars have made reference to institutional, behavioral, and normative legacies as a determinant of the variety of institutional outcomes of mass media reform in CEE (Coman 2000, 50-3).[4] The argument simply links the pre-transitional media institutions as a determinant for the resulting, post-transition outcomes of media reform. While interesting, few have examined this role of media institutional legacies casting their long shadows on to the reform process.

Related to this, in Jakubowicz’s examination of media institutions in CEE (2001), he makes the case for separating Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic from Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania. The distinction is that the former group’ institutional reforms have been more transparent and in the direction of

[3] She further questions the role of international media which has been integrated into this analysis (Randall 1998, 245-6).
[4] Coman also argues that the transition was not one of aspiration towards mass media in a liberal democratic setting but a management of new demands within the old media paradigm, arguing that the “new disturbs and the old conforms” (2000, 50).

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liberal market practices. The ‘differentiation process’ of de-monopolization had a head start in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (Giorgi 1995). A north vs. south argument, this resonates with earlier pre-transitional examinations. Buzek, in writing about the function of the Communist press in the early 1960’s, suggests a subtle, intra-regional difference between essentially the north and the south (1964, 11), such that the north was comparatively freer. While this does seem to provide a basis for delineation among the group of democratizing countries used here as cases for this study, the macro-level differentiation lacks sufficient and significant definition. As this analysis is not an inquiry into the origins of media systems but rather a comparative analysis at a single time period, we benefit from the more relaxed assumptions of relatively coterminous beginnings and similar pasts.

Many of the contributions to our understanding of media institutional reform in CEE inform us on the structural, technological, and institutional changes required of moving mass media institutions away from state financial and ideological control (Hester 1991,1992; Splichal 1994; Corcoran and Preston 1995; Paletz 1995; Rogerson 1997; O'Neil 1997, 1998; Rantanen 1998; Milton 2000; Sparks 2000; Gross 2002, 2004). Obtaining licenses, updating broadcasting or printing technology, training and hiring staff represent only some of the fiscal responsibilities that were shifted from state subsidy. Additionally, devising, legislating, and ultimately implementing new broadcasting (and licensing) laws profoundly shaped the struggle for the control of broadcasting (Dahlgren and Sparks 1995: see also Webster 1992; Jakubowicz 1995).

Jakubowicz (1996a, 40-2) posits four domains of concern for media scholars interested in the region: the legal, economic, professional, and political environments in

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which these transformations have been undertaken. Below, I address the political and legal (both legislative and extant political influence) and the economic environments. The professional component is included under the larger political influence discussion.

Mass media's move away from the state's financial, ideological, and technological control ushered in the newer era of private and commercial media market, and with it, dependency on advertising and subscription, that is, its ability to generate profit (Becker 1996). Thus the reform of media institutions toward market-based controls was primarily shaped by the distribution of licenses, content, and competition, that is to say, a political process. Into the early 1990's, almost all of the CEE nations' state radio and television remained under influence of their respective governments with only superficial efforts of privatization. However, while not uniformly true, and as we will see in several of these countries, this does not necessarily imply governmental resistance to exorcizing itself but rather for some, a financial necessity in order to keep these stations open.

The economic facet of media liberalization in CEE was a blend of investments from private, domestic, and foreign groups.[5] For these states, a large part of the process of media de-monopolization was the elimination of government funding and the selling of former state agencies to private investors. It has been argued that privatization among the many liberalizing strategies was seen as the only effective means to move towards democratic society and away from the authoritarian past (Manaev 1996, 40). However, rather than the wholesale purchase of former state broadcast and print media, national media companies which had the needed financing to overcome the initial, and nearly always substantial, costs of privatization found themselves being underwritten by

[5] For an exhaustive analysis of mass media ownership in CEE during the 1990's, see Coman (2000).

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international private media groups.[6] Those able to make the financial outlays necessary to fund these renovating, rejuvenating, and purchasing demands were, in general, foreign investors from Western Europe and America.[7] Access to the initial investments in CEE were crucial to national media groups, particularly television broadcasting (Sparks 2000, 44-5; see also Gross 2002, 37). In countries in which the legislative allowances for licensing and market liberalization had been introduced, this alliance between international and domestic media groups was not strictly financial but also allowed for the transference of technical know-how and equipment to CEE media groups (Aumente *et al*. 1999; see also Armstrong 1996)[8] and crucial local connections for international groups in the early years of transition.

As Gross describes (2002, 110), in the early years of transition in CEE, the continuum of both television and print media choices for individuals paralleled an ideological continuum. As competitors, foreign media (invested in alliances with national level media groups) found that to generate revenue they had to acquiesce to domestic demands for politically charged presentations. They had to, in Gross' words, "be political" (*ibid.,* 36). Commercial broadcasts offered a mix of politically biased news and ideologically-neutral entertainment, with strong favor toward the more popular and revenue-raising latter (see Goban-Klas 1994; Splichal 1994; Paletz, Jakubowicz, and Novosel 1995; O'Neil 1997; Sparks and Reading 1998). Some argue that international companies exhibited more a 'gold mine' than a 'marketplace of ideas' motive. In contrast to Gross,

[6] These were essentially media joint-stock companies.
[7] This had several effects which can be thematically bifurcated into the rapid expansion of private media (particularly in print media) and the accompanying deterioration of journalistic standards. While fascinating, this is outside the scope of this study.
[8] For example, technical adjustments included rectifying the simple disparity between older and newer equipment. Western broadcasts use higher radio broadcast frequencies (88-108 MH) while the former Comintern nations (CEE) often used much lower ones. (Fletcher and Herzman 1992, 38).

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Jakubowicz argues that foreign owned papers, for example, tried to remain to some degree apolitical to avoid trouble (1998/9, 16), especially smaller papers (local or regional).[9]

For newspapers, the opportunity to multiply, while more frequently more costly than radio, was the lack of a, or arbitrarily enforced, formal licensing process. This also likely emerged out of the lessened technological difficulties and lower initial outlays for publishers. For print media, foreign capital used several strategies including: initial investments in the local press (because of smaller costs and relatively weak competition) and the purchasing of shares of national dailies. This blurred the lines of ownership. For broadcast media it was much easier to delineate between public service broadcasting and its commercial counterpart (Coman 2000, 41) as the control of the necessary equipment much more clearly indicated ownership. Yet at this time, the other broadcast media, radio, exhibited a great deal of independence, and subsequently more homegrown ideological petulance. This was in large part due to the relatively lower technological hurdles than was required for both television and sometime even newspapers. Limiting radio broadcasts to local or regional distribution, broadcaster' smaller scale allowed them to often sidestep the formal, and usually prohibitive, licensing processes for national broadcasting.

This section discusses the reform processes for television, radio, and newspaper in each of the six cases. To operationalize the degree of reform, each country will be ranked along two continuums and assigned a relative score. This will aid our later analysis of correlating individual-level media effects and the macro-level processes (see Table 1).

[9] In the uncertain licensing environment of the early 1990's, many were apolitical to remain 'below the radar'.

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<Table 1 about here>

First is the degree to which the medium has been legislatively liberalized. That is, to what extent has legislative efforts been made to assert competitive principles as the basis for that medium's market. The legal aspect of media liberalization includes the legislative action taken to nurture liberalization of state mass media and the broadening of competition. For the cases here, all have passed broadcasting legislation.[10] However, as a result of the legal parameters of privatization, the process of privatization itself differed between media and across countries. Print media was often privatized through the straightforward ascension of journalist and editors (or professional organizations) to positions of control or private agencies (usually foreign) buying controlling shares from the state. This spontaneous privatization in fact was the norm in CEE (Coman 2000, 38). The former process occurred in Czechoslovakia and Hungary while the latter in Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria.[11] Poland deviated from this as a governmental agency was established to handle the orderly, but piecemeal, privatization (*ibid*., 39). For radio and television, privatization was a more exaggerated process as the state often yielded licenses and broadcast capacity begrudgingly.

The legislative component might seem a sufficient measure of the level of reform; however, residual or implicit control by a political actor or actors reigned in attempts at independence.[12] In the first years of media institutional reform for CEE, the expanding number of political parties competing for the diminishing control of mass media and the

[10] Czechoslovakia 1991; Poland and Romania 1992; Hungary 1995; Bulgaria 1996.
[11] This "buy out" privatization included not only foreign companies but on occasion local businesses, banks, even political groups.
[12] This is not to say that ideology does not play a salient role in the mass media of CEE as many television and radio broadcasts and newspapers alike are ideologically driven. This issue has been addressed in the Methodology chapter above.

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increasing demands placed on media by their audiences as the application of liberalizing policies was as influential. As Coman notes (2000, 37), "legislation [alone] has been unable to eliminate the influence of politics upon the media;" therefore, the second dimension is the observable level of political involvement of political actors.[13] The difference is the level of manipulation, either through control of funding or appointments that political actors, principally political parties, are able to exert over the medium.[14]

The matrix shows the lowest score for a low level of legislated media reform and a high level of political influence. If one or the other dimension is held constant, an increase of the other (whether political manipulation or legislation intended to liberalize the particular media) produces a moderate increase in the ranking score. To achieve the highest ranking, the legislative dimension should be high and the political influence dimension should be low.[15]

Television:

Bulgaria:

In December 1990, the new democratic parliament passed the "provisional Statute of Bulgarian Television and Radio" (Milev 1998); however, rather than a substantive attempt at liberalizing mass media in Bulgaria, it was hollow legislation that allowed the state to postpone reform and ultimately maintain control over both national television and radio. In 1995, this question was revisited a legislative attempt was made at offering

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[13] More difficult to incorporate is the level of technological capabilities. As we will see, the technology needed to broadcast was typically guarded by political actors, keeping foreign investors and media groups (and their newer technology) at bay. Therefore, in an attempt to incorporate this, technological barriers will be included in the political influence dimension.

[14] For a complete discussion of the regulatory analysis, particularly the political process of creating and charging regulatory boards to oversee the privatization process, see Jakubowciz (1998/9).

[15] These rankings are meant to provide a comparative meter of media institutional reform within the region and are not intended to suggest that some have done nothing while others are perfectly liberalized media environments. They are used as comparative measures within this study.

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limited licensing for new television and radio stations (the "Act on Concessions"). Although designed to initiate the deregulation of telecommunications, the substantive outcome was only a trickle of 'provisional licenses' to local (non-national) television and radio stations. Again in July 1996 (late even by CEE standards), the incumbent reformed Communist majority passed the "Radio and Television Act" (18 July 1996). Once again, this legislation did little to separate public service media from political connections. So transparent and flimsy was this effort that the Constitutional Court later in year declared the act unconstitutional. Bulgaria, like Romania, had to wait until the very end of one-party rule for media to begin a genuine dismantling of governmental impediments to liberalization (Sparks 2000, 40).

To this point, Bulgarian National Television (BNT) was still funded (and editorially regulated) by the state although in the process of transforming both into 'national public' media. Bulgarian National Television was also heavily in debt, an excuse the reformed Communist had used to maintain control. Well into the mid-1990's, the two national stations of *Bulgarska Televiziya* not only remained under the purview of state control but remained supplicant in their broadcast programming as the federal media licensing board was slow in issuing licenses to private competitors (Bakardjieva 1995). Both channels, *Channel One* and *Efir 2*, were the only national television broadcasts received by 96% and 76% of the country, respectively. Foreign investors were not only thwarted in their attempts to obtain broadcast licenses but also purchase access to national broadcasting facilities.[16] Private television existed only at the local level and emerged comparatively late. Of the few, but limited, independent broadcasters were *Rodopi*, a regional television

[16] *Efir2* was briefly courted by George Soros and the American company Central European Media Enterprises (CME).

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station and *Nova Televizia*, which was available in some urban centers. The two largest private television broadcasters, *Nova TV* and *7 Days*, were in Sofia with little distribution beyond that.

Despite the BSP having won the 1994 elections, Petar Stojanov of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) wins the presidential elections of 1996 and new elections are held in April 1997. These parliamentary elections are won by the UDF and they initiated a shake up of the Media Commission. Up until this point, while most television could be considered ideologically and programmatically pro-government, legislative steps in direction of privatization were hesitantly being taken. At best, piecemeal privatization was taking place not only in licensing private television and allowing international media into Bulgaria, regulatory control over state television began to wane (Milev 1998). With the UDF, although the directors were still appointed by the parliament,[17] the process was granted a new degree of transparency and legitimacy and more pointedly leaned in the direction of genuine reform.

Foreign interest and investment has updated Bulgarian television mostly by the threat of competition. Technologically, Bulgaria state television consolidated its broadcasting facilities, as in 1997 there were 39 television transmitters, down from 119 in 1996.[18] This was partially the result of updating broadcasting equipment, a function of the intervention of international media groups into the newly privatized television market.

The Czech Republic:

First among the Central and Eastern European countries, the significant regulatory changes guiding the privatization of Czechoslovak broadcast and print media were

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[17] Up until this point, there had been a new General Director of the Media Commission nearly every year since 1989 (a rotation maintained by their ideological drift).
[18] Republic of Bulgaria. National Statistical Institute. Statistical Yearbook 1999. Sofia.

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legislated 30 October 1991 (Sparks 2000, 43; also Johnson 1995). Not long after, in February 1992, an administrative board was empowered to license private media groups. However, both the Broadcasting Council and parliament increasingly came to contest the process of awarding of commercial radio and television licenses (Korte 1994), as an issue of impartiality arose due to the accountability the administrative board to the Czechoslovak Parliament.

Nonetheless, the state broadcasting monopoly was almost immediately abolished and public service broadcasting corporations were moved away from state control (Smid 1998). Both public sector television and radio function under broadcasting fees and have received little to no federal funding since 1993. Between 1991-2, the federal commissions in charge of Czechoslovak television were split into two groups, Czech Television and Slovak Television. After the *Velvet Divorce*, Czech law finally consolidated public service television into one channel and loosened the regulatory procedures that enhanced the privatization of the other, now more available, frequencies (Wilson 1994). In June 1993, the first private television station, *Premiéra TV* was broadcast in Prague. Although it was initially a local broadcast, by late 1994, it was broadcast nationally.[19] The first national commercial television broadcasts was *TV NOVA* in February 1994, a product of the Central European Media Enterprises,[20] which owned 96% (Ballentine 2002).

Among the countries under analysis here, *TV NOVA* was the first national commercial television broadcast in CEE. This station deviated from Czech public television in two

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[19] In January 1997, it became *Prima TV.* Although factually, on 14 May 1990, *OK3*, named 'Open Channel', had broadcast national satellite channels where Russian television had been. However, for all of the cases here, I discuss primarily the terrestrial (vs. satellite) broadcasters as by the mid-1990's, terrestrial based television broadcasts made up the solid majority of television consumption (because of the technical adjustment and extra cost of equipment) and in some cases, it was not available. Regardless of its exclusion, the rankings remain essentially the same.

[20] The Central European Media Enterprises (CME) is an American media company, a subsidiary of the larger Central European Development Corporation.

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significant ways. First was the American style programming. Both entertainment and news programming took on a fast-paced popular approach which threw the state-run programs in stark relief. Second was the tremendous financial capabilities of the Western based company, which in turn allowed the rapid technological and creative changes to take place.[21] As mentioned above, at nearly the same time, a second national television broadcast emerged, the now-named *Prima TV*. While also a private national television broadcaster, it did not present such an overt challenge to the former regime in terms of programming styles and ideological orientation.

By 1997, Czechoslovak regulatory reform led to not only numerous applications for private media but also the influx of foreign capital. There were effectively five national television channels, the government owned and operated, *Česka Televize* consisting of CT1 and CT2; *TV Nova* and *Prima TV*, both privately owned; and *TV3*, a non-governmental Czech station. Despite the open and relatively successful licensing of private television, radio, and newspapers, criminal liability laws were again passed over in an October 1995 legislative move to address media freedom.[22] Yet, by 1997, impediments to objective and free broadcast and print journalism had been effectively addressed.

Hungary:

In the pre-transition era, more than two-thirds of Hungarian television was imported from the west (Tesar 1991, 138), of which 30% of the total received direct Austrian and

[21] Not surprisingly, of the two directors of *TV Nova*, Vladimír Železný had publicly expressed support for the liberal Czech parties.
[22] For a fuller description of the limitations to free media and criminal liability laws during this period, see Zagalsky (1994).

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Yugoslav television signals (Szekfü 1989).[23] Hungary gave the initial impression of a strong interest in liberalizing its mass media. However, the significant media reform legislation, the "Media Act", failed to clear the parliament in 1992. What emerged out of this was a "…grey area of media policy [and] the ad hoc allocation of broadcasting frequencies" (Szekfü 1998, 30). Within this "grey area", political competition for control of formerly public television became known as the "Media Wars" (Szekfü 1996; Molnár 1999). The election of 1994 was considered the battleground for these 'wars' as ownership competition was bitterly contested.[24]

The "Media Wars" of the early 1990's started when the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), winner of the first election, assumed indirect but certain control of both radio and television.[25] The directors of *Magyar Radio* and *Magyar Televezia* were initially handpicked by Prime Minister Josef Anatall. However, this did not assure their ideological congruency as in 1992, they were removed from their positions for their slight but noticeable drift from governmental subservience. The MDF's loss to the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) in 1994 simply transferred this control to the communist successor party. In accord with this implicit pact, as late as 1994, many competent but vocal employees were fired from both *Magyar Televezia* and *Magyar Radio*.

These political machinations ended when, despite a parliamentary majority of reformed communists, the Media Act was finally passed. The 1995 Media Law created both the main supervisory body overseeing the industry is the National Radio and

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[23] One historian notes that television from Austria was so popular, Hungarian officials arranged meetings with Austrian officials in order to gain news coverage and interviews in order again to communicate with their Hungarian constituents (Dawson 1989, 58).

[24] Even so, some scholars argue that news presentations were, on a whole, non-ideologically aligned and objective (Szekfü 1998).

[25] The SzDSz (Alliance of Free Democrats) and FIDESz (Alliance of Young Democrats) claimed adherence to the notion of an independent media and were during this period (1990-1993), putting them clearly in the minority.

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Television Board (ORTT) and the legislative basis for the distribution of broadcast frequencies to non-state media companies, simply a dual broadcasting system finally ending the monopoly over television that state run *Magyar Televezia* had enjoyed for the first six years of transition (Csapo-Sweet and Kaposi 1999). However, at least one representative of each party still sits on the supervisory board of both. While rapid shifts to foreign ownership made the Hungarian press the most privatized in CEE (by 1995 nearly 80% of newspapers were privately owned), the Hungarian government had resisted the similar privatization of electronic media (see Galik and Denes 1992; Galik 1996). The first private television station to emerge after this was the *RTL Klub*. Additionally, during the mid-1990's, another national television network emerged and quickly outpaced, in terms of audience and quality, its state owned counterparts, *Duna* television.[26]

Poland:

On 29 December 1992, the Polish broadcast law, the "Radio and Television Act", was passed and the Poland parliament had effectively legislated the end of the state's monopolistic media control. As one means to dismantle state control of television, Polish public television is funded by a combination fee and advertising thus providing a commercial basis for public service radio and television. International media corporations were poised to enter the new media market on the eve of the ratification of this new Polish Press Law. However, foreign investment (and some might argue, domination), was explicitly limited by Polish law. The legislation put in place a cap on foreign ownership of broadcast media (at 33% and the board of directors must include a majority of Polish citizens). Additionally dampening privatization, directors of the broadcasting commission

[26] In 1999, *Duna* TV won a UNESCO prize for best cultural television in the world.

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were political appointments through the first two elections (Karpinski 1995). Not only were licensing and broadcast allocations addressed, programming content and advertising content was regulated. Up until this point, there were only local private broadcasters. Afterwards, most received a license in 1993-4.

However, not unlike many of its neighbors, salient political actors shaped early Polish media, in particular, the Catholic Church.[27] The Church's role related to media was actually governed by an additional, and extraordinary, set of laws (Piatek 1998, 50). Additionally, despite the distance between national television broadcasters and the Polish government, during the run up to the September 1997 Sejm elections, opponents made accusations regarding unfair treatment in terms of the predominate level of access to the media (particularly television) available to incumbent communist party successor (the Social Democrats) and their coalition partner, the PSL. Many have regarded this as a free media market simply 'flexing it muscles'.

With former state television, ideologically independent from the state, few national level broadcasters entered the market. In Poland by 1997, there were three national television networks, the two government run *Telewizja Polska 1* and *2* and the privately owned *TV Polonia*.

Romania:

Like Bulgaria, there was little foreign-owned and commercial media in Romania throughout most of the 1990's (Gross 2002, 35), despite an early impression that Romania was eager for media reform. In September 1990, SOTI Television, the Romanian Society for the Creation of an Independent National Television Company

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[27] The Roman Catholic Church's involvement was sufficient to establish a counterpart to the Polish Information Agency (*Polska Agencja Informacyjna*), the Catholic Information Agency (*Katolicka Agencja Informacyjna*).

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began with one hour programs in major cities. However, given its perpendicular tack to the general subservience of other television stations to political domination, its license was revoked in 1994. Romania also initially seemed progressive in terms of media reform legislation, as some authors argued that Romanian television potentially could serve as a 'democracy leader' in Romania (Mollison 1998). Unfortunately, the anticipated Audiovisual Media Act (1992), the Public Radio and Television Act (1994), and the Copyright Protection Act were contradictory and "dysfunctional" (Lazescu and Murgu 1998, 55), citing much of this was due to the simple lack of initial know-how. Additionally, Ion Iliescu, Prime Minister and successor of the Ceausescu regime, was keen not only on monitoring television and radio but also keeping them in ideological check.

Regardless of this implicit political force, it was more likely that the complicated financial and technological difficulties that kept many new media competitors from being able to broadcast. Until 1996, access to sufficiently powered broadcasting equipment limited independent radio and television broadcasters, keeping foreign investment at bay. Without the boost of foreign capital and investment, non-government funded television struggled to assemble the technical and journalistic know how. This process was further slowed as Romanian journalists, many who went to train in the West, found that on their return, the strict criminal liability laws remained. It was only after Iliescu's removal from power in 1996 that these barriers to objective (that is to say, effective) reporting could be safely crossed.

Romanian national television was at the time of this survey dominated by the state's Societatea Româna de Televiziune (RTV) and its channels, *Radioteleviziunea Romania*

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One (TVR1) and *Radioteleviziunea Romania Two* (TVR2). TVR1 was the only channel that could broadcast nationally in to the mid-1990s (TVR2 was much smaller and regional). As of 1997, for some parts of Romania, it was the only channel that can be received. At the end of the year and into the next, *Antena 1* became the first commercial television network, followed by *ProTV* and *Prima TV* (finally granted terrestrial licenses).[28]

Slovakia:

Following the Velvet Divorce in 1993, the Slovak parliament had been reluctant to continue legislating further independence for both broadcast and print media. What was Czechoslovak became Slovak. Slovakia's national television broadcasting includes state-owned *Slovenska Televizia* (STV), with two channels, STV1 and STV2 using different broadcasting technology.[29] In 1995, the television station *Vasa Televizia* (VTV), formerly labeled 'independent', was clearly aligned with the incumbent Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) headed by Vladimir Mečiar. His 1994 victory resulted in more restrictive legislation for independent, albeit still nascent, media. Although Slovakia inherited the initial legislative freedoms from the former Czechoslovakia attempts, evidence of the enforcement of ideological congruency suggests that it has not progressed, and may have regressed, in lieu of political influence. The Slovak Media Law remained in perpetual 'preparation stage' and had not been introduced by 1997 (Brecka 1998). By this time, the private Slovak television market was limited to *Markíza*, which was essentially an entertainment channel, owned and run by the CME (49% ownership), and remained politically timid.

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[28] This is important because the other two semi-national broadcasters, *Tele 7abc* and *Ameron*, actually couriered videotapes out of Bucharest to broadcast on their more distant stations on a one day delay.
[29] STV1 is PAL and STV2 is SECAM.

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Ranking:

Therefore, at the time the surveys were conducted, this order represents the cases assigned value of the matrix of liberalization (again, see Table 2). Given the two dimensions of this ranking, this results in this order (from most reformed to least): the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Romania and Slovakia, and Bulgaria (see Table 2).

<Table 2 about here>

Radio:

The legislative means of liberalizing radio broadcasting in all of these cases was often linked to television legislation. Therefore, in the following discussion, attention will be primarily given to aspects of radio reform that may deviate from the same trajectory as television and from each other.

Bulgaria:

The national channels of *Bulgarsko Radio*[30] were subject to the lingering influence of the state's financial control. As such, they were acquiescent in their programming as, like television, the federal licensing board was slow in issuing licenses to private competitors. Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) was funded (and editorially regulated) by the state although in the process of transforming both into 'national public' media. In 1997, while both television and radio could be considered pro-government, steps in direction of radio broadcast privatization were being taken. Evidence of this was the election of the Director-General of state broadcasting by the Bulgarian Parliament, replacing the former director with the former chief editor of the official party daily of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), *Democratsia*. This had the effect of easing, but not freeing, radio from the tight orbit about the state's editorial control.

[30] Bulgarian International Radio; *Radio Christo Botev* and *Radio Horizont*

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Like television, Bulgaria had several pockets of independent radio broadcasts, but they existed only on weak, local frequencies. Despite their limited reach, at the time of these surveys, there were no less than 60 private, but again very local, radio stations. *Radio Free Europe* consistently supported and run local broadcasts of its own with heavy programming aimed at the intelligentsia. The most respected and widely consumed (in terms of number of listeners) was *Darik Radio*. It later emerged as the first independent national radio station. If there was evidence of any measurable liberalization, it was only at the local or regional level of broadcasting.

The Czech Republic:

In the initial years of transition, the Czechoslovak government authorized the transmission of foreign radio programs including RFE and the BBC. After the Velvet Divorce, Czech law finally consolidated public service radio into three channels but loosened the regulatory procedures that enhanced the privatization of the other, now more available, frequencies. Public sector radio functions under broadcasting fees and has, like television, received no federal funding since 1993. Also like television, the federal commissions in charge of Czechoslovak radio were split into two groups, Czech Radio and Slovak Radio.

As we have seen in each of the CEE countries, despite low national competition, the greatest expansion of competition emerged at the local and regional level. In March 1991, 'trial radio licenses' were issued that preceded the legislation of the October media law. In that time, nearly 30 private radio stations obtained a license. The governmentally controlled national radio networks included *Česky Rozhlas One* (also known as *Česky Radiozurnál*), *Česky Rozhlas Praha*, and the smaller, *Česky Rozhlas Vltava*. For Czech

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radio, the three broadcasts of *Česky Rozhlas* dominated the airwaves. Three private, national broadcasting radio stations that were finally able to enter the market in the mid-1990's: *Frekvence 1, Free Europe,* and *Radio Alfa.*[31]

Hungary:

The state system of Hungarian radio broadcast on several channels under the umbrella title of *Magyar Radio*. They included *Kossuth Radio* (mainly political programming), *Petőfi Radio* (mainly entertainment programming), and *Bartok Radio* (mainly cultural programming). *Rádió Danubius* functionally began in 1986 as a quasi-experimental state commercial radio. After the transition, it remained rather small albeit nationally commercial despite being purchased by a western media group. Similarly, *Sláger Radio* also emerged but remained in the same category as *Rádió Danubius*.[32] The first private radio was *Rádió Híd*; however, it was broadcast in English (its owner was CME), limiting its initial audience. It has since switched to Hungarian although it carried *Voice of America* news programming (in English). There are far fewer local radio broadcasters than in the other cases. Overall, Hungarian radio represents a somewhat afterthought approach to the liberalization of radio, by including it in legislative reforms but without pronounced attention.

Poland:

In the years leading up to the 1989 transition, western radio programs long considered subversive, *RFE, VOA, BBC,* and *Radio France Internationale* were paid less attention to by the Polish government (Jakubowicz 1999) as the iron curtain was becoming

[31] All foreign owned and operated. *Free Europe* was a joint project under Czech and Slovak editorial bureaus, SFE, BBC, VOA, and Deutsche Welle. *Frekvence 1* was run by the French company Europe Développment. *Radio Alfa* is a CME broadcast.
[32] Other small commercial radio broadcasters included *Rádió 11* and *Rádió Juventus*. *Tilos Rádió* (Secret Radio) was an independent station that ran illegally for some years in the early 1990's.

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increasingly permeable. By 1997, Polish radio consisted of several national government operated radio broadcasts, *Polskie Radio BIS, Polskie Radio One, Polskia Radio Dwojka (Two), Polskie Radio Trojka (Three),* and the commercially run *Radio Maryja,*[33] *Radio RMF FM*, and *Radio Zet. Radio Zet* was able to outperform state radio with a combination of largely unbiased political reporting and a general avoidance of or reliance on low content broadcasts. Legislatively, Polish radio is only exceptional for the 'kid gloves' treatment of the Catholic Church. Despite this unique characteristic, Polish radio reform has generally proceeded apace with the Czech Republic. The largest difference is the lack of local radio and proliferation of national radio broadcast stations.

Romania:

Public service radio in Romania emerged under the purview of the Societatea Română de Radio (SRR). Its four channels *Radio Romania Actualitata, Radio Romania Cultural, Radio Romania Timeret,* and *Radio Rumantsch* nearly dominated the airwaves. Some have argued that it has been, by many measures independent of financial and political influence since 1994 (Roventa-Frumusani 2001); however, like television, the political exertion of influence remains because of the technological difficulties. There are many local broadcasters but only three large, but not national, ones. These three, *Radio Contact, Uniplus,* and *Pro FM* are all foreign owned and operated[34] yet at the time of the surveys had been unable to secure the necessary facilities (and licenses) to broadcast nationally. However, the technological gap in Romania is not entirely a broadcasting issue. Radio programs were mostly broadcast in the 'eastern" wavelengths (because of

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[33] The radio for Polish Catholics
[34] *Radio Contact* owned by Belgium Radio Contact (owned by RTL) and *Pro FM* and *Uniplus* are both owned by CME.

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the equipment Romanians had) and therefore exclude them from listening to much the international radio that can be broadcast into Romania.

Slovakia:

Of Slovak mass media, radio broadcasting demonstrated the most significant strides toward liberalization. *Rádio Slovensko, Rádio Regina, Rádio Devín, Radio FM, Rádio Patria, Slovensky Rozhlas One, Slovensko 1,* and *Radio Slovakia International* represent the diversity of the state's major broadcasting programming. This, however, may be due to a majority of entertainment programming and avoidance of news on these broadcasts. The extensive number of public service radio is tempered by their limited regional coverage. Of these, only *Slovensko 1* and *Rock FM* are near-national radio stations. Additionally, private radio includes *Fun Radio, Radio Twist, RMC Radio,* and *Radio Tatry.* However, although both *Fun Radio* and *Radio Twist* refer to themselves as national radio stations, they are merely widely broadcast. Unlike the other cases, in Slovakia, radio is entirely regional. The fragmented nature of these broadcasts cast suspicion on the capacity of radio as a whole to provide a popular and uniform basis for information.

Rankings:

Unlike television, we have seen several accounts of local and regional radio. This highlights a particular problem as although the environment for pluralization of radio may be present, the lack of uniformity across regions within these countries may be problematic. While many local radio stations may be free from direct political influence, the fragmented nature may be less effective as a mass media. Nonetheless, given the two dimensions of ranking these cases, the following represents the degree to which radio has

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demonstrated liberalization. Given the two dimensions of this ranking, this results in this order (from most reformed to least): the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria (tied), and Romania and Slovakia (tied) (see Table 3).

<Table 3 about here>

Print Media:

Bulgaria:

Print media, such as newspapers, magazines, and journals were able to multiply more rapidly and were less regulated than the broadcast counterparts. Similar to all CEE countries, the explosion of newspapers, particularly of smaller, regional ones outpaced television and radio (Rubin 1999, 61).[35] One reason for this explosion was the leniency given toward foreign ownership of print media. Germany's Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (WAZ) bought between 70-80% of largest publishing groups (including the small international part of *24 Chassa* (24 Hours), *168 Chassa* (168 Hours), and *Trud* (Work)). Many large circulation dailies have been very critical of the government. The daily tabloid, *24 Chasa* (24 Hours), with its weekly variation, *168 Chasa* (168 Hours), present a mix of sensationalism and in-depth reporting. Although both take direction from former communists, a crucial factor aiding their ability to start up, these are largely regarded as the most independent. In comparison to other print media, the *Chasas*' also run on much less foreign capital than others in print media, giving them a Bulgarian roots authenticity. Generally, the demands of the newspaper market eased broadsheet newspapers (that is, informational newspapers such as *Dnevnik*) to the margins while multiplying info-tainment, sensationalist dailies and weeklies. Those print media that are not independently owned and run are clear forums of parties, *Democratsia*, of the Union

[35] For the discussion of print media, I discuss dailies and weeklies together.

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of Democratic Forces and *Douma*, of the Bulgarian Socialist Party. While ideologically differentiated, print media in Bulgaria was replete with options.

The Czech Republic:

In the early 1990's, newspapers (and magazines) had become an especially easy entry point for foreign investment into Czech mass media. Before the transition in the Czech Republic, *Lidové Noviny* (People's News) had been a monthly informational source for the Czech human rights activists (associated with Charter 77). Purchased in 1993 by Ringier AG of Switzerland, it remained independent, that is, financially independent of state control and clearly aligned with Václav Havel. This was not the exception for the Czech Republic print media as by early 1995, a majority of the newspaper industry was owned by foreign, largely German, broadcasting companies.[36] Driven by foreign investment, other popular newspapers were similarly independent, such as *Mladá fronta dnes* (Youth Front Today).

Because of this, among Czech-owned newspapers, many have been able to emerge as reputable, non-ideological sources of information, one example being the widely-read Czech version of the *Financial Times*, *Hospodarske Noviny*. Some publications were able to survive the transition, although clearly ideological; *Respekt* (Respect) emerged in pre-transition Czechoslovakia as a dissident paper and *Pravo* (Truth) is the successor to *Rude Pravo* (Red Truth).

Hungary:

Overall, Hungarian newspapers were more privatized than other media and as such, they were generally more confrontational than television (English 1992, 73-4; also Oaks

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[36] Specifically, *Passauer Neue Presse* through its subsidiary the *Vltava-Labe-Press, Rhenish-Bergische Druckerei und Verlagsgeselschaft,* and *Mittelrhein Verlag - Bohemia*.

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1997). Like Poland, Hungary benefited from a pre-transition of unraveling state control. In 1988, due to a minor relaxation of the state's legislative grip the press, eighty-five new newspaper and magazines sprung up. Setting the pace of privatization, Hungarian print media raced to non-state ownership as by April 1990, seven newspapers had declared themselves independent and transferred full ownership to Axel Springer, the German media magnate. Forty percent of *Népszabadság* (People's Freedom), the former Communist daily, was sold to German-based Bertelsmann AG and quickly became a liberal oriented newspaper. Similarly, *Magyar Hírlap* (Hungarian Journal) sold 40% of its control to the Mirror Holding Company. *Nepszava* (People's Voice), as one of the daily, pre-transition party organs has remained closely identified with the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP). *Magyar Nemzet* (Hungarian Nation) was also associated with the moderately conservative, mid-1990's FIDESZ.[37] *Nepszabadsag, Nepszava, Magyar Hirlap, Magyar Nemzet* all existed before 1989 and with the exception of the conservative daily *Magyar Nemzet*, each have distinct left-liberal leanings. The Hungarian version of the *Financial Times, HVG* (*Héti Vilag Gazdasag:* Weekly World Economics) is one of the clearly non-aligned weekly newspapers.

Hungary had at the time of this analysis, roughly 10 national and 24 local dailies. Most telling about the print media was that each was privately owned and a majority by foreign owners.[38] As mentioned above, even private, foreign owned companies found themselves being political to be competitive. Not unique to the Hungarian press was the slow withdrawal of political influence on the other forms of mass media, radio and

[37] Interestingly, FIDESZ, under the leadership Viktor Orban in the mid-1990's, later transformed the party toward more progressively liberal political leanings. *Magyar Narancs* (Hungarian Orange) so clearly identified its political orientation that the newly defined FIDESZ assumed its trademark orange as its own.
[38] Of the 24 local newspapers: Axel Springer owns 10; Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung owns 5; Funk GmbH owns 3; and Associated Newspapers owns 3.

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television, and print media, as a function of the new market, simply found that it needed to be political to be viable (Whiting *et al.* 1994).

Poland:

Among the countries of CEE, Polish newspapers were the first to be privatized (Jakubowicz 1999; also English 1992, 102). Poland enjoyed some degree of pre-transitional relaxed press freedom in terms of international papers (particularly in the large urban areas), in addition to an independent Catholic press, which while uncensored, was the least interfered with by the state. The Polish Workers Defense Committee (KOR), founded in 1976 as the precursor to Solidarity, found among many of its activities disseminating reliable information about the political, economic, and social realities in Poland. The Polish dissents associated with this movement (and eventually Solidarity) were so well organized as to establish an 'unofficial' press agency in 1980, *Agencja Solidarność*. Its weekly bulletin, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* (Weekly of Mazowia) was the training ground for the eventual editors and journalists for the most widely, post-transition newspaper, *Gazeta Wyborcza*. More than any of the other countries, Poland's pre-transition media history, underscored by this active and underground samizdat industry, created relatively stable 'foundations' from which media institutions could emerge.

It comes as small surprise that like Hungary, by 1996, 71.6% of print media was foreign owned press. As such, no paper was a functionary of the government and the market was broadly politically diverse (Millard 1998, 92). The paper *Rzeczpospolita* (Republic) was regarded as providing very good business and economic reporting. National newspapers included *Polityka, Wprost, Gazeta Wyborcza* (center-left), *Gazeta*

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Polska (right leaning), and *Tygodnik Powszechny* (liberal Roman Catholic), *Trybuna* (the successor of *Trybuna Ludu*, the communist party daily and organ for the Democratic Left Alliance - SLD, which ruled from 1993-7).

Romania:

Like many of the CEE countries, Romania's largest daily, *Adveărul* (the Truth), was a former communist paper that has been able to retain a large audience, mainly through a somewhat objective, high content approach. *Libera* was Romania's first independent daily newspaper although it steered clear of direct political content and succeeded largely by remaining largely a tabloid paper. As mentioned above, only late in the 1990's did foreign investment penetrate Romanian mass media markets to boost independent mass media as Ringier AG of Switzerland bought majority shares of *Capital* and *Success*, turning them into widely consumed financial papers. However, despite the comparatively looser regulation of the press and the infusion of the greatest amount of foreign investment (vs. radio and television), the conversation of the press from a state organ to an objective and functioning independent press has been underwhelming (Gross 1993; 1996). By 1997, lingering fears among journalist, a lack of domestic capital, and a continually postponed legal environment had the effect of stunting its development (Starck 1999). In sum, Romanian print media remained one of the least liberalized.

Slovakia:

While print media showed more indications of diversification, at some level, all media displayed at least some adherence to Mečiar's official party line until 1998 (Vojteck 1995). After the split from the Czech Republic, all mass media became not only ideologically congruent but also more government oriented, that is to say more 'Slovak'

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(Rosenberger 1994). Mečiar's increasingly xenophobic stances resonated in the mass media, particularly in reference to the Hungarians in southern Slovakia and the Romas presence in general (Druker and van den Heuvel 1994). However, during this period, while certainly less ideologically diverse, some publications were able to establish a reputation for reliability, born out of an apolitical or deferential orientation to the incumbent regime. The former Communist paper, *Pravda* (Truth) and another pre-transition paper, *Národná Obroda* (National Renewal), were among this group (others include *Nový Cas* and *SME*). Again, although considered reputable, these publications certainly had their ideological stance: *Pravda* was and remains a left-leaning daily and *Národná Obroda* has become the unofficial party organ of the political party Alliance of New Citizen (ANO). Slovakia was notable for its general lack of publications.

Rankings:

Unlike the previous television and radio sections above, the liberalization of the press has already received a great deal of attention from other observers, specifically Freedom House. Their political ratings have been used as a standard of measure and comparison due to the rigorous compilations of indices of freedom. In addition, they have rated the press freedoms in these countries. Freedom House's rating are derived from scores of the "laws and regulations that influence media content", "the political pressures and controls on media content (including harassment or violence against journalists or facilities, censorship, self-censorship etc)", and "the economic influences over media content".[39] Like the political ratings, countries are assigned a number between 0-100, with 0-30 indicating a relatively free press, 31-60 indicating a partly free press, and 60-100 indicating not free. According to their 1996-7 ratings, the Czech Republic (19) and

[39] http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm

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Poland (27) were free. Bulgaria (44), Hungary (34), Romania (47), and Slovakia (49) were partly free. Therefore, in order of most free to least free, we have the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia (See Table 4). To convert these scores, I constructed a number line and assigned the highest rank (5) to the most liberalized. The countries that followed did so at somewhat regular intervals making the assignment of rankings fairly straightforward. The Freedom House scores for Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia clustered in the 40's ("partly free" in the Freedom House rakings); therefore, these latter countries we all given the next to last lowest score of "2".

<Table 4 about here>

As with the other rankings, it is important to remember that these ratings are better conceptualized as categorical orderings rather than strict interval rankings (see Table 5 for a summarized table of the media rankings). They are useful in the empirical analysis here by providing an order, not necessarily an interval rating.

<Table 5 about here>

Observed micro-level media effects:

In order to compare the media institutional reform process to the individual-level effects we have seen in the preceding chapters, we need coherently summarize the latter. Making sense of the micro-level results from the above three chapters is a complicated task, as there is simply a tremendous amount of information. At the end of each chapter, a summary was presented; however, for the purposes of the analysis in this chapter, there are two approaches to understanding the sum of them that also highlight the aim of this inquiry.

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First we can look at the differential effects of different media, their content, and source. This represents the direct examination of the effects of specific media, their attributes, and function as they impact individuals' political and economic attitudes. Methodologically, this is simply aggregating the number of significant media variables cross-nationally to determine if the frequency with which we observe significant and substantive results at the individual-level move in a synchronistic pattern with variation at the national-level. This approach is the more direct examination of media effects. Do individuals' media consumption choices show evidence of changing due to national-level media institutional liberalization? Are patterns of information- and distraction-seeking similar across all democratizing countries? Additionally, it will uncover types of effects that emerge at different stages of nations' media institutional reform. In doing so, we may identify "stages" at which media institutions begin to produce consistent, even recognizable, effects.

Of course, the opposite would also be an anticipated outcome. This approach may illuminate the possibility that there are no identifiable "stages", providing support for the idea that media in democratizing countries are substantially 'other'. That is, it would undermine support for the notion that media in democratizing countries evolve toward western-standards, decreasing their theoretical distance as institutional change increasingly takes place. Or more simply, not only would we find evidence for interesting and new media effects on individuals in non-western countries, but also that these countries, their media, and their citizens/audience members are not replicas of the west but rather may establish theoretical distinctiveness.

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In addition to this approach, the interactive effects are labeled in three distinguishing ways. As discussed in the content chapter, we have seen a relatively consistent interaction effect across content; namely, that news and high content media tend to mitigate differences between individuals defined by particular sets of socio-political predispositions and socio-economic locations. As we also saw in the source chapter, this effect is not limited to content. Therefore, an 'N' indicates this observed *neutralizing* effect in the interaction of the media and individual attribute. Alternatively, an "E" denotes the *exacerbating* effects of media on particular attributes in which both groups of SES/SPP are pushed further into disparity. As we saw, low content media tended to aggravate differences between individuals defined by particular sets of socio-political predispositions and socio-economic locations. This difference was also present in the source chapter across the competing effects of domestic and international media. Finally, an 'R' represents a disordinal effect of interaction. That is, the effect *reverses* its direction due to the interactive nature of the component variables. While less frequent, this effect occurs frequently enough to override dismal.[40]

The second is an approach of understanding these media effects across the chosen indicators of political and economic attitudes (i.e. the dependent variables). This approach differentiates between the media effects on specifically political attitudes and specifically economic attitudes. That is, are media better (or worse) at influencing different attitudes in different countries and if so, how? From the empirical results presented in the above analysis, would we be able to determine a pattern of media consumption that suggested the basis for effects across media, variation due to content, or

[40] Adding yet another dimension to the information provided in these tables this designation may capture some of the most interesting effects of media in democratizing countries suggestive of media as a cross-cutting cleavage or sorts that assuages (or aggravates) attitudinal divisions between socio-economic groups.

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even differences across domestic and international sources? Organizing an analysis along this division also serves to confirm or undermine the *observational* argument that media consumption of distal events, that is the second-hand participation in large political and economic phenomena, are relevant to political socialization.

These two approaches are relevant to understanding the effects of media at an individual-level in democratizing countries. In this chapter, however, we approach the media effects across the cases, differentiated by degrees of media institutional reform, liberalization, and political involvement. Therefore, I summarize the effects of media by country so that correlating them with measures of media reform, we can not only test the theory of media dependency but also posit preliminary hypotheses about the relationship between a country's progress in reforming its media institutions and the effects at the individual level. This will include tests incorporating the two approaches, although each suggests a diversity of future research, a preliminary analysis is presented here. In doing so, we can develop the foundation for a multi-level argument of the process of democratization and the role of mass media in political socialization.

The intent behind ranking these Central and Eastern European countries by the level of their media institutional reform is to replace country names with variables (Przeworski and Teune 1970). That is, to identify macro-level characteristics which have viable theoretical consideration, in this case, the level of institutional progress away from state-dominated media toward a liberalized media market. Our expectations are roughly that as we progress from lower ranked countries, countries that have made fewer and weaker strides toward media liberalization, to higher ranked countries, we anticipate finding patterns of recognizable, that is western, media effects. The former group should manifest

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a distinctive pattern of effects across countries "deep" in transition while the latter reflect countries that have reformed themselves into the more familiar patterns of individual-level media effects.

Television:

The first examination is among these countries as they are ranked as to their television reform. From above, from least to most, the progression is Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, and finally the Czech Republic.

When compared to the basic usage and preferential consumption of television, there is little instructional information to be found (see Table 6).

<Table 6 about here>

This is not surprising. As noted in the chapters above, television is a complex medium and deriving easily identifiable effects from general consumption was unlikely. The number and direction of effects neither lend themselves to a coherent pattern across these rankings nor across political attitudes and economic evaluations. This is no reason to despair as the more theoretically precise television variables below shed more light on this multi-level relationship.

Examining the ranked countries by the individual-level usage of content (of television), we see a more coherent picture. Remember that there were two interesting findings in the content chapter above. The observed differences between information- and distraction-seeking (high and news content consumption and entertainment consumption, respectively) did not present a general solution but a conditional one, depending on *who* was watching what. For high content and news, for higher SES/SPP groups there was a generally positive effect and less so for lower SES/SPP groups. It was also noted that for

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the former, information-seeking combated the negative influence of social communication underscoring the use of competing information sources. What we see here is that this effect occurs predominantly in the higher ranked countries.

What does that mean? It would seem that in countries with more consolidated media institutions, high content and news do serve as alternative sources of information and play a relevant role in individuals' political attitudes and economic evaluations. For lower ranked countries, these effects do not emerge coherently, but what does emerge informs us on the second interesting finding from above.

Above we found that *who* was using low content was significant in that low content tended to make the differences between higher and lower SES/SPP groups more significant. What the ranking of media institutional reform brings to light is that low content use and preferences drive disparate SES groups' economic evaluations farther apart, if not exclusively, then certainly more pronouncedly, in the lower ranked countries.

First of all, it is mostly individuals' economic evaluations that suffer from this and secondly, in countries that have made little progress toward media liberalization, the traditional determinants of individuals' structural location on economic evaluations are exacerbated by the consumption of low content, that is, the media consumption habit of distraction-seeking. Taken together, these findings of differences not only among media consumption but also between the SES/SPP groups of higher and lower ranked countries, suggests that in the midst of the transition period, media play a deleterious role for those who engage in television consumption in a manner of seeking out distraction from the ongoing transition. At the same time, for the countries that are nearing completed television reform, not only does low content wane in its influence but high content and

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news exert a more salient, and positive, role in the information-seeking process. In addressing the macro-level consideration, television not only exerts different effects on citizens with different sets of SES/SPP, but also reflects the national-level level of institutional reform in its role in the political socialization process of individuals.

The most compelling finding of the source and content analysis (international vs. domestic sources of news and entertainment) is the cross-nationally consistent and positive effect of entertainment, particularly from international sources. Again, while hypothesizing about competing theories (the positive effect of international sources and the negative effect of low content), it is beneficial to recall the media as culture argument. Where media are widely dispersed and consumed, they influence the expectations of individuals, the understanding of the world outside individuals' immediate experiences, and reinforce cultural norms. Preceding the effects of specific media manipulations, media play a broad but salient role in defining citizens' perceptions and therefore conceptualizations of reality. What we see is that even in low content, values, norms, and cultural accoutrements are embedded and subsequently transmitting to audience members. While this flies in the face of our understanding of low content, it lends some evidence for the contributory role of international media in the process of political socialization, despite the level of media institutional reform. It seems that international entertainment is the primary conduit of diffusion.

Aside from individuals' *patterns* of media use, this finding suggests that the media institutional reform process illuminates the fluidity of the television environment and how the shift toward media liberalization changes the impact of media on audience

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members in conjunction with their SES/SPP profiles. In short, how media and democratization differs from media and democracy.

Continuing the analysis of source, international and domestic sources of television only hint at a cross-national effect. Simply, those countries at the lower rankings show positive correlations with all television use, regardless of source. For example, despite the limitations to international media penetration into Bulgaria and Romania, we still see international media effects. At a higher reform level, albeit not much greater, we see the separation associated with international and domestic sources. Again, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the shift toward more positive correlations with international broadcasts supports the diffusion hypothesis while negative correlations are not a necessary component of this argument. However, these rankings represent only a comparative metric useful for the analysis here and do not make the argument that these countries had arrived at political and economic consolidation. International companies looking to expand into Bulgaria, Romania, and to some degree Slovakia,[41] were often either unwilling, as a matter of excessive economic risk, or unable, as a matter of political ability, to effectively enter these markets until a minimum level of market and technological security could be established. At this time in these lower ranked countries, the television markets provided rocky soil which international broadcasters found difficult to cultivate, unlike the media environments in higher ranked countries. This, in turn, limited broadcasts, access, and therefore, audience exposure. Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to argue that, in congruence with what we found in the last chapter, that international media are efficacious and to some degree *favor* countries with more advanced levels of domestic media institutional reform.

[41] Despite the residual institutional reform from its former nation-mate.

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Newspaper:

As described above, the liberalization of print was more removed from political wrangling and subject to independent effects yet the process was neither instantaneous nor uniform. Therefore, the rankings for newspaper reform shift to a new rank order, from low to high: Bulgaria and Romania and Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. In Table 7, we can see this order imposed on the observed individual-level effects.

<Table 7 about here>

First, newspaper usage, as an independent effect, was at all stages of reform uniformly positive. Newspaper consumption, as a media consumption choice and one related to information-seeking, exerts a positive influence. This is seconded by the Attention Index which incorporated newspaper consumption in conjunction with television news consumption. As before in both the chapters above and the high content television discussion, high content generally benefited higher SES/SPP groups; yet, as we see here, a more complex tapping of individuals' information-seeking demonstrates the subtle influence of individuals' media choices.

As an interaction variable, newspaper more frequently emerges in the higher ranked countries. This suggests two things. One, like above, there is a more pronounced search and subsequent influence of "informational" media in the higher ranked countries. As in the television content debate, various groups in higher ranked countries benefited from newspaper consumption, the socially communicative improving their attitudes and the politically interested increasing theirs. Two, this may be a function of higher quality newspapers. Newspaper reform, as discussed above, was not only limiting the influence

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of political parties and entities but also the fomenting of objective, effective reporting. Given the lower cost of newspaper publication (in contrast to television), there were increasing outlets for committed journalists and reporters, creating an atmosphere of relative journalistic freedom. This mutli-level examination highlights these relationships between individuals' media choices and the macro-level effects of reform.

Finally, the preponderance of newspaper effects emerges not only in the higher ranked countries, but also among the dependent variables institutional trust and sociotropic economic evaluations. Newspapers, as a medium of information, are better at relaying this information about distant political and economic phenomena. Information-seeking, in this case through newspaper consumption, is linked once again to the *observational* power of media, providing involvement with events beyond individuals' immediate, personal experience.

Radio:

The ranking of the reform process on radio looks much more like television as these processes were often undertaken simultaneously. From low to high: Romania and Slovakia, Bulgaria and Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. As such, the micro-level effects of radio are provocative and at the same time almost completely unrelated to the macro-level reform process.

<Table 8 about here>

In Table 8, we see that individuals' broad consumption of radio is in every instance positive. At the same time, the usage does not discriminate between political attitudes and economic evaluations, and to a certain extent, between the levels of institutional reform. This is the most straightforward, clearly interpretable effect in this inquiry. Radio, despite

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the user, attitude or evaluation, or geographical location, positively contributes to the process of political socialization. Rather than bemoaning the lack of cross-national differences, we should be excited to find a media effect that both confounds (or highlights the lack of) previous theory and is so consistently effectual. Although there is a slight tendency toward a higher frequency of significances in the higher ranked countries, it is not overwhelming or lopsided as some of the other media have shown. We must recall that Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia each suffered from technological and political impediments to generating national radio, most likely serving as the limitation to radio effects rather than a discriminating choice between these countries.[42] Additionally, considering the network or overlapping regional radio broadcasts, radio emerged as a significant variable simply because regional radio was not state radio (regardless of its content).

The delineation between domestic and international sources of radio adds little nuance to the observed effects. Although there are a few interactions, they do not reinforce the necessity of distinguishing between sources. Despite the long historical relationship between CEE citizens' radio use and efforts to encourage democratization in the region, radio usage's positive effects are more likely related to individuals' residual trust of that particular media. Simply, regardless of what comes out of the speakers, radio was a medium of freedom.

It is important to include one final observation from the macro-level analysis. For countries with low rankings, we find that 70% of the interactions involve SES variables

[42] This analysis helps explain what we see and underscore the relationship between levels. The cross-national approach not only informs us on media institutional reform but also practical issues of access and ability as implicit in the media institutional reform rankings is the ability to broadcast or print as independent media.

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(more than double the number of SPP interactions) and for the higher ranked countries, the interactions are almost evenly split between SES and SPP. This is significant for two reasons.

One, surveying the entire inquiry, although media and the traditional determinants of political attitudes and economic evaluations compete to be the strongest influence, for the citizens of the lower ranked countries, structural constraints exert stronger effects not only as independent variables but also as interactions. This suggests that media serve to reinforce these divisions between SES groups for countries at low levels of media institutional reform.[43] Essentially, the media consumption choices that members of different SES groups make further exacerbate the structural differences in the political socialization process. That is, media overlaps with SES cleavages in such a way to strengthen attitudinal disparities between groups.

Second, for citizens in countries which have made more progress toward media institutional reform, these structural determinants recede slightly in the presence of individuals' socio-political predispositions, that is, individually-held socio-political attributes. Even more specifically, as the most common interactive SPP is social communication, this underlines the communicative and informational exchange of these citizens in conjunction with media usage. In more consolidated media environment, media become less of a cleavage and more an informational resource.

[43] As mentioned above briefly, in the consistently lowest ranked country, Bulgaria, ideological orientation is positively correlated with and omnipresent in Bulgarians' political attitudes and economic evaluations. This is not true for any other country and reflects the on-going ousting of the *de facto* one-party system that, until the year of these surveys, was still in place.

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Conclusion:

If we were to have the opportunity to examine a new region of democratizing countries, I would include the following information for the development of potential hypotheses of media in democratizing countries. Mass media, in conjunction with individuals' structural location and socio-political predispositions, support the process of political socialization based on their usage. During transition, if consumed in a manner of information-seeking, the audience member is likely to benefit, although members of higher socio-economic groups and more politically engaged socio-political predispositions are *more* likely to benefit, particularly as the media institutions near consolidation. The opposite intention of 'tuning out', or using media as distraction-seeking, is particularly deleterious to members of lower socio-economic groups.

Secondly, it is not necessary for international media to be overtly informational. By broadcasting into the region, and by virtue of the implicit norms and values embedded in all types of programming, international media cultivate political attitudes and economic evaluations consistent with political socialization. The same can be said of radio, although this effect is slightly contingent on the level of institutional preparedness. Finally, newspapers are effective means for individuals to vicariously participate in political and economic events beyond their immediate environments. Print media provide the most consistently positive effect on individuals' assessment of 'distant' political and economic phenomena.

However, confounding our study of media dependency is that countries with low levels of media institutional reform (most often Bulgaria and Romania, and occasionally Slovakia, whose early start in reform was stunted by the Velvet Divorce and subsequent

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repressive Mečiar regime) are also countries that had continued to struggle with democratization. Legislative foot-dragging, high barriers to market entry for both international and non-state domestic groups, and enduring political influence were not exceptional to the media institutional reform process but to nearly all institutional reform efforts. Conversely, even in the mid-1990's, the countries with the more developed media environments, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and occasionally Poland, were making large strides in transition toward political democracy and market economies.

It is methodologically problematic to assert that these media reform rankings are a process unaffected by the concurrent political and economic liberalization. While the examination here provides some initial insight as to media's role, media institutional reform correlates well with countries' political/economic development. As one example, the press freedom rating by Freedom House demonstrate this difficulty in separating these processes as the Freedom House's Press Freedom index and their Political Freedom ratings scores correlate at 0.9037 (see Table 9), making attempts to delineate among the competing macro-level processes statistically problematic to disentangle.

<Table 9 about here>

This is true of the other media as well.[44] While contemporaneous, given what this chapter has presented, these simultaneous reform processes do not limit our ability to make the assertion that the media institutional reform processes are involved. However, for Central and Eastern Europe, although these disparate efforts at political, economic, and media reform were undertaken in tandem with one another, given the components of these rankings it is not untenable to argue a multi-level process.

[44] The negative correlation with my rankings has to do with Freedom House's 'reverse' scoring.

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To what extent then can we assert a multi-level process? This analysis is an initial look at the relationship between fluid and varied media environments and the effects that the accompanying media exert on individuals. It further allows us to make a preliminary examination of two interesting aspects of media and democratization. One, the varying stages of institutional reform allows us to replace country names with theoretically substantive variables. Although limited to a single geo-political region, in this intra-regional study, these countries represent a range in legislative, technological, and political media reform, that is, stages of media reform. Methodologically reminiscent of cohort analysis, linking this macro-level process to observed effects at the micro-level begins the task of identifying relevant variables within the media institutional reform process that characterize 'immature' democratic media moving toward 'mature' democratic media.

Two, taking advantage of the cross-national variation, the changes across the associated micro-level findings, however, allow us to make a small gain in developing media dependency theory. From either end of the media dependency argument, we cannot say that individuals are more or less reliant on media. What we can say is that the effects that we have seen vary across these countries in such a manner that suggests not only a reliance on media but a differential reliance on media. Distraction-seeking by low SES/SPP in early stages of transition and media reform detract from those individuals' political attitudes and economic evaluations, particularly the latter. At later periods, information-seeking is both generally beneficial to most groups and particularly beneficial to upper SES/SPP groups. Both combine to present support for information-seeking as a positive effect on the process of political socialization during transition. As Almond and Verba (1963) accept the 'democratic citizen' hypothesis that citizens must

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be informed and actively engaged (Lasswell's 'democrat'). It is encouraging to discover that information-seeking, as a media consumption behavior, and social communication, as a personal attribute, respectively, are reflected in individuals' political behavior in countries transitioning to democracy.

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Tables and Figures:

Table 1: Level of Mass Media Institutional Reform:

		Legislative Media Reform		
		Low	*Medium*	*High*
Political Influence	*High*	1	2	3
	Medium	2	3	4
	Low	3	4	5

Table 2: Television Rankings:

	Television		
	Legislative Media Reform	*Political Involvement*	*Score*
Bulgaria	Low	High	1
Czech Republic	High	Low	5
Hungary	Medium	Medium	3
Poland	Medium	Medium	3
Romania	Medium	High	2
Slovakia	Medium	High	2

Table 3: Radio Rankings:

	Radio		
	Legislative Media Reform	*Political Involvement*	*Score*
Bulgaria	Medium	Medium	3
Czech Republic	High	Low	5
Hungary	Medium	Low	4
Poland	Medium	Medium	3
Romania	Low	Medium	2
Slovakia	Medium	High	2

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Table 4: Print Media Rankings:

	Newspaper	
	Freedom House	*Score*
Bulgaria	44	2
Czech Republic	19	5
Hungary	34	3
Poland	27	4
Romania	47	2
Slovakia	49	2

Table 5: Summed Rankings for Media Institutional Reform in CEE:

	Television			**Radio**			**Newspaper**	
	LMR	*PI*	***Score***	*LMR*	*PI*	***Score***	*FH*	***Score***
Bulgaria	Low	High	**1**	Medium	Medium	**3**	44	**2**
Czech Republic	High	Low	**5**	High	Low	**5**	19	**5**
Hungary	Medium	Medium	**3**	Medium	Low	**4**	34	**3**
Poland	Medium	Medium	**3**	Medium	Medium	**3**	27	**4**
Romania	Medium	High	**2**	Low	Medium	**2**	47	**2**
Slovakia	Medium	High	**2**	Medium	High	**2**	49	**2**

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Table 6: Aggregate Micro-level Mass Media Effects: Television (by ranking, regardless of Dependent Variable):

		Bulgaria	Romania	Slovakia	Hungary	Poland	Czech Republic
	RANK	**1**	**2**	**2**	**3**	**3**	**5**
Medium	*Direct Effects*	(-) Preference	(+) Usage	(+) Preference	(+) Usage		(-) Usage
	Interactive Effects	(+) Urbanity^{R}		(+) Preference* Income^{E}	(-) Urbanity^{N}		(+) Urbanity^{N}
Content	*Direct Effects*	(+) Attention Index	(+) Attention Index (x2) (+) News Preference (-) News Usage (x2)	(+) High Content (-) News	n/a	(+) Attention Index (x2) (+) Ignore Index (x2) (-) Entertainment Preference	(+) Attention Index (-) Entertainment
	Interactive Effects	(-) Enteratinment *Education^{N} (-) Entertainment *Age^{E}	(+) Entertainment * Political Int^{E} (x2) (-) News * Income	(+) News Preference* Age^{E} (+) Entertainment *Ideological Orientation^{R} (-) News Preference* Income^{R}	n/a	(+) Entertainment *Income^{E} (+) News* SocComm^{N} (+) News Preference* SocComm^{N} (-) Entertainment Preference*SocComm^{R}	(+) News* Social Communication^{R}
Source	*Direct Effects*	(+) International Entertainment	(+) International (x2) (+) International Entertainment	(+) Domestic Usage (x3) (+) International Preference (+) Domestic Entertainment	(+) Domestic Usage (-) Domestic Preference (x2)	(+) Domestic News (+) International Entertainment (-) International News	(+) International News (-) Domestic Entertainment (-) Domestic News
	Interactive Effects	(+) International Entertainment* SocComm.^{R}	(-) Domestic News*Education^{R} (-) Domestic News*Income^{N}		(-) International * Urbanity^{N}	(+) Int'l*Education^{E} (+) Domestic News* SocComm^{N} (+) International News* SocComm^{N}	(+) International Entertainment* Income^{E} (-) Domestic News*Age^{N}

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Table 7: Aggregate Micro-level Mass Media Effects: Newspaper (by ranking, regardless of Dependent Variable):

		Bulgaria	Romania	Slovakia		Hungary		Poland		Czech Republic
	RANK	**2**	**2**	**2**		**3**		**4**		**5**
Medium	*Direct Effects*		(-) Preference (+) Usage			(+) Usage (x2)		(+) Usage		
	Interactive Effects			(-) Preference* Income^{E}		(+) Urbanity^{R}		(+) Preference* Political Interest^{E} (+) Preference* Education^{E} (+) Usage* SocComm.^{N}		(-) Age^{R}
Content	*Direct Effects*	(+) Attention Index	(+) Attention Index (x2)			n/a		(+) Attention Index (x2)		(+) Attention Index
	Interactive Effects									

Table 8: Aggregate Micro-level Mass Media Effects: Radio (by ranking, regardless of Dependent Variable):

Radio		Romania	Slovakia		Bulgaria	Poland		Hungary		Czech Republic
	RANK	**2**	**2**		**3**	**3**		**4**		**5**
Medium	*Direct Effects*		(+) Usage			(+) Usage		(+) Usage (x3)		(+) Usage (x2)
	Interactive Effects		(+) Income^{E}							
Source	*Direct Effects*				(+) International					
	Interactive Effects		(-) Domestic* Political Interest^{N}		(+) International *Education^{E} (-) International *Urbanity^{E}	(+) Domestic Radio* SocComm^{R}				

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Table 9: Freedom House Press and Political Ratings:

	Freedom House Ratings (average)[45]	**Television Ranking**	**Radio Ranking**	**Newspaper**	
				Ranking	*FH ranking*
Bulgaria	2.5	**1**	**3**	**2**	44
Czech Republic	1.5	**5**	**5**	**5**	19
Hungary	1.5	**3**	**4**	**3**	34
Poland	1.5	**3**	**3**	**4**	27
Romania	2.5	**2**	**2**	**2**	47
Slovakia	3	**2**	**2**	**2**	49
Correlation		*-0.73422*	*-0.79373*	*-0.8327*	*0.9037*

[45] Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for political rights and for civil liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated "free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 "partly free," and between 5.5 and 7.0 "not free."

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Chapter 9: Conclusion

Mass media do have a significant role in the process of political socialization in the countries undergoing democratization. Their role is defining the reality of transition, providing a means to observe the political process from afar, and allowing some to participate vicariously and others to escape. During these tumultuous periods of change, individuals use media to both inform and distract themselves, to 'tune in' and 'tune out'. This inquiry has identified coherent patterns of media influence that depend on the attributes of individuals and the development of the media institutions themselves. Therefore, to conclude this study, let us confront the evidence and seek to explain what it is that we have found. The end of the last chapter summarized and contextualized the micro-level findings, highlighting not only the effects at the individual-level but also placing those findings in the framework of shifting media environments. I restate these findings here.

The basic consumption of television, as a media choice, is rather inconclusive and unrelated to the cross-national progress of media reform. High content television consumption, including news, exerted the hypothesized effect on individuals, particularly for higher SES/SPP group members. This effect also took place more often in countries that had made progress away from state-dominated media. Low content had a separating effect. That is, higher SES/SPP group members seemed to respond to low content consumption in a counter-hypothesized manner, generally increasing the level of their political attitudes and economic evaluations. However, for lower SES/SPP group members, low content exerted its hypothesized, that is, negative, effect on these attitudes and evaluations, particularly the latter. For countries that had made little progress in

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media institutional reform, this separating effect was more pronounced. It seems that the pattern of distraction-seeking was most harmful to the political attitudes and economic evaluations of the least advantaged groups of transition.

Therefore, with regard to the effect of television content, the observed effects demonstrate that the effects of individuals' content choices on their political socialization are not only a matter of choosing between low and high content programming, but also predicated on individuals' structural location, socio-political predispositions, and the level of media institutional reform in the countries of which they are citizens. Depending on the particular constellation of these variables, the use of low and high content can be beneficial or detrimental to the process of political socialization.

In the period following transition, international television is important. However, it is international entertainment that is the primary conduit of diffusion. Unlike the competing effects of low and high content that we saw above, the choice to consume international entertainment contributes to the process of political socialization, although slightly more effectively in countries in which media institutional reform has progressed.

For newspaper consumption, we find a generally positive effect and a more pronounced effect as an interaction in countries with higher levels of media reform. This medium choice not only taps an information-seeking intention but also is an effective medium in conveying 'distant' political and economic phenomena. Radio provided the simplest media effect. Although slightly favoring more institutionally developed countries, radio was a positive effect regardless of SES, SPP, political attitude, or economic evaluation.

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Finally, citizens of countries with lower levels of media institutional reform were more likely to derive political attitudes and economic evaluations from structural determinants and media choices tended to exacerbate rather than mitigate differences in the levels of political attitudes and economic evaluations between higher and lower SES group members. While citizens in higher institutionalized countries tended not only to rely on less structural constraints (SES) and more on socio-political predispositions but also benefit from using media in an information-seeking manner.[1]

In sum, the results suggest that countries do resemble more western modes of media effects in some ways as they move from low levels of media institutional reform, that is, through the stages of media liberalization, to higher levels. Newspaper and television increasingly take on familiar effects. However, the presence of radio as a significant media variables and effect of low content, international low content in particular, demonstrate important theoretical deviations. Secondly, with the inclusion of individuals' SES and SPP profiles, we find that media push and pull in different directions. For countries in transition, these differences reinforced the divide between higher and lower groups while countries closer to consolidation evidenced a move toward information-seeking and fewer negative effects among media consumers. Therefore, although this progression is generally toward what we recognize, during the process of transition and institutional reform, media effects on the process of political socialization seem to mutate in accordance with both individual-level constraints and national-level changes.

[1] This resonates with other contributions to the study of the development of political attitudes in CEE. Evans and Whitefield (1995) have argued that while the first generation of 'new democrats' derives much of their assessment of the performance of political institutions from their assessment of economic evaluations; second, or later, generations are able to make these evaluative distinctions based on institutional performance. This demonstrates a development of a more complex political orientation.

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Political Socialization, Democratization, and Mass Media:

How does this inquiry inform us on political socialization, democratization, and mass media? This is an inquiry into the sociological process that is thrust upon the people in countries attempting to liberalize both their political institutions and economies. The impetus for attitudinal change is rarely a singular event but rather the exposure to, the propensity toward, and desire for a new orientation to politics and political phenomena. Relying on structural locations as a predetermined likelihood of citizens' ability to adapt to new political, social, and economic realities is useful only in conjunction with our understanding of these same citizens' behaviors related to attitudinal adaptation. Direct participation in political events and meaningful confrontations with political actors are effective means of augmenting an individual's adaptive behavior. Yet, these events, for the larger population, are few and far between. Only media provide a constant, pervasive, and omnipresent exposure to the 'events of the day'. Citizens' choices to engage (or disengage from) these vicarious political experiences signal their behaviors related to attitudinal socialization. Therefore this examination of the political socialization process in countries transitioning to democracy makes two substantive contributions to the literature on political socialization in democratizing countries and the mass media.

In regards to the first, the process of political socialization is complemented and often enhanced by individuals' observation of the process of transition. As a one-step-removed means of participation in the new order, the consumption of media provides access to information, values, and concrete political, economic, and social phenomena beyond the often limited personal experiences of individuals. Observation serves as individuals'

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means not only to see, hear, and read about democratization but also to contextualize themselves and their experiences in the 'larger world'.

In this inquiry, two of the dependent variables represented political and economic phenomena that required citizens to 'tune in' as rarely would their daily routines include direct contact with either. Both institutional trust, an index of the level of confidence individuals' had in the performance of several governmental branches, and individuals' sociotropic economic evaluation, an assessment of the performance of the national economy, tapped individuals' perceptions of processes large and 'far away'. These two claimed the lion's share of the observed effects underscoring the observational role of mass media.

Even for the residents of Sofia, Bucharest, Budapest, Bratislava, Prague, and Warsaw, the events unfolding were often out of the reach of their direct experience. Aside from voting, participation in political activities, and personal actions that included confronting the new government (applications, petitions, etc…), CEE's citizens' daily lives were in many ways isolated from the transition and thereby excluded from direct participation in the reform process. The new regime and economy was 'participated' in by common citizens only vicariously.[2] This impacts the second contribution.

As to the second contribution, to the mass media literature, we find clear support for a pattern of information-seeking that contributes to the process of political socialization in democratizing countries; and that this individual pattern of media use is noticeably scarcer in the earlier stages of reform, hindering the process of political socialization.

[2] This inquiry has provided evidence that media, particularly newspapers, were the best means for observation. They were followed by radio, and finally television, of which the complexity makes its consumption conditionally influential.

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What is information-seeking? Information-seeking is a political behavior and political choice an individual in a democratizing country makes to use mass media in such a way that it suggests an interest in the political, economic, and social events *du jour*. Unlike the West, for countries undergoing transition, these daily events embody the struggles of the citizenry, thereby heightening its relevance to their orientation to politics. Information-seeking is thereby not simply an individuals' consumption pattern of media but also a political behavior. This links mass media with the individual-level process associated with countries' democratization.

In this inquiry, I have delineated between media and their content as a means to information-seeking: e.g. newspapers are information rich while television, in general, is information poor; news content is information rich while entertainment content is information poor. Individually, in conjunction with individuals' SES and SPP, and even in conjunction with each other (the 'Attention' Index), these information media variables have provided the empirical basis for making the claim that individuals' choices to use these media and these content generally exhibit higher levels of political attitudes and economic evaluations. That is, during periods of democratization, information-seeking is good for the political socialization process.

This is particularly true for the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, and within these countries more so for citizens with higher SES profiles. This is less true for Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. This cross-national distinction rests on the extent to which these countries have been able to achieve a degree of media institutional reform, particularly as it relates to the residual political influence of the former Communist

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government (for Slovakia, it was the rise of the nationalistic, xenophobic Mečiar government).

For these institutional laggards, information-seeking as a contributory media choice was less frequent; however, distraction-seeking, the other media choice, exerted a negative influence on those least advantaged in the process of political socialization. Distraction-seeking, or 'tuning out', not only had a negative influence on individuals' political attitudes and economic attitudes, but further disadvantaged lower SES and SPP groups. Conceptualizing this media choice as *non*-information-seeking, the argument for the information-seeking process is bolstered.

A combination of the observational component of political socialization and the political behavioral choice of information-seeking suggest a pattern in which individuals' media use, their structural location and socio-political predispositions, and national-level differences can be integrated into preliminary components of a theory of mass media and democratization.

A Theory of Mass Media and Democratization:

"The gap between theory and practice has turned the media into one of the many yet unresolved problem of transition" (Jakubowicz, 1998/9, 2). The study of mass media in non-Western democracies is limited not only by the lack of data and theory, but also but scholars' lingering western-centric orientation to understanding mass media. Coman (2000, 49) argues that for a theory of mass media in transitional societies, a new theory of mass media must answer the following questions:

- What *is* the area of study and does this area allow us to make valid generalizations about mass media in transition?
- What are the characteristics of the initial and even final stages of this process?
- Is there theory that allows us to understand the whole process?

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To the first, I would argue that viewing this as a regional study is rather uninformative, but defining by experience, that is democratization, lends the theoretical debates and analytical findings a firmer basis from which to develop. This is not only a study of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, it is a study of mass media in a non-Western setting. Although we have seen some tentative patterns emerge, it also suggests is that a single theory of mass media and democratization is unlikely to bear much fruit. The intra-regional disparities among the CEE countries, while empirically interesting, are limited to a (albeit broader) European context. The development of a coherent theory to represent democratization is limited by the number of substantively varied geo-political contexts: Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, Central Asia, and China, to name but a few. Yet, democratization is central to current international political debates and our insight into this process must be generated through an arduous process of examination and re-examination.

In addition, for students of democratization, the units of analysis are substantively different. The transformation of individuals that accompanies a profound re-ordering of their social and political worlds is subject to a myriad of influences. As democratic politics is more likely to flourish with an engaged citizenry, the development of individual-level qualities in the immediate period following a transition is not a casual concern but an imperative. Media institutions as well are fluid and fragile, subject to the ebb and flow of political and economic contestation. Simply, for countries in transition, audience members and the media themselves resemble but are not replicas of the Western standards.

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Answering the second question has been a lingering question in the democratization literature (the 'consolidation' question) and is unlikely to receive a satisfactory answer (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Nonetheless, I took advantage of the cross-national differences to make claims about media institutional differences. This inquiry has given some credence to the notion that there are not only distinguishable 'stages' of media institutional reform but also that these stages represent different contexts in which individuals' media choices and use contribute or detract from the process of political socialization.

As straightforward as identifying the 'beginning' of media reform in countries transition might seem to be, we have seen the evidence that, not unlike their political and economic counterparts, some aspects of these countries' media institutional reform had a 'head start' in the pre-transition period (Hungary, the Czech Republic) while others continued to struggle with the technological, political, and legislative disentanglement well into the period of transition (Bulgaria and Romania). Similarly, identifying the 'end' is to appeal to the normative: when are media institutions sufficiently 'free'? Given these conceptual difficulties, can we identify the intervening stages? Are we able to conceptualize media institutional reform like the political and economic transformations, a series of nodes on a continuum of liberalization, on different paths to the same place, or on different paths to different destinations? These are questions that require examination as both the political and economic transition literatures have received. However, only multiple, cross-temporal case-studies are more likely to aid our ability to demarcate 'stages' and the accompanying evidence as to the role of mass media.

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In response to the final question, there is theory that can aid our understanding of mass media in democratizing countries but it must continue to originate from the analyses of regions in transition rather than the preconceived and export-limited Western-centric viewpoints. Coman (2000, 54) answers his own question here stating that what we have witnessed has not created a new model of mass media but rather is a mixture of known paradigms. To more fully develop theoretical distinction, the study of the political effects of mass media must not only expand the regions of analysis but also extend the realm over which media are argued to influence individuals, broadening studies to include not merely a handful of political actions but also political orientations, attitudes, and values that first, are more likely to be influenced and second, are often the determinants of political action (Iyengar and Simon 2000).

Normative Implications:

Others have voiced arguments suggesting that not only have we been unable to generate meaningful and substantive findings from the processes of media reform in countries transitioning to democracy, but that mass media have acted as a deterrent to democratization (Mondak 2003). Mass media in CEE "…have largely failed to provide full representation of the people in media content, to generate dialogue among all groups in society and to enhance popular participation in problem definition and decision-making. It is for these reasons that they are part of the problem in post-Communist societies in transition" (Jakubowicz, 1998/9, 28).

From this inquiry, are we able to say that mass media has contributed to the process of political socialization, to countries in the liminal space between distinct political regimes, to democratization? Mass media exert their influence not independently of

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individuals but because of individuals' choices. That is, mass media, like many large and small contributors to individuals' re-orientation to a new political and economic order, are a means to attitudinal change. This undermines political science's appeal to the *causal* rather than the merely correlated. However, I argue that mass media represent political choices. Choosing to observe, choosing to disengage, choosing to 'tune out' or 'tune in' are political choices with observable political consequences. That is to say, mass media can be manipulated, stunted, encouraged, developed, maintained, but the extent of their effects rest on the decision that individuals make in using them. That is the causal argument. Individuals engage in political choices in choosing what to watch, read, and listen to and these political choices in turn impact the subsequent process of political socialization. Mass media enable these choices.

We then return to the normative question, are mass media 'good' for democratization? Almond and Verba (1963) assert the 'democratic citizen' hypothesis that citizens must be informed and actively engaged (Lasswell's 'democrat'). That is, individual choices, media choices, beyond structural constraints beyond residual political attitudes *can* be good for democracy. From this inquiry, it is not unreasonable to argue that the observed media effects of information-seeking and observation reflect these. This, of course, is subject to the *ability* of media to provide these. And as we have seen here, this is not uniformly the case, as Bulgaria, Romania, and in many instances, Slovakia, countries that proved to be murky media environments, provided little political nourishment for individuals. It is this distinction that makes the study of mass media in democratizing countries informative, provocative, and distinct.

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Future Research Directions:

There are two fruitful avenues of research to further expand the analysis presented here. The first is to expand the number of regions in which mass media are studied including further analysis of effects on political attitudes and participation in non-western settings (see for example the work on China: Chan and Chin-Chuan 1991; Chan and Qiu 2001). In their review of media effects, Iyengar and Simon (2000) cite the limitations of the current body of political communications literature to methodologically uncover and identify the effects of media, particularly those associated with campaigns, on individuals' political participation, specifically the act of voting. Yet, even in this review, they myopically limit their concerns to the Western, specifically American, media environments. If these constitute the whole of media, the study of political communications will remain un-dynamic and uninteresting as scholars continue to pore over the minutiae in what we purport to know about media and democracy. They would benefit from appending the adjective "western" to "mass media" when describing the state of the field, as what we know about mass media is not much more than what we know about the rather idiosyncratic, and limited, western media.

The future of the field of political communication would develop into a wealth of theoretical and applied knowledge through expanding our inquiries into regions of non-western democracies, countries attempting democratization, and regions of other political orders. While certainly less data-rich, and thereby more difficult for scholars to collect information and ultimately make sense of what is found (particularly for the intellectually sedentary), this avenue of research should not be left to area-specialists and lone

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comparativists and is more likely to develop our understanding of the role of media as a political actor.

This approach also includes expanding the methodological approaches in the examination of mass media in non-western settings. I further suggest expanding the approaches to generating information. One way is to complement the media effects studies by breaking down the components of the media themselves. In doing so, this allows for the introduction of more sophisticated media theories to be tested (such as agenda-setting, framing). Albeit a piecemeal approach, concerted efforts would bring new insight into the common and nation-specific role of mass media. Another way is to collaborate in efforts toward an experimental research program. In order to more finely test audience responses, this type of research benefits from more sophisticated measurement of responses, both observed and psychometric. The largest contribution would be that research in this area examines media's claim of causality.

The second substantive research direction would be to take heed of what we are slowly beginning to discover about mass media in countries in transition and new democracies. I see two distinct research questions that complement this inquiry and expand our understanding of the process of political socialization, democratization, and mass media.

One is the examination of the media 'cleavage effect'. As we saw above, individuals' media consumption choice often overlapped SES or SPP distinctions in such a manner as to exacerbate the disparity between members of these groups' levels of political attitudes and economic evaluations.[3] As societies are comprised of several strata of groups,

[3] As an example, Figure 8a from the Content chapter. Higher income Poles have higher sociotropic economic evaluations than lower income Poles. Introducing their media consumption of low content, the

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delineated from one another as to the degree they are engaged in the democratic political order. Future inquiries could investigate whether media, as one component of a free and plural democratic society, can be held responsible to some degree for reinforcing these strata or cutting across the populations of these groups to more widely engage new democrats. Therefore, do media contribute to the development of an active citizenry or do they impact individuals differently, empowering some groups while disabling others? If we assume that a measure of political stratification is a mixed bag of cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral differences; such as varying levels of political engagement; do media mitigate these inherent stratifications, or do they endow citizens differently, reinforcing these divisions? Normatively, we would prefer the former.

In the context of democratization, media studies have a great deal to contribute. Any unequal distribution of power has political consequences (Bendix and Lipset 1966; Wright 1985), and therefore, this examination of media is relevant to our understanding of the emergence of political stratification in new democracies as well. Implicit in media theories is the notion that individuals consume media differently and in doing so aid or inhibit their own political development. Differently endowed citizens explicitly stratify a polity, placing individuals in varying relationships to their governments and each other. Classic elite theorists, Pareto, Mosca, and Michels were in agreement over the idea that, within a society, people can be ranked by their share of an unequally distributed political good, primarily in their case, political sophistication and knowledge. Other authors have

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higher income group members see an *increase* of their evaluations while the lower income group members see a *decrease*. That is, this media consumption behavior overlaps with the income determinant, reinforcing or exacerbating the differences between these groups. (other examples include: in the Media and Frequency chapter: Figures 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c; in the Content Chapter, Figures 7b, 7c, 8c, 8d, 8e; in the Source chapter, Figures 7a, 7b). Of course, we have seen evidence of the opposite effect as well, media as a cross-cutting cleavage, mitigating differences between groups (examples include in the Media and Frequency chapter: Figures 1a, 2b; in the Content Chapter, Figures 9d, 9e; in the Source chapter, Figures 6c, 6f, 7e, 7f).

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similarly noted that the disproportionate distribution of political competence and efficacy functions as a cleavage, i.e. stratifies groups (Barnes and Kaase 1979, 15). Therefore, as democratization progresses, society may become stratified as individuals are differently endowed through the process of political socialization.

Political stratification as a measure of the disproportionate distribution of power in a society is related to media as there exists a reciprocal relationship between information and power (De Fluer and Ball-Rokeach 1982, 108). Therefore, media, as one of many means to differently endow citizens with democratic attitudes, can serve to either cross-cut or reinforce these divisions in society (*ibid.*, 92). The media's distribution of these endowments (as one mechanism through which individuals learn political norms) can potentially contribute to political inequality by providing groups differing levels of political information, engagement, and ultimately empowerment.

Theorists have argued that media can provide either a centrifugal (providing order, control, unity and cohesion: see Almond and Verba 1963; Rogers 1986) or a centripetal effect (change, freedom, diversity, and fragmentation: see Golding and Murdock 1986; Elliot 1982). However, the debate of whether there is fragmentation or imposition of an imaginary unity by media remains unresolved (Hall 1977). Yet even these distinctions are normatively varied. A centripetal effect encourages a multiplicity of viewpoints but also segments the audience, while a centrifugal effect provides unifying messages but tends toward a singular, collective comprehension of the world. Similarly, media have been argued to have either an integrative role, offering consensual values, ideas, and information (Deutch 1966; Graber 1993, 203), or it can reinforce sub-groups within society, deepening the delineation among citizens and endowing them with differing

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capabilities. Massification, or the unifying effects of mass media, is aimed at or employed as nation building, propaganda, and indoctrination (see Pool 1983; Brand 1987; McLuhan and Power 1989: Anderson 1991). The centrifugal force of media is also referred to as demassification, that is, a media effect that decentralizes or fragments the audience rather than unifying it. This effect is hypothesized to exist at both nodes of mass media, the democratization of transmission and the diversification of reception (see Ang 1991; Fiske and Hartley 1976).

This paradox is best expressed as McQuail: "…[M]ass media seem in principle to threaten social integration and also to be an antidote to the threat to integration from other social forces, such as mobility and rapid change" (1987, 88). Further, the rapid fragmentation of mass media is problematic as they do not serve as a unifier or disseminator of universal values (particularly in CEE, see Gross 2002, 143).

Normatively, for countries continuing to transition toward democracy, if media are mobilizing and integrative, democracy has benefited. If not, media may not only be hindering the process of transition but also undermining the long-term prospects of democracy in this region. Therefore, media's role in shaping new democrats' development of democratic attitudes may, instead of 'leveling the playing field', *reinforce* political stratification. This can be seen as anathema to the contributory role a free and plural press is assumed to have in a democracy. Political stratification occurs when groups (particularly lower SES) have a general lack of interest in politics and political activity and that non-democratic (more authoritarian) attitudes exist (Pateman 1970, 3); while, the correlation moves in an expected manner such that individuals with

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high SES are more sociable and more politically active (Milbrath 1960; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). As this correlates with media use, general patterns should emerge.

The second development would move the study of mass media beyond the substantive but narrow political attitudes and economic evaluations to more sophisticated political orientations, such as political efficacy, and observable political behavior. In addition to the assessment of new democratic institutions, attitudinal engagement includes a self-reported measures of efficacy. Almond and Verba premise much of their participant citizen on individual efficacy, or a "belief in one's competencies a key political attitude" (1963, 206-7). "The self-confident citizen appears to be the democratic citizen. Not only does he think he can participate, he thinks that others ought to as well. Likely to be a more active citizen, …the self-confident citizen is also likely to be the more satisfied and loyal citizen" (*ibid*., 207). Political efficacy provides individuals with the potential to act, a reserve of influence. Campbell *et al*. (1954, 187) defined efficacy as "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process" (see also Pateman 1970; Macpherson 1977). This potential to act allows for the power and responsiveness of democratic governance to continue (Almond and Verba 1963, 346).

Widely used in the American context, political efficacy has been bifurcated into internal and external efficacy (Balch 1974; Coleman and Davis 1976; Converse 1972),[4] the former related to feelings of political competence and the latter related to institutional trust or confidence in institutions. Related to these qualities are the qualities of political

[4] Internal efficacy is the beliefs about one's own competence to understand, and to participate effectively in politics. External efficacy is the feeling as to the responsiveness of governmental authorities and institutions to citizens' demands.

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trust, psychological involvement, and political participation. Again, media's expected influence on individuals' levels of self-reported efficacy is that the more time that is spent in diversion, the less efficacious one feels. Additionally, using media to inform oneself increase one's feelings of efficacy. As we have seen here, these media choices ebb and flow in the course of media institutional reform and differ among SES/SPP groups ultimately shaping the level of engagement in new democracies.

Political behavior is most clearly manifested in individuals' actions. The concern is whether citizens of new democracies are undergoing a transformation toward becoming engaged democratic citizens instead of simply espousing abstract tenets of democracy. Dahl argues that democracy provides the opportunities not only to develop a relationship with the government, but also individual qualities such as self-determination, acting in one's own interest, and responsibility (1989, 93). Therefore, his activity, communication, and attention are a sort of political capital he can draw from when he is compelled to, "…prepar[ing] the individual for intervention in the political system" (Almond and Verba 1963, 347) and creating a "… latent or potential source of political influence and activity" (*ibid*., 349).For countries undergoing transition to a democratic political order, the notion of individual political mobilization is not insignificant. This process has less to do with abstract or normative commitments to the new regime and more to do with individual development. A new political and social order demands socialization to new political norms, requiring learning not only the rules of the game but how these rules shape individuals' role in it. A new democratic political culture, one that does take practice, necessitates individuals to adopt new political attitudes and political behaviors.

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In sum, the unfortunate realization is that outside of the laboratory, media effects are difficult to identify and vary according to a multitude of individual-level, contextual, and institutional variables. Given that understanding the effects of media in an established democracy is difficult, the strength of media's influence, its directness in causation, and it saliency in understanding social and political phenomena is at best problematic. This is in some small way testing existing notions about media's influence on mass public's level of political engagement. Yet, it differs in that, as democratization places the preponderance of the burden on citizens to learn the norms of a new political culture, little is known about media's influence on political behavior in this context.

Conclusion:

This inquiry has been both ontological and etiological. The former belies the inductive nature of this inquiry. Are mass media a significant part of individuals' political socialization in countries transitioning to democracy? Is there substantive and provocative evidence that while re-orienting themselves to the new political, economic, and social realities in nascent democracies, individuals consume mass media in such a manner that affects their development of political attitudes and economic evaluations? This inquiry has provided evidence to suggest strong affirmative answers to these questions.

The latter informs our understanding of the process of political socialization, that is, what aspects of individuals' lives exert significant influence on this development. What are the sources of influence that aid in or hinder the re-orientation to new political and economic attitudes in democratizing countries? Combining the answers to both sets of

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questions, we arrive at the conclusion that individuals' consumption of mass media should be included in the array of influences of the political socialization process.

The study of mass media is an amalgamation of more narrow sub-fields of inquiry. At the most basic level, mass media are the instruments of communication and there are essentially two branches of inquiry. First is the study of the medium, the physical devices that govern the means of communicative distribution. There are two sub-fields in this branch of study. Scholars first study individuals' differential consumptive patterns of particular media and correlate this with differences in audience members' social and political engagement and the use of media as a resource or a distraction. The second is the study of the media themselves, their presentation, framing, content, and individuals' psychological (even physical) reaction to these various stimuli. This type of study includes the analysis of the variable impact on individuals across measurable dimensions of information, instructional, and/or entertainment content. Another type includes the more subtle patterns of audio and visual manipulation that shape audiences' reception and subsequent orientation to the presentation. At the core level, these research directions tap the central concern of the study of mass media. What do mass media do to individuals? Or more precisely, do mass media influence, shape, or mold individuals' perceptions of political, economic, and social phenomena? And if so, how?

The other branch of inquiry pursues questions related to the function of mass media as an institution. Scholars investigate the regulation of broadcasting, licensing, and administrative control over mass media. This avenue of research centers on the distance that the legislative (that is to say, political) process creates between the normative goal of a properly functioning, market based media environment and the observable media

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reality. Another branch examines the physical distribution systems, including the technological disparities between various media systems.

Undergirding both of these branches is the assumption that mass media play a role in defining the social and political realities of audience members. This role is uniformly assumed to be positive when mass media aspire to the principles of the market and are free of excessive political influence. Deviations from this, of course are not a matter of if, but to what degree.

This inquiry has sought to broaden the scope of media studies by examining the hypothesized effects of mass media on individuals' political and economic attitudes during the tumultuous period of democratic transition rather than in the established democracies of Western Europe and America. This line of inquiry is not topically different that the above research branches, but rather the units of analysis, while *similar,* are not equivalents of the units of analysis that provide the empirical bases for the above analyses. Although we identify the units of analysis in the same terms, the study of mass media in new democracies is fundamentally a new enterprise.

Although in reference to western media institutions, Iyengar and Simon remark (2000, 150), a broad swatch of media studies scholars imagine themselves as "deliberative democrats…[believing that] the health of democratic society depends on the quality of political communication".[5] This is relevant to this inquiry as well. Democratization opens our collective eyes to a wider range of media environments, stretching our continuum of mass media to include the initial stages of reform, the half-formed, the bastard, and the consolidated.

[5] Best set out by McQuail (1987) as democratic-participant theory.

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Media institutions, the political, social and economic environments of audience members, the even audience members themselves only resemble those on which media theory has been built and developed. This presents scholars with one of two options. One, assume away the differences and continue unabated by the essential differences. Or two, approach this topic inductively, seeking to not only bring media theory into broader application, but also to develop our understanding of media in non-western societies. The latter is of utmost importance given the international *zeitgeist* surrounding the potential for democratization in decidedly non-western settings. This burdens our research to be instructive and informative to an audience of those concerned with the fostering and cultivation of democracy outside the west.

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Curriculum Vitae
P. Matthew Loveless

Education:

Indiana University: Bloomington, IN. 2000-2005. *Doctor of Philosophy:* Political Science

University of Memphis. Memphis, TN. 1998-2000. *Master of Arts*: Political Science.

Rhodes College. Memphis, TN. 1995. *Secondary Teaching Certification*: Mathematics.

Auburn University. Auburn, AL. 1989-1993. B.S. *Business Administration - Marketing*.

Professional Experience:

August 2004 to the present:

Researcher: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES): Mannheim, Germany.

- **Research Team Leader**: Involved in creating a single data set of individual-level survey data from 26 countries to be used by EU scholars (the European Election Survey 2004).
    - Responsibilities include managing data sets of cross-national surveys, preparing them for distribution (including cleaning, weighting, and documentation), statistical consultation, and preparing uniform questionnaires and codebook.

August 2000 to August 2004:

Associate Instructor – Indiana University, Bloomington. Department of Political Science

- **Instructor**. *Quantitative Political Analysis*: Y395
    - Course for upper level undergraduates in statistical analysis and research design
- **Research Assistant**
    - Responsible for the design and maintenance of on-line, cross-national elite questionnaire
    - Participated in the data management, data coding and statistical analysis
- **Data Lab Assistant**.
    - Assist faculty and graduate students with information technology, locating data sources, and subsequent analytical support (including instruction of statistical software, data analysis, and interpretation).
- **Associate Instructor**.
    - Graduate teaching assistant for *West European Politics* and *American Politics.*

August 1999 to June 2000 and August 1995 to July 1996:

Teacher of English as a Second Language (ESL)/ Secondary

- *Jurisich Miklos Gimnázium*: Kőszeg, Hungary

August 1996 to July 1999:

Secondary-Level Teacher. Houston High School - Germantown, TN
Mathematics and Business courses. Tenure May 1999

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Publications:

Loveless, Matthew and Robert Rohrschneider. (*forthcoming*)"Attitudes toward European Integration in Central and Eastern Europe: An Experiential Argument" in Public Opinion and the EU in Eastern Europe. R. Rohrschneider and S. Whitefield (eds.). Berghahn Books.

Loveless, Matthew. 2004. "Public Opinion Surveys in Hungary" in Public Opinion and Polling around the World. John Greer (ed.). ABC-CLIO.

Conferences:

Loveless, Matthew. "The Diffusion Hypothesis: Exporting Democratic Values via International Media" to be presented at the 2005 Mid-West Political Science Annual Meeting. Chicago, IL: 7-10 April 2005.

Loveless, Matthew. "The High-Low Content Debate in Democratizing Countries: Central and Eastern Europe and the Development of Democratic Political Attitudes." presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Chicago, IL: 2-5 September 2004.

Loveless, Matthew and Robert Rohrschneider. "Attitudes toward European Integration in Central and Eastern Europe: An Experiential Argument" paper presented at the EU Conference, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN: 1-3 April 2004

Loveless, P. Matthew and T.K. Ahn. "Game Theory and Democratic Transitions: Modeling and Theoretic Re-considerations of Przeworski's Democracy and the Market" paper presented in the *Democratization: Theory and Experience* division at the Southern Political Science Association Conference: New Orleans, LA: 7-10 January 2004.

Loveless, P. Matthew. "Networks and Social Capital and Eastern Europe" paper presented in the *Comparative Politics – Transitions toward Democracy* division at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference: Chicago IL:25-28 April 2002.

Loveless, P. Matthew. "Satisfaction with Democracy: Disparity among Constituencies" paper presented in the *Comparative Politics of Industrial Nations* division at the Southern Political Science Association Conference: Atlanta, GA: 7-10 Nov. 2001.

Service:

Chair for *Theory and Methodology* Panel at the annual Political Science Graduate Conference at Indiana University (Bloomington): April 2001, 2002, 2004, & March 2003

Member *American Political Science Association*
Member *Mid-West Political Science Association*

Achievements and Awards:

Awarded the **John Gillespie Scholarship** for superior analytical abilities and research skills in positive political theory, mathematical modeling and/or the use of quantitative methods to study politics. Spring 2003: Department of Political Science, IUB.

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Visiting Research Fellow, Summer 2003, University of Debrecen, Hungary. Graduate Student Research Exchange Fellowship: Office of International Programs, IU (Bloomington, IN).

Awarded the **Summer Pre-Dissertation Travel Grant** (Summer 2002): Office of International Programs, Indiana University – Bloomington, IN (USA).

Intermediate **Language Certification** in Hungarian, Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University - Bloomington, August 2000.

Foreign Language Area Studies (FLAS) Fellowship. Summer 2001. *Kazakh* Language.

Awarded **Most Outstanding Teacher** at Houston High School (from a faculty of 105) by the Shelby County Education Association in the school year (1998-1999).

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